108,334 research outputs found
Credit flows to businesses during the Great Recession
During the last recession, credit flows suffered their worst slowdown since World War II. A look at selected credit market measures gives some insight into why the slowdown was so severe. The measures also show that in spite of the size of the shock, credit flows actually recovered extremely quickly—a testament to the depth of the credit markets, and possibly the interventions that were taken to support them.Flow of funds ; Economic conditions - United States ; Recessions
Resource theory of contextuality for arbitrary prepare-and-measure experiments
Contextuality has been identified as a potential resource responsible for the
quantum advantage in several tasks. It is then necessary to develop a
resource-theoretic framework for contextuality, both in its standard and
generalized forms. Here we provide a formal resource-theoretic approach for
generalized contextuality based on a physically motivated set of free
operations with an explicit parametrisation. Then, using an efficient linear
programming characterization for the contextual set of prepared-and-measured
statistics, we adapt known resource quantifiers for contextuality and
nonlocality to obtain natural monotones for generalized contextuality in
arbitrary prepare-and-measure experiments.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures. Comments are welcome
Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless
contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive
assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat
defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of
evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the
competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the
evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods
games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a
result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed
and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always
defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we
show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not
for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition
from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of
an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability
Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and
cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial,
as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others
obtained different results. Among the possible forms of heterogeneity, we focus
on the individual perception of risks and rewards related to a generic event,
that can show up in a number of social and biological systems. The modelling
approach is based on the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory. To represent
this kind of heterogeneity, we implement small and local perturbations on the
payoff matrix of simple 2-strategy games, as the Prisoner's Dilemma. So, while
usually the payoff is considered as a global and time-invariant structure, i.e.
it is the same for all individuals of a population at any time, in our model
its value is continuously affected by small variations, both in time and space
(i.e. position on a lattice). We found that such perturbations can be
beneficial or detrimental to cooperation, depending on their setting. Notably,
cooperation is strongly supported when perturbations act on the main diagonal
of the payoff matrix, whereas when they act on the off-diagonal the resulting
effect is more difficult to quantify. To conclude, the proposed model shows a
rich spectrum of possible equilibria, whose interpretation might offer insights
and enrich the description of several systems.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figure
The implications of capital-skill complementarity in economies with large informal sectors
In most developing nations, formal workers tend to be more experienced, more educated, and earn more than informal workers. These facts are often interpreted as evidence that low-skill workers face barriers to entry into the formal sector. Yet, there exists little direct evidence that such barriers are important. This paper describes a model where significant differences arise between formal and informal workers even though labor markets are perfectly competitive. In equilibrium, the informal sector emphasizes low-skill work because informal managers have access to less outside financing, and choose to substitute low-skill labor for physical capital.Labor market
The development of the Huambo Province in Angola - The application of a spatial interaction model to simulate the movement from autarky to external integration
Huambo province in Angola has been detached from the outside world since the begining of the nineties. First due to the civil war in Angola and from then on due to the degradation of the roads and destruction of the railways. Furthermore there is the lack of integration of the province itself due to transport difficulties and human desertification. The objective of this paper is to understand the role of the roads network and the distribution of public funding in the revival of the economy in the Province of Huambo. First we present a review of the literature that stresses that one of the major causes of poverty due to war is related to the lack of accessibility. Then we formulated, calibrate a spatial interaction model for the Huambo City and Province where the degree of openness of the economy can be explicitated. Finaly we simulate the model for different scenarios of road network and distrubution of public funds.
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