Causes, consequences and countermeasures to driver fatigue in the rail industry: The train driver perspective

Fatigue is an important workplace risk management issue. Within the rail industry, the passing of a stop signal (signal passed at danger; SPAD) is considered to be one of the most major safety breaches which can occur. Train drivers are very aware of the negative consequences associated with a SPAD. Therefore, SPADs provide a practical and applied safety relevant context within which to structure a discussion on fatigue. Focus groups discussing contributing factors to SPADs were undertaken at eight passenger rail organisations across Australia and New Zealand (n ¼ 28 drivers). Data relating to fatigue was extracted and inductively analysed identifying three themes: causes, consequences, and countermeasures (to fatigue). Drivers experienced negative consequences of fatigue, despite existing countermeasures to mitigate it. Organisational culture was a barrier to effective fatigue management. A fatigue assessment tool consistently informed rostering, however, shift swapping was commonplace and often unregulated, reducing any potential positive impact. In discussing fatigue countermeasure strategies, drivers talked interchangeably about mitigating task related fatigue (e.g. increasing cognitive load) and sleepiness (e.g. caffeine). Ensuring the concepts of fatigue and sleepiness are properly understood has the potential to maximise safety

Is it safe to cross? Identification of trains and their approach speed at level crossings

Improving the safety at passive rail crossings is an ongoing issue worldwide. These crossings have no active warning systems to assist drivers’ decision-making and are completely reliant on the road user perceiving the approach of a train to decide whether to enter a crossing or not. This study aimed to better understand drivers’ judgements regarding approaching trains and their perceptions of safe crossing. Thirty-six participants completed a field-based protocol that involved detecting and judging the speeds of fast moving trains. They were asked to report when they first detected an approaching train, when they could first perceive it as moving, as well as providing speed estimates and a decision regarding when it would not be safe to cross. Participants detected the trains ∼2 km away and were able to perceive the trains as moving when they were 1.6 km away. Large differences were observed between participants but all could detect trains within the range of the longest sighting distances required at passive level crossings. Most participants greatly underestimated travelling speed by at least 30%, despite reporting high levels of confidence in their estimates. Further, most participants would have entered the crossing at a time when the lights would have been activated if the level crossing had been protected by flashing lights. These results suggest that the underestimation of high-speed trains could have significant safety implications for road users’ crossing behaviour, particularly as it reduces the amount of time and the safety margins that the driver has to cross the rail crossing

A team drives the train: Human factors in train controller perspectives of the controller-driver dynamic

Naweed, A ORCiD: 0000-0002-5534-4295Signal passed at danger events (SPADs) impact safety-risk on rail networks, despite the introduction of novel technologies aimed at addressing their cause and effect. Much of the rail safety literature has had a tendency to focus on activities within the cab, placing a spotlight on “errors” within the train driving role. However, a train is not propelled by a single person—is it is propelled by a tightly-coupled team where driving and train controlling activities are distributed but must work in concert. This study set out to understand how controllers perceive the controller-driver dynamic, and how these perspectives impact upon SPAD-risk. Interviews were conducted with 35 train controllers from 6 rail organisations across Australia and New Zealand. Data were collected using the SITT forward scenario simulation method and analysed using conventional content analysis. Eleven different perspectives were identified, ranging in type and varying by frequency, each with implications for the strength of the coupling in distributed cognition between the controller and driver roles and with implications for SPAD-risk. How these perspectives may influence controller-driver dynamics are illustrated using sample scenarios from the data. The findings emphasise key dimensions of the teaming factors in the movement of trains and illustrate how the underlying values and philosophies in different train controlling cultures influence safety. Findings are discussed in the context of obtaining a holistic and more informed model of train driving. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019