The welfare effects of a large depreciation : the case of Egypt, 2000-05

The Egyptian pound depreciated sharply between 2000 and 2005, declining by 26 percent in nominal trade-weighted terms. The author investigates the effect of the large depreciation on household welfare operating through exchange rate-induced changes in consumer prices. He estimates exchange rate pass-through regressions using disaggregated monthly consumer price indices to isolate the impact of the exchange rate changes on consumer prices. Then he uses household-level data from the 2000 and 2005 Egyptian household surveys to quantify the welfare effects of these consumer price changes at the household level. The average welfare loss due to exchange rate-induced price increases was equivalent to 7.4 percent of initial expenditure. Stronger estimated exchange rate pass-through for food items imply that this effect disproportionately affected poorer households.Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Poverty Lines,Commodities

Can disaggregated indicators identify governance reform priorities ?

Many highly-disaggregated cross-country indicators of institutional quality and the business environment have been developed in recent years. The promise of these indicators is that they can be used to identify specific reform priorities that policymakers and aid donors can target in their efforts to improve institutional and regulatory quality outcomes. Doing so however requires evidence on the partial effects of these many very detailed variables on outcomes of interest, for example, investor perceptions of corruption or the quality of the regulatory environment. In this paper we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to systematically document the partial correlations between disaggregated indicators and several closely-related outcome variables of interest using two leading datasets: the Global Integrity Index and the Doing Business indicators. We find major instability across outcomes and across levels of disaggregation in the set of indicators identified by BMA as important determinants of outcomes. Disaggregated indicators that are important determinants of one outcome are on average not important determinants of other very similar outcomes. And for a given outcome variable, indicators that are important at one level of disaggregation are on average not important at other levels of disaggregation. These findings illustrate the difficulties in using highly-disaggregated indicators to identify reform priorities.Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Governance Indicators,Econometrics

Neither a borrower nor a lender : does China's zero net foreign asset position make economic sense?

China in the past few years has emerged as a net foreign creditor on the international scene with net foreign assets slightly greater than zero percent of wealth. This is surprising given that China is a relatively poor country with a capital-labor ratio about one-fifth the world average and one-tenth the U.S. level. The main questions that the authors address are whether it makes economic sense for China to be a net creditor and how they see China's net foreign asset position evolving over the next 20 years. They calibrate a theoretical model of international capital flows featuring diminishing returns, production risk, and sovereign risk. The calibrations for China yield a predicted net foreign asset position of -17 percent of China's wealth. The authors also estimate nonstructural cross-country regressions of determinants of net foreign assets in which China is always a significant outlier with 5 to 7 percentage points more of net foreign assets relative to wealth than is predicted by its characteristics. China's extensive capital controls can explain why its current net foreign asset position is far away from what is predicted by open-economy models and cross-country empirics. It seems reasonable to assume that China's international financial integration will increase over time. The authors calibrate and predict different scenarios out to 2025. These scenarios are necessarily speculative, but it is interesting that they typically imply negative net foreign asset positions between 3 and 9 percent of wealth. What may be counter-intuitive for many policymakers is that successful institutional reform and productivity growth are likely to lead to more negative net foreign asset positions than occurs with stagnation. Starting from China's zero net foreign assets position, it would take current account deficits in the range of 2-5 percent of GDP to reach any of these net foreign assets positions. These are not unreasonable deficits, but they require a large adjustment from the present 6 percent of GDP current account surplus.Economic Theory&Research,Investment and Investment Climate,Capital Flows,Economic Growth,Banking Law

Spatial correlations in panel data

In many empirical applications involving combined time-series and cross-sectional data, the residuals from different cross-sectional units are likely to be correlated with one another. This is the case in applications in macroeconomics and international economics where the cross-sectional units may be countries, states, or regions observed over time. Spatial correlations among such cross-sections may arise for a number of reasons, ranging from observed common shocks such as terms of trade oil shocks, to unobserved contagion or neighborhood effects which propagate across countries in complex ways. The authors observe that presence of such spatial correlations in residuals complicates standard inference procedures that combine time-series and cross-sectional data since these techniques typically require the assumption that the cross-sectional units are independent. When this assumption is violated, estimates of standard errors are inconsistent, and hence are not useful for inference. And standard correction for spatial correlations will be valid only if spatial correlations are of particular restrictive forms. The authors propose a correlation for spatial correlations that does not require strong assumptions concerning their form and how show it is superior to a number of commonly used alternatives.Sanitation and Sewerage,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Information Technology,Environmental Economics&Policies,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education,Econometrics,Information Technology

