15 research outputs found

    Four essays on UK takeovers : evidence from matching analysis

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    In four empirical chapters, matching analysis is employed to estimate the effects of specific contractual and regulatory arrangements on particular deal outcomes in the UK takeover market. The first chapter highlights the positive effect of earnout financing on the acquiring firms' returns in private target acquisitions. Furthermore, this chapter offers a detailed example of how the non-parametric Propensity Score Matching, despite its growing popularity in financial research, can lead to inaccurate inferences when relevant private-target-specific factors are omitted from the analysis. The second chapter provides the first empirical examination of the effect of the earnout's terms on the premium offered to the target firm's shareholders, and how information asymmetry concerns influence this premium. Additionally, the findings indicate that increases in the premia are negatively interpreted by the market in non-earnout financed deals. However, this negative effect is neutralised in comparable earnout financed deals. The third chapter provides the first empirical contribution that highlights the deal- and firm-related factors that contribute to the growing reliance on the Scheme of Arrangement, as a substitute for the Contractual Offer, in conducting UK public target deals. Despite the concerns raised in the legal literature about the limited bargaining power of the target shareholders under the Scheme, the robust conclusions indicate that such shareholders manage to receive premia that are at least as high as the premia received by shareholders in comparable Offer deals. The fourth chapter employs a hand-collected dataset that covers the incidences of termination fee use in the UK takeover market. The main result is that, in the period preceding the ban that The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers had imposed on termination fees, the inclusion of these fees had a beneficial, or at worst neutral, effect on target shareholders' wealth. Consequently, it is recommended that the Panel ends its ban

    The earnout structure matters : takeover premia and acquirer gains in earnout financed M&As

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    In this article, based on both parametric and non-parametric methods, we provide a robust solution to the long-standing issue on how earnouts in corporate takeovers are structured and how their structure influences the takeover premia and the abnormal returns earned by acquirers. First, we quantify the effect of the terms of earnout contract (relative size and length) on the takeover premia. Second, we demonstrate how adverse selection considerations lead the merging firms to set the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Lastly, we show that while acquirers in non-earnout financed deals experience negative abnormal returns from an increase in the takeover premia, this effect is neutralised in earnout financed deals

    Distraction by the Release of Economic Indicators and the Wealth Effects of Takeovers

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    We show that acquirers exploit the market’s distraction by newly released economic indicators to announce value-destroying acquisitions. This strategy is effective in private target acquisitions due to the difficulty of valuing private companies. Acquirers in value-destroying private target acquisitions are more likely than public target acquirers to time their announcements during days when key economic indicators are released. After correcting for selection bias, private target acquirers during the time of the release of key economic indicators experience negative abnormal returns. Because market distraction reduces the initial negative reaction, the magnitude of these losses becomes more noticeable during the post-acquisition period
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