2 research outputs found
Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders'
valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider
combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent for a set of
items can be expressed as , where is a private single parameter
of the agent, and the function is publicly known. Our motivation behind
studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally
in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an
ad shown in a set of ad-slots, is, say, the number of {\em unique}
viewers reached by the ad, and is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b)
From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function
simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more
amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based
on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any -approximation
non-truthful algorithm () for this problem into
and -approximate truthful
mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time,
respectively