Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding

In recent work, Mark Alfano (2012; 2014) and Jennifer Saul (2013) have put forward a similar kind of provocative sceptical challenge. Both appeal to recent literature in empirical psychology to show that our judgments across a wide range of cases are riddled with unreliable cognitive heuristics and biases. Likewise, they both conclude that we know a lot less than we have hitherto supposed, at least on standard conceptions of what knowledge involves. It is argued that even if one grants the empirical claims that Saul and Alfano make, the sceptical conclusion that they canvass might not be as dramatic as it first appears. It is further argued, however, that one can reinstate a more dramatic sceptical conclusion by targeting their argument not at knowledge but rather at the distinct (and distinctively valuable) epistemic standing of understanding

THE RISK OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMATE PARTNER CHOICE WITHIN A RISK SOCIETY

This dissertation examines the influence of competing risks in shaping individuals\u27 choices about potential intimate relationships. According to Ulrich Beck\u27s risk society theory, the individualization of social risks has direct and measurable consequences for the ways people organize and evaluate potential intimate relationships (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 2002, 2004; Giddens, 1994; Lupton, 2006). This study investigates the ways in which subjective or identity-related risks hypothesized by scholars of late modernity shape the perception and the actual risk of dating violence. Empirical research on dating violence identifies many objective “risk factors” related to a person’s chances of experiencing intimate partner violence; however studies investigating perceptions of dating risk from the subject’s perspective sometimes reveal more personal concerns and priorities. To date, no intimate partner violence research explicitly utilizes a conceptualization of risk informed by risk society theories. The present study explores the potential for utilizing risk society concepts in explaining the relationships between perceptions of instrumental risks and identity-related risks, and how these risk perceptions may impact involvement in dating violence

The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement

A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or are otherwise ‘trivial’. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science

The epistemology of cognitive enhancement

A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held by both proponents and critics of nontraditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This article does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that “enhanced” cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit or are otherwise “trivial”. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science

Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity

Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non- objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others

Should Issuers be on the Hook for Laddering? An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulation Litigation

On December 6, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story exposing abuses in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs). The story revealed tie-in agreements between investment banks and initial investors seeking to participate in hot offerings. Under those agreements, initial investors would commit to buy additional shares of the offering company\u27s stock in secondary market trading in return for allocations of shares in the IPO. As the Wall Street Journal related, those [c]ommitments to buy in the after-market lock in demand for additional stock at levels above the IPO price. As such, they provide the rocket fuel that sometimes boosts IPO prices into orbit on the first trading day. This process of encouraging purchases in the aftermarket at ever-higher prices has come to be known as laddering. This Article presents a study of the role and extent of culpability of issuers of stock in such laddering schemes

SEC Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay of Should I Go?

We examine the career paths of attorneys in the Enforcement Division at the SEC. Using a variety of performance metrics, we find evidence that long term lawyers and lawyers in regional offices do not perform as well as other SEC attorneys. We also report that men and women may differ in their career paths in this field. We find that early-stage female attorneys perform just as well as male attorneys. Notwithstanding their comparable performance, these early-stage women are less likely to get a raise or promotion. We find that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, at least at earlier points in their careers. We also find evidence that attorneys who perform well at the SEC are more likely to leave the agency, and that their destination is more likely to be a partnership at a law firm, contradicting the “revolving door” hypothesis

Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Consitutional Amendment Process

In this Article, the authors develop an economic theory of the constitutional amendment process under Article V focusing particularly on the roles that Congress and interest groups play in that process. The authors construct a model to predict when an interest group will seek an amendment rather than a statute to further its interests, highlighting how interest group maintenance costs and anticipated opposition affect that choice They then discuss the efficiency goals of constitutionalism-precommitment and reduction of agency costs--and argue that the structure of the amendment process under Article V prevents realization of these goals The authors contrast the Bill of Rights amendments, which established precommitments and reduced the agency costs of government, with the latter seventeen amendments, which expanded the federal government and increased agency cost They attribute the change in the nature of the amendments to the interest-group domination of the political process and Congress\u27 control over the constitutional amendment agenda The authors conclude that the Founders\u27 intent to put the Constitution beyond the reach of factions backfired: although factions cannot control the content of the Constitution, neither can the majority. In fact, Article V prevents the majority from precommiting itself and hinders its ability to control the agency costs of government, as evidenced by the history of the failed amendments Although the authors conclude that Article V thwarts the efficiency goals of constitutionalism, they predict that little can be done to remedy this flaw