A New Message Recognition Protocol With Self-Recoverability For Ad Hoc Pervasive Networks

Abstract. We examine the problem of message recognition by reviewing the definitions and the security model in the literature. In particular, we examine the Jane Doe protocol, which was proposed by Lucks et al., more closely and note its inability to recover in case of a certain adversarial disruption. Our paper saves this well-studied protocol from its unrecoverable state when such adversarial disruption occurs. We propose a new message recognition protocol, which is based on the Jane Doe protocol, and incorporate the resynchronization technique within the protocol itself. That is, without having to provide a separate resynchronization procedure, we overcome the recoverability problem of the Jane Doe protocol. Moreover, we enumerate all possible attacks against the new protocol and show that none of the attacks can occur. We further prove the security of the new protocol and its ability to self-recover once the disruption has stopped

A New Message Recognition Protocol for Ad Hoc Pervasive Networks

We propose a message recognition protocol which is suitable for ad hoc pervasive networks without the use of hash chains. Hence, we no longer require the sensor motes to save values of a hash chain in their memories. This relaxes the memory requirements. Moreover, we do not need to fix the total number of times the protocol can be executed which implies a desired flexibility in this regard. Furthermore, our protocol is secure without having to consider families of assumptions that depend on the number of sessions the protocol is executed. Hence, the security does not weaken as the protocol is executed over time. Last but not least, we provide a practical procedure for resynchronization in case of any adversarial disruption or communication failure

A Message Recognition Protocol Based on Standard Assumptions

Abstract. We look at the problem of designing Message Recognition Protocols (MRP) and note that all proposals available in the literature have relied on security proofs which hold in the random oracle model or are based on non-standard assumptions. Incorporating random coins, we propose a new MRP using a pseudorandom function F and prove its security based on new assumptions. Then, we show that these new assumptions are equivalent to the standard notions of preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and existential unforgeability given that F is a pseudorandom function

Asymptotics of combinatorial structures with large smallest component

We study the probability of connectedness for structures of size n when all components must have size at least m. In the border between almost certain connectedness and almost certain disconnectedness, we encounter a generalized Buchstab function of n/m