The Violence of Hacking: State Violence and Cyberspace

The violence of bits and bytes is real. How can we conceive of violence in a digital world? Do traditional definitions provide a reasonable means to understand the impact of violence emanating from cyberspace? This work examines the concept of violence at the state level and builds and argument that violence is not confined to pre-digital static definitions. Like physical violence, cyber violence conducted by states is instrumental and constitutive of both physical and non-physical acts. These acts in combination facilitate state goals, specifically the potential to win wars or achieve related policy objectives. Cyber war is not your father’s war, but it has many of the same effects. What are the first, second and third order effects achievable in cyberspace? Are these effects conceptual or have they been demonstrated? What does and can state violence in cyberspace look like and why is it important

Aesop’s Wolves: The Deceptive Appearance of Espionage and Attacks in Cyberspace

Appearances in cyberspace are deceptive and problematic. Deception in the cyber domain poses an immensely difficult challenge for states to differentiate between espionage activities in cyberspace and cyber attacks. The inability to distinguish between cyber activities places US cyber infrastructure in a perilous position and increases the possibility of a disproportionate or inadequate response to cyber incidents. This paper uses case analysis to examine the characteristics associated with the tools and decisions related to cyber espionage and cyber attacks to develop a framework for distinction leveraging epidemiological models for combating disease

The Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence Cyber Decision-Making

The debate over cyber technology has resulted in new considerations for national security operations. States find themselves in an increasingly interconnected world with a diverse threat spectrum and little understanding of how decisions are made within this amorphous domain. With The Decision to Attack, Aaron Franklin Brantly investigates how states decide to employ cyber in military and intelligence operations against other states and how rational those decisions are. In his examination, Brantly contextualizes broader cyber decision-making processes into a systematic expected utility–rational choice approach to provide a mathematical understanding of the use of cyber weapons at the state level.https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/aci_books/1003/thumbnail.jp

The Cyber Losers

National security cyber activities harm human rights and democracy activists. With increasing state cyber capabilities comes heightened pressure on civil society and democracy activists. We often think of the cyber arms race from the perspective of states and corporations; however, the real losers are activists who seek to promote democracy, development, and human rights. This article examines how advances in national security activities have created a new spectrum of issues for activists not previously encountered, and posits a theory of externalities emanating from the cyber arms race

Innovation and Adaptation in Jihadist Digital Security

The importance of the internet to contemporary jihadists as a tool for recruitment, propaganda and operational planning is well established. Less thoroughly studied are the ways in which jihadists work to keep this activity secure from monitoring and disruption, and in particular the ways in which they innovate and adapt to changes in the technological environment. Online forums, training manuals, tweets, blogs, Facebook posts and other forms of communication point towards a jihadist community that is alert to changes in both the technology and the laws and policies of its adversaries. Supporters of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, and resurgent elements of al-Qaeda make use of increasingly decentralized online networks to learn and spread technical knowledge. These communities operate outside of the groups’ zones of physical control, exploit emerging technologies and develop novel technical solutions when their communications and organizational infrastructure is challenged. This cycle of innovation and adaptation, informed by community learning and external information sources, is a challenge to intelligence and law-enforcement efforts to stop potential terrorist attacks

Defining the Role of Intelligence in Cyber: A Hybrid Push and Pull

This book critically analyses the concept of the intelligence cycle, highlighting the nature and extent of its limitations and proposing alternative ways of conceptualising the intelligence process. The concept of the intelligence cycle has been central to the study of intelligence. As Intelligence Studies has established itself as a distinctive branch of Political Science, it has generated its own foundational literature, within which the intelligence cycle has constituted a vital thread - one running through all social-science approaches to the study of intelligence and constituting a staple of professional training courses. However, there is a growing acceptance that the concept neither accurately reflects the intelligence process nor accommodates important elements of it, such as covert action, counter-intelligence and oversight. Bringing together key authors in the field, the book considers these questions across a number of contexts: in relation to intelligence as a general concept, military intelligence, corporate/private sector intelligence and policing and criminal intelligence. A number of the contributions also go beyond discussion of the limitations of the cycle concept to propose alternative conceptualisations of the intelligence process. What emerges is a plurality of approaches that seek to advance the debate and, as a consequence, Intelligence Studies itself. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, criminology and policing, security studies and IR in general, as well as to practitioners in the field.https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/aci_books/1008/thumbnail.jp

Cyber Actions by State Actors: Motivation and Utility

Covert action is as old as political man. The subversive manipulation of others is nothing new. It has been written about since Sun Tzu and Kautilya. People and nations have always sought the use of shadowy means to influence situations and events. Covert action is and has been a staple of the state system. A dark and nefarious tool often banished to philosophical and intellectual exile, covert action is in truth an oft-used method of achieving utility that is frequently overlooked by academics. Modern scholars contend that, for utility to be achieved, activities such as war and diplomacy must be conducted transparently. Examined here is the construction of utility for a subset of covert action: cyber attacks

The Most Governed Ungoverned Space: Legal and Policy Constraints on Military Operations in Cyberspace

Winning wars in cyberspace might sound easy: the click of a mouse or the press of the enter key on a keyboard. Yet, the web of networks that constitutes cyberspace is imbued with challenges. Seemingly every day there is a new story of a government, business, or individual, suffering from a serious hack. These hacks are often attributed to state actors or transnational criminal organizations. Combined, the almost daily revelations of serious incidents compound a common misperception that cyberspace is an ungoverned space. The reality of cyberspace, however, is far different and constitutes a complex environment of overlapping jurisdictions. The overlapping geographic, legal, and technical boundaries affect everything from the freedom of information to the decision to engage in military operations. Technical specifications as well as laws and policies established by local and national governments, international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and corporations form the decision-making framework for national policy-makers and military commanders. Understanding how all the elements of cyberspace interact provides context for when, why and how the United States engages in military operations in cyberspace. This paper examines the complexities of the environment and their impact on the decisions of states (with emphasis placed on the United States) to engage in offensive cyber operations, cyber exploitation, and defensive cyber operations against other states and non-state actors. Moreover, it examines the important role that overlapping governmental and non-governmental organizations have in affecting the types of behaviors that occur within cyberspace