9,287 research outputs found

    Prospects after the Voting Reform of the Lisbon Treaty

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    The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the dfferent demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.European Union, Council of Ministers, qualified majority voting, Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, demographics

    The Core of a Partition Function Game

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    We consider partition function games and introduce new definitions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

    Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives

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    A well-studied nonlinear extension of the minimum-cost flow problem is to minimize the objective ijECij(fij)\sum_{ij\in E} C_{ij}(f_{ij}) over feasible flows ff, where on every arc ijij of the network, CijC_{ij} is a convex function. We give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the case when all CijC_{ij}'s are convex quadratic functions, settling an open problem raised e.g. by Hochbaum [1994]. We also give strongly polynomial algorithms for computing market equilibria in Fisher markets with linear utilities and with spending constraint utilities, that can be formulated in this framework (see Shmyrev [2009], Devanur et al. [2011]). For the latter class this resolves an open question raised by Vazirani [2010]. The running time is O(m4logm)O(m^4\log m) for quadratic costs, O(n4+n2(m+nlogn)logn)O(n^4+n^2(m+n\log n)\log n) for Fisher's markets with linear utilities and O(mn3+m2(m+nlogn)logm)O(mn^3 +m^2(m+n\log n)\log m) for spending constraint utilities. All these algorithms are presented in a common framework that addresses the general problem setting. Whereas it is impossible to give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the general problem even in an approximate sense (see Hochbaum [1994]), we show that assuming the existence of certain black-box oracles, one can give an algorithm using a strongly polynomial number of arithmetic operations and oracle calls only. The particular algorithms can be derived by implementing these oracles in the respective settings

    The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

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    A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.dynamic solution, absorbing set, core, non-emptiness

    Approximating Minimum-Cost k-Node Connected Subgraphs via Independence-Free Graphs

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    We present a 6-approximation algorithm for the minimum-cost kk-node connected spanning subgraph problem, assuming that the number of nodes is at least k3(k1)+kk^3(k-1)+k. We apply a combinatorial preprocessing, based on the Frank-Tardos algorithm for kk-outconnectivity, to transform any input into an instance such that the iterative rounding method gives a 2-approximation guarantee. This is the first constant-factor approximation algorithm even in the asymptotic setting of the problem, that is, the restriction to instances where the number of nodes is lower bounded by a function of kk.Comment: 20 pages, 1 figure, 28 reference
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