A formal evaluation of the performance of different corporate styles in stable and turbulent environments

The notion of "parenting styles", introduced by Goold, Campbell and Alexander, has been widely acknowledged by the Corporate Strategy literature as a good broad description of the different ways in which corporate managers choose to manage and organize multibusiness firms. The purpose of this paper is to present a formal test of the relationship between parenting style and performance. For this test, we developed a set of agent-based simulations using the Performance Landscapes framework, which captures and describes the evolution of firms led by different parenting styles in business environments with different levels of complexity and dynamism. We found that the relative performance of each style is contingent upon the characteristics of the environment in which the firm operates. In less complex business environments, the Strategic Planning style outperforms the Strategic Control and Financial Control styles. In highly complex and highly dynamic environments, by contrast, the Strategic Control style performs best. Our results also demonstrate the importance of planning and flexibility at the corporate level and so contribute to the wider debate on Strategic Planning vs. Emergent Strategies.Corporate strategy; Parenting styles; Agent-based models;

Corporate strategy in turbulent environments: Key roles of the corporate level

This paper analyzes the evolution during the period 1986-2002 of the corporate strategy of Lujan, a highly successful car components manufacturer headquartered in Spain, as a way to explore how the corporate level influences the successful evolution of a company exposed to a "turbulent" environment over a long period. We find that the corporate level plays three key roles. First, it drives a firm's evolution by developing a cognitive representation of the firm's competitive landscape. Second, it paces the company's evolution by alternately shifting the balance of organizational initiatives between static efficiency-based "local search" strategies, chosen in times of stability or economic slowdown, and dynamic efficiency-based "long jump" strategies, adopted during periods of major environmental turbulence. Long-jump corporate strategies, carried out through limited downside strategic initiatives such as real options and strategic alliances ("off-line long-jumps"), are particularly frequent in these circumstances. The third role consists of developing an organizational architecture that frames the self-organized coordination of the different business divisions. The Lujan story clearly illustrates the important role of corporate strategy in a firm that must undergo radical transitions as a result of major environmental changes.corporate strategy; turbulent environments; complexity theory; car components;

Government Regulation

Abstract. Interest in the use of so-called voluntary approaches to supplement or replace formal environmental regulation is on the rise, both in Europe and in the United States. These approaches fall into two general categories: (1) industry-initiated codes of good practice focusing on environmental management systems or performance goals, and (2) negotiation between government and individual firms (or industry sector trade associations) focusing on regulation or compliance. This paper addresses the latter. In the United States, the motivations for engaging in such negotiation are manifold and sometimes contradictory. They include desires (1) to facilitate the achievement of legislated environmental goals by introducing flexible and cost-effective implementation and compliance measures, (2) to negotiate levels of compliance (standards) fulfilling health-based legislative mandates, (3) to negotiate legal definitions of Best Available Technology and other technology-based requirements, and (4) to weaken environmental regulation. In the United States, administrative agencies have long been experimenting with “negotiated rulemaking as a means of setting regulatory standards, and the Administrative Procedure Act was amended in 1990 to encourage further use of this process. U.S. agencies have also made frequent use of negotiation as a means of defining compliance responsibilities for individual firms. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has sometimes acted outside of the authority given to it by its enabling legislation in an attempt to negotiate environmental policy and implementation. Two recent examples are the "Common Sense Initiative," in which EPA attempted broad-based negotiation focuses on particular industry sectors, and “Project XL", in which the agency attempted to negotiate flexible implementation of environmental requirements with individual firms. Although both programs are now moribund, each provides useful lessons for future efforts at environmental negotiation. This paper describes and analyses negotiated agreements in the United States in the context of EPA efforts to ensure environmental protection. These agreements can be described according to the following taxonomy: (a) negotiated regulation (either preceding formal regulation or as a substitute for formal regulation); (b) negotiated implementation (negotiations with an individual firm to establish the timetable and/or the means for meeting a particular regulatory standard; and (c) negotiated compliance (negotiation in the context of an enforcement action in which the firm is out of compliance with an applicable standard and there is an opportunity for extra-statutory environmental gains, such as encouraging cleaner production through the leveraging of penalty reductions). The criteria for evaluation used in this paper include: environmental outcomes, effects on stimulating technological change, time for development (time to completion), ease of implementation (likelihood of court challenge), stakeholder influence (ability of large firms to dominate outcome, environmentalists-industry balance of power), and administrative features

