Parton distributions in the photon from γ∗γ\gamma^* \gamma and γ∗p\gamma^* p scattering

Leading order parton distributions in the photon are extracted from the existing $F_2^\gamma$ measurements and the low-$x$ proton structure function. The latter is related to the photon structure function by assuming Gribov factorization to hold at low $x$. The resulting parton distributions in the photon are found to be consistent with the Frankfurt-Gurvich sum rule for the photon.Comment: 8 pages, including 4 figure

High-frequency QPOs as a problem in physics: non-linear resonance

The presence of a kHz frequency in LMXBs has been expected from scaling laws, by analogy with the QPO phenomenon in HMXB X-ray pulsars. Interpretation of the two kHz frequencies, observed in accreting neutron stars, in terms of non-linear resonance in strong-field gravity led to the prediction of twin QPOs in black hole systems, in a definite frequency ratio (such as 2/3). The imprint of a subharmonic of the 401 Hz rotation rate in the frequencies of the QPOs detected in the accreting millisecond pulsar is at once a signature of non-linear resonance and of coupling between accretion disk modes and the neutron star spin.Comment: presented at X-ray Timing 2003: Rossi and Beyond, Boston, November 200

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making

We present empirical evidence suggesting that political context—judicial hierarchy and judicial panel dynamics—influences an authoring judge’s use of legislative history. Specifically, we find that to the extent that political ideology matters, a district court judge’s choice of legislative history is influenced, albeit mostly, by (1) the political makeup of the overseeing circuit court and (2) the political characteristics of a judge’s panel colleagues, as well as by the circuit court as a whole. These factors matter more than the authoring judge’s own political-ideological connection to the legislators. Put differently, an authoring judge will have a greater tendency to cite legislative history by legislators who share political affiliation with the colleagues and superiors of the authoring judge than legislators sharing the same political party affiliation as the authoring judge himself. These findings are consistent generally with positive political and contextual theories of judicial persuasion, collegiality, and strategic decision making

Centrifugal Force and Ellipticity behaviour of a slowly rotating ultra compact object

Using the optical reference geometry approach, we have derived in the following, a general expression for the ellipticity of a slowly rotating fluid configuration using Newtonian force balance equation in the conformally projected absolute 3-space, in the realm of general relativity. Further with the help of Hartle-Thorne (H-T) metric for a slowly rotating compact object, we have evaluated the centrifugal force acting on a fluid element and also evaluated the ellipticity and found that the centrifugal reversal occurs at around $R/R_s \approx 1.45$, and the ellipticity maximum at around $R/R_s \approx 2.75$. The result has been compared with that of Chandrasekhar and Miller which was obtained in the full 4-spacetime formalism

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Ending the Patent Monopoly

For nearly two centuries, an inventor applying for a U.S. patent has been required to obtain the opinion of an expert who has searched the prior art and determined that the inventor’s application meets the standards of patentability. And for nearly two centuries, those expert opinions could be obtained only from a single office run by the U.S. government. The patenting monopoly, which is almost certainly undesirable, is now being eroded. Rising global trade and technological sophistication have increased the number of patent filings in every country; government patent offices here and abroad are thus being driven to rely on patenting opinions from other public and private entities. For demonopolization to be effective, however, entities determining patentability must have high-powered incentives to make accurate judgments. Two disciplining mechanisms may be particularly useful: (1) randomly selecting private patenting opinions for an intensive governmental evaluation, with fines imposed on any examining firm if its opinion is found to have led to the issuance of an invalid patent, and (2) authorizing legal challenges to patents by private attorneys general. This article offers preliminary assessments of the optimal design of these and other disciplining mechanisms