Supplying Compliance: Why and When the United States Complies with WTO Rulings

In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the “demand side” – that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the “supply side” – who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is the first study to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the United States government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This Article presents empirical evidence that who within the government must supply compliance is the most important factor in explaining both whether and when the United States government complies with WTO rulings, even after controlling for important characteristics of the state filing the request and the political importance of the affected industry. These results demonstrate that understanding the domestic supply of compliance is a critical, if neglected, aspect of international law theory. The results also highlight how the dominant “unitary actor” model (adopted by international law scholars to explain compliance) obscures important causal pathways in the compliance process. This Article opens up a new and rich field of study into what makes international law effective or ineffective

The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study

Scholars have long speculated that commitments to human rights agreements are unlikely to have an effect on domestic policy because they do not contain a threat of external enforcement. Recent research has challenged that belief by suggesting that ratification of human rights agreements leads democracies to change their policies because international commitments change public support for reform. Although considerable progress has been made, the empirical research in support of that theory has not directly tested the primary causal mechanisms speculated to produce policy changes. Experimental methods present a promising way to do exactly that. To leverage that fact, I have embedded an experiment within a survey in the first effort to explore whether information on the status of international law changes public opinion on a purely domestic human rights issue: the practice of subjecting prisoners to solitary confinement. The results show that, although generic appeals to human rights do not influence public opinion, references to prior treaty commitments do. In other words, the results demonstrate the plausibility of theories of compliance with human rights agreements that are based on the idea that international obligations alter the political climate within democracies

Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional Rights

Constitutional scholars have generally put faith in courts’ ability to improve the protection of constitutional rights. While courts have limited means to enforce their own decisions, the literature suggests that their decisions are implemented either when courts enjoy strong legitimacy or when they bring functional benefits to other branches. In this Essay, we call this conventional wisdom into question. We present data suggesting that the existence of independent courts does not increase the probability that governments will respect constitutional rights. We outline four reasons why this might be so. First, courts that too frequently obstruct the political branches face court-curbing measures. Second, courts avoid high-profile clashes with the political branches by employing various avoidance canons or deferral techniques. Third, courts protect themselves by issuing decisions that are mostly in line with majoritarian preferences. Finally, courts are ill equipped to deal with certain types of rights violations like torture and social rights. All these accounts offer a potential explanation for why courts’ ability to enforce constitutional rights is more limited than is commonly believed

Trade Openness and Antitrust Law

Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears in the early 1990s as a large number of new countries adopt antitrust laws. However, we find a positive correlation between trade openness and antitrust enforcement resources and activities for both early and late adopters of antitrust regimes during this period