Macroeconomic Effects of Social Security Privatization in a Small Unionized Economy

This paper analyses the effects of a pension system privatization in a unionized economy. Using an overlapping-generations framework we show that in an environment characterized by unemployment, a reform towards a private pension system in the steady state may result in lower levels of employment and capital stock. In this case even if the privatization increases the welfare of all future generations, the reduction in the welfare of the elderly due to reduced pension benefits may be greater and a Pareto improving transition to a private system may not be feasible. On the other hand if the reform leads to higher employment then a Pareto-improving pension privatization scheme can be constructed.public pensions, social security privatization, labour union, unemployment

Capital Importers Pay More for their Imports

We examine the effects that a country’s net capital flows have on the (border) prices that a country pays for its imports of goods. Using data from 2000 to 2009 for 11 euro area countries we utilize a pricing-to-market specification to study exporters’ pricing behavior to the rest of the countries in the sample, at the industry level, for 900 goods disseminated at the 4- digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC- revision 3) level. This allows us to construct a panel dataset which contains observations across exporters, importers, industries and time, ending up with a total of 594,327 observations. We find a strong influence of the importing country’s net capital inflows on the border prices of its imports of goods. This result is robust across different specifications of the underlying model, as well to different sample dis-aggregations across types of capital flows, product categories, and exporters.capital flows, import prices, pricing to market, globalization, euro area

Turkish Delight for Some, Cold Turkey for Others?: The Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union

Following Turkey’s application for EU membership in 1987, a Customs Union (CU) between Turkey and the EU, mainly covering trade in manufacturing goods and processed agricultural products, came into effect in 1995. In addition to a large agricultural sector, Turkey also specializes in the production and exportation of relatively low-price, low-quality varieties of manufactured products. We use a theoretical framework in order to demonstrate that these features of the Turkish economy imply asymmetric changes in the trade volumes of the incumbent countries of the EU as a result of the EU-Turkey CU. By examining disaggregated trade data we find that the technologically sophisticated EU countries (e.g., mainly the Northern European countries) are also least similar to Turkey in terms of their export structure, whereas the degree of export similarity between the less technologically sophisticated EU members and Turkey is high. Our econometric results indicate that, in contrast to the “Northern” group’s exports to other EU15 countries (which have remained intact), the Southern countries’s exports to the other EU15 countries have declined as a result of the EU-Turkey CU. Moreover, the extra penetration of the Turkish market by EU countries has not been more favourable to the Southern group. These findings also imply that technologically sophisticated countries may see no significant further benefits from Turkey’s full accession to the EU (whereas the migration and political influence related costs for these countries may be large).European Union, Turkey, customs union, exports, gravity, differentiated products

Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from OECD Countries

This paper attempts to identify the effect of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). We employ data envelopment analysis on a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 to construct two alternative PSE indicators that reflect the governmental goals of economic performance and stability. In turn, using a novel technique that merges the methodologies of Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007), we regress the PSE scores obtained on an extensive set of alternative fiscal decentralization measures. Backed by strong empirical results, obtained from a number of different specifications, we contend that PSE is increasing with fiscal decentralization.public sector efficiency, fiscal decentralization, semi-parametric models

Are democratic governments more efficient?

This paper explores the relationship between public sector efficiency (PSE) and the level of democracy, both theoretically and empirically. At the theoretical level a simple model of elections with two time periods is presented, which takes into account whether the political regime is democratic or not. Specifically, we assume that elected officials in democracies are “more” accountable to voters than the respective ones in autocracies. This mechanism induces the democratic politicians to produce the public good in a more efficient way, in order to remain in power. In the empirical section we examine the effect of democracy on PSE for a panel dataset of 50 developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2000. Our results suggest that the relationship between PSE and democracy is positive and statistically significant, thus confirming our theoretical priors.H11; D7

Public sector efficiency: Leveling the playing field between OECD countries

In this paper we seek a robust methodology to measure the relative public spending efficiency of 19 OECD countries over the period 1980-2000. Based on the functional classification of government expenditure, we decompose total public spending into its separate accounts and we employ a semi-parametric method to obtain relative efficiency scores (for the separate accounts as well as for aggregate public spending). The econometric method isolates the impact of government inefficiency from the inefficiency arising from the socioeconomic environment or luck, thus leveling the playing field between the examined countries. The results suggest that the quality of governance is more important than the socioeconomic environment or luck. Finally, we propose a technique to measure the allocative efficiency of public spending, in an effort to proxy the optimal allocation of public funds when the governments set specific targets.Public spending; Technical and allocative efficiency; Stochastic DEA

One strike and you’re out! Dictators’ fate in the aftermath of terrorism

We use a cross-country dataset on terrorism and leadership survival from 1970 through 2015 to shed light on a leader’s fate after terrorists’ strike. We provide robust evidence that incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes face an increased hazard of exit from political power. This is contrasted with the closed authoritarian dictators that remain intact. Moreover, we fail to find a robust effect of terrorism on a leader’s survival probability in democracies. We conceive this effect to be due to the collapse of the elite coalition in autocracies after an attack, suggesting that the Dictator’s “loyal friends” betray him in the aftermath of terrorism

Be my guest: the effect of foreign policy visits to the USA on FDI

We examine whether a country leader’s diplomatic visit to the USA affects the Foreign Direct Investment inflow. The literature so far has found inconclusive results regarding diplomatic relations' effect on international flows. We use a dynamic Inverse Probability Weighting Regression Adjustment framework to examine this relationship and estimate the causal effect of foreign visits. Our results indicate that a visit to the US increases the country’s total FDI inflows by up to one percentage point per annum, with a cumulative effect reaching 2.5 percentage points six years after the visit. However, this is a short-run effect as it disappears in the subsequent years. Furthermore, our first-stage results shed light on the profile of the leaders that visit the US. Our findings are consistent with the view that foreign visits act as signals to investors regarding the country’s political risk

Do Democracies Have Higher Current Account Deficits?

In this paper we argue that democracies tend to run (larger)current account deficits than autocracies. Our argument is based on the different incentives faced by democratic and autocratic leaders. The main theoretical hypothesis are tested on a dataset that consists of 121 countries over the period 1980-2012, using five year averages and a fixed effects panel data model. The empirical findings suggest that autocracies run lower current account deficits than democracies. Special focus is given in the issue of endogeneity by estimating an IV Fixed Effects model, using as instruments of Democracy the share of Christian adherents in each country and also the level of democracy in neighboring countries. These results are found to be robust across alternative empirical specifications

Sovereign Defaults and Political Regime Transitions

The view put forth in the present paper is that economic fluctuations emerge to change the political landscape. In this context it is hypothesized that state defaults are associated with autocratic polity changes. To support this view we use a dataset of all state defaults from 1800 to 2004 and examine the empirical validity of the hypothesis that a state default leads to a decline in the level of democracy. Then we examine 3 case studies of state defaults that are consistent with our hypothesis: Spain in 1852, Greece in 1932 and Ecuador in 2000. The econometric results and the historical analysis of the three case studies are consistent with our main hypothesis