Institutions, trade, and growth : revisiting the evidence

Several recent papers have attempted to identify the partial effects of trade integration and institutional quality on long-run growth using the geographical determinants of trade and the historical determinants of institutions as instruments. The authors show that many of the specifications in these papers are weaklyidentified despite the apparently good performance of the instruments in first-stage regressions. Consequently, they argue that the cross-country variation in institutions, trade, and their geographical and historical determinants is not very informative about the partial effects of these variables on long-run growth.Environmental Economics&Policies,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Economic Theory&Research,Economic Theory&Research,Governance Indicators,Environmental Economics&Policies,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences

Governance Indicators, Aid Allocation, and the Millennium Challenge Account

Aid works best when it is directed to countries with relatively good institutions and policies. But how should good governance be measured, and how can aid allocation rules be designed in light of the strengths and weaknesses of existing measures? We address in brief a number of methodological and applied challenges, motivated by the U.S. government's recent proposal to allocate resources from the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the issues and recommendations apply more broadly. Among others, we discuss the implications of margins of error in governance data, the difficulties in measuring trends, and the need to complement existing cross-country indicators with in-depth country diagnostics.Millennium Challenge Account, MCA, Aid Effectiveness, Aid Allocation, Governance Indicators, Governance Data

The dot-com bubble, the Bush deficits and the US current account

Over the past decade the US has experienced widening current account deficits and a steady deterioration of its net foreign asset position. During the second half of the 1990s, this deterioration was fueled by foreign investment in a booming US stock market. During the first half of the 2000s, this deterioration has been fuelled by foreign purchases of rapidly increasing US government debt. A somewhat surprising aspect of the current debate is that stock market movements and fiscal policy choices have been largely treated as unrelated events. Stock market movements are usually interpreted as reflecting exogenous changes in perceived or real productivity, while budget deficits are usually understood as a mainly political decision. We challenge this view here and develop two alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble (the “dot-com” bubble) has been driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble and fiscal policy (the “Bush” deficits). The “benevolent” view holds that a change in investor sentiment led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy response to this event. The “cynical” view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. We discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the US economy and, in particular, its net foreign asset position.Current account, net foreign assets, stock market bubbles, budget deficits

Growth forecasts using time series and growth models

The authors consider two alternative methods of forecasting real per capita GDP at various horizons: 1) univariate time series models estimated country by country; and 2) cross-country growth regressions. They evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance of both approaches for a large sample of industrial and developing countries. They find only modest differences between the two approaches. In almost all cases, differences in median (across countries) forecast performance are small relative to the large discrepancies between forecasts and actual outcomes. Interestingly, the performance of both models is similar to that of forecasts generated by the World Bank's Unified Survey. The results do not provide a compelling case for one approach over another, but they do indicate that there are potential gains from combining time series and growth-regression-based forecasting approaches.Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Economic Theory&Research,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Educational Technology and Distance Education,Public Health Promotion,Economic Forecasting,Economic Theory&Research,Achieving Shared Growth,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education

Governance indicators : where are we, where should we be going ?

Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients acknowledge the importance of good governance for development. This understanding has spurred an intense interest in more refined, nuanced, and policy-relevant indicators of governance. In this paper we review progress to date in the area of measuring governance, using a simple framework of analysis focusing on two key questions: (i) what do we measure? and, (ii) whose views do we rely on? For the former question, we distinguish between indicators measuring formal laws or rules'on the books', and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules'on the ground', calling attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. For the latter question, we distinguish between experts and survey respondents on whose views governance assessments are based, again highlighting their advantages, disadvantages, and complementarities. We also review the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. We conclude with some simple principles to guide the refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. We emphasize the need to: transparently disclose and account for the margins of error in all indicators; draw from a diversity of indicators and exploit complementarities among them; submit all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny; and, in light of the lessons of over a decade of existing indicators, to be realistic in the expectations of future indicators.Governance Indicators,National Governance,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance,Banks&Banking Reform