Do Shareholders' Preferences Affect their Funds' Management? Evidence from the Cross Section of Shareholders and Funds

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies, and we find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors. We find additional evidence in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds' portfolio weights. Nous étudions comment les gestionnaires de fonds réagissent aux préférences contradictoires de leurs investisseurs. Notre étude se concentre principalement sur les conflits entre les comptes taxés et les comptes de retraite des fonds internationaux qui font l'objet de compromis différents entre les gains en dividendes et les gains de capital. En théorie, les gestionnaires peuvent résoudre ces conflits par des opérations d'arbitrage sur les dividendes, mais une base de données privée d'opérations d'arbitrage fait apparaître qu'en pratique ils ne peuvent pas. Les gestionnaires doivent alors résoudre ces conflits à travers leurs politiques d'investissement, et nous trouvons des résultats significatifs montrant que ceux dont le capital est issu majoritairement des retraites favorisent les investisseurs de fonds de pension. Nous trouvons également des différences entre les poids des portefeuilles de fonds américains et canadiens.Dividend arbitrage, tax efficiency, agency issues, mutual funds, arbitrage sur les dividendes, taxes sur les rendements, placements pour compte, fonds commun de placement

How and Why do Investors Trade Votes, and What Does it Mean?

The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders vote in the ratios that they themselves choose. We document an active market for votes within the equity-loan market, where we find that the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates these vote reallocations, and we find support for this view in the cross section of votes: there is more trade for higher-spread firms and more for poor performers, especially when the vote is close. We also find that the vote reallocations correspond to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals. L'analyse classique de la gouvernance d'entreprise suppose que les actionnaires votent selon les modalités choisies par la firme, par exemple un vote par action. Mais si les coûts associés à la séparation et à l'échange des votes sont suffisamment faibles, alors les actionnaires votent selon les modalités qu'ils ont eux-mêmes choisies. Nous présentons le cas d'un marché actif de votes au sein du marché des mises de fonds sous forme d'emprunts (equity loans), où nous constatons qu'en moyenne les votes se vendent pour rien. Nous supposons que l'asymétrie d'information provoque cette réallocation des votes, et nous étayons cette hypothèse à travers l'étude transversale des votes : le nombre d'opérations est plus important pour les compagnies dont l'écart acheteur-vendeur est plus élevé ainsi que pour celles dont les résultats sont plus faibles, particulièrement lorsque le vote est clos. Cette étude montre aussi que la réallocation des votes permet de soutenir les propositions des actionnaires et de s'opposer à celles des gestionnaires.vote trading, corporate governance, equity lending, information asymmetry, transaction de votes, gouvernance d'entreprise, prêt d'actions, asymétrie d'information

Stocks are Special Too: An Analysis of the Equity Lending Market

With a year of equity loans by a major lender, we measure the effect of actual short-selling costs and constraints on trading strategies that involve short-selling. We find the loans of initial public offering (IPOs), DotCom, large-cap, growth and low-momentum stocks to be cheap relative to the strategies’ documented profits and that investors who can short only stocks that are cheap and easy to borrow can enjoy at least some of the profits of unconstrained investors. Most IPOs are loaned on their first settlement days and throughout their first months, and the underperformance around lockup expiration is significant even for the IPOs that are cheap and easy to borrow. The effect of short-selling frictions appears strongest in merger arbitrage. Acquirers’ stock is expensive to borrow, especially when the acquirer is small, though the major influence on trading profits is not through expense but availability

Leaning for the Tape: Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds

We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter-end portfolio prices with last-minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large-cap funds to well over 2 percent for small-cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross section of incentives from the flow/performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter\u27s last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate, controlling for the stocks\u27 size and performance

Failure Is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices

Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. A part of the value of failing passes through to options prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and options prices is significantly weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit despite competition between market makers appears to result from the cost advantage of larger market makers

Crossborder Dividend Taxation and the Preferences of Taxable and Nontaxable Investors: Evidence From Canada

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies. We find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors and further evidence for this view in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds’ portfolio weights

Design and Validation of a Device to Aid in Extension Ladder Setup

The problem of ladder base slippage is a leading cause of workplace injuries and causes a number of annual deaths.  Research has shown that ladder users tend to set up extension ladders at an angle between 66° and 69° above horizontal, which is much shallower than the specified standard of 75.5°. This results in an increase in the friction required at the base of the ladder to support the weight of the ladder and its user, and leads to an increased likelood of a slideout accident.  To counteract the problem of ladder base slipping, a device was developed to aid the user in achieving a proper setup angle.  The device uses a mechanical switch to wired to LEDs that provide the user feedback on setup angle.  The device was tested in a laboratory environment, and was shown to positively impact the ability of the user to erect the ladder at a proper angle

Observation of associated near-side and away-side long-range correlations in √sNN=5.02 TeV proton-lead collisions with the ATLAS detector

Two-particle correlations in relative azimuthal angle (Δϕ) and pseudorapidity (Δη) are measured in √sNN=5.02  TeV p+Pb collisions using the ATLAS detector at the LHC. The measurements are performed using approximately 1  μb-1 of data as a function of transverse momentum (pT) and the transverse energy (ΣETPb) summed over 3.1<η<4.9 in the direction of the Pb beam. The correlation function, constructed from charged particles, exhibits a long-range (2<|Δη|<5) “near-side” (Δϕ∼0) correlation that grows rapidly with increasing ΣETPb. A long-range “away-side” (Δϕ∼π) correlation, obtained by subtracting the expected contributions from recoiling dijets and other sources estimated using events with small ΣETPb, is found to match the near-side correlation in magnitude, shape (in Δη and Δϕ) and ΣETPb dependence. The resultant Δϕ correlation is approximately symmetric about π/2, and is consistent with a dominant cos⁡2Δϕ modulation for all ΣETPb ranges and particle pT

Search for direct production of charginos and neutralinos in events with three leptons and missing transverse momentum in √s = 7 TeV pp collisions with the ATLAS detector

A search for the direct production of charginos and neutralinos in final states with three electrons or muons and missing transverse momentum is presented. The analysis is based on 4.7 fb−1 of proton–proton collision data delivered by the Large Hadron Collider and recorded with the ATLAS detector. Observations are consistent with Standard Model expectations in three signal regions that are either depleted or enriched in Z-boson decays. Upper limits at 95% confidence level are set in R-parity conserving phenomenological minimal supersymmetric models and in simplified models, significantly extending previous results

Measurement of χ c1 and χ c2 production with s√ = 7 TeV pp collisions at ATLAS

The prompt and non-prompt production cross-sections for the χ c1 and χ c2 charmonium states are measured in pp collisions at s√ = 7 TeV with the ATLAS detector at the LHC using 4.5 fb−1 of integrated luminosity. The χ c states are reconstructed through the radiative decay χ c → J/ψγ (with J/ψ → μ + μ −) where photons are reconstructed from γ → e + e − conversions. The production rate of the χ c2 state relative to the χ c1 state is measured for prompt and non-prompt χ c as a function of J/ψ transverse momentum. The prompt χ c cross-sections are combined with existing measurements of prompt J/ψ production to derive the fraction of prompt J/ψ produced in feed-down from χ c decays. The fractions of χ c1 and χ c2 produced in b-hadron decays are also measured