Epilogue—Beyond Pollution Control and Prevention:

Environmental Law, Policy and Economics: Reclaiming the Environmental Agend

Unraveling the “black box” of cross-business-unit collaboration : paper presented at the 2014 Academy of Management Conference

Extensive research identified the economic, organizational and social factors that configure the process of cross-business unit (“cross-BU”) collaboration leading to the creation of crossBU synergies. Yet, the inner workings of the “black box” determined by the multiple cause and effect relationships between these factors remains to be determined. Building from current theory, we studied the process of cross-BU collaboration through a simulation model. We found that the initial conditions and patterns of evolution of the different configurations of factors lead to significant differences in the performance of cross-BU collaboration initiatives. Our findings extend previous research, characterizing cross-BU synergy creation as a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, by identifying the drivers of such complexity and its effects on performance. We also shed light on the impact of business relatedness on performance and on the roles of the corporate level in multi-business firms. We finally discuss how managers should manage cross-BU initiatives under different organizational arrangements

The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: A Prescription for Prevention

As workers become more aware that occupational exposure to toxic substances can impair their ability to bring healthy children into the world. they will begin to focus on legal mechanisms for reducing reproductive hazards in the workplace. The authors explore the use of compensatory remedies and anti-discrimination laws to provide an impetusfor employers to provide safe workplaces. hey investigate using workerprotection laws to reach psychological injuries and harm to offspring. They also survey existing preventive tools such as injunctive relief and the right to refuse hazardous wor

Negotiated Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Agreements in the United States: Lessons for Policy

The interest in so-called voluntary approaches to supplement or replace formal environmental, or occupational health and safety regulation has taken on new importance in both Europe and the United States. These approaches fall into two sharp divisions: (1) industry-initiated codes of good practice focusing on environmental management systems or performance goals, and (2) negotiated agreements between government and individual firms or industry sector trade associations focusing on regulation or compliance. This paper addresses the latter. In the United States, the motivations behind negotiated agreements are manifold and sometimes contradictory including desires (1) to facilitate the achievement of legislated or mandatory environmental goals by introducing flexibility and cost-effective compliance measures, (2) to negotiate levels of compliance (standards) fulfilling legislative mandates, (3) to negotiate legal definitions of Best Available Technology and other technology-based requirements, and (4) to weaken environmental initiatives. Efforts in furtherance of negotiated agreements have thus been greeted with mixed results by the various stakeholders. In the context of an anti-regulatory climate in the United States, the Administrative Procedures Act has been amended to allow “negotiated rulemaking” in achieving regulatory agency mandates. However, even before this legal innovation, regulatory agencies have been negotiating regulations. Independent of this legal avenue, negotiated compliance with industry associations is being fostered through the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) “Commonsense Initiative” and with individual firms through “EPA's Project XL”, again with mixed reception. The proposed paper describes and analyses negotiated agreements in the United States in the context of (1) EPA efforts to ensure environmental protection and (2) the Occupational Safety and Health Administration efforts to ensure worker health and safety. These agreements can be described according to the following taxonomy: (a) Negotiated regulation (either preceding formal regulation or as a substitute for formal regulation); (b) Negotiated compliance (implementing regulation or informal agreements) (i) the means and timetable for coming into compliance with emission, effluent, or concentration requirements (ii) negotiation in the context of an enforcement action in which the firm is out of legal compliance (for example, encouraging cleaner production through the leveraging of penalty reductions). The criteria for evaluation include: environmental or health and safety outcomes, effects on stimulating technological change, time for development (time to completion)/implementation (likelihood of court challenge), stakeholder influence (ability of large firms to dominate outcome, environmentalists–industry, or labour–management balance of power),and administrative features