Lunar production of solar cells

The feasibility of manufacturing of solar cells on the moon for spacecraft applications is examined. Because of the much lower escape velocity, there is a great advantage in lunar manufacture of solar cells compared to Earth manufacture. Silicon is abundant on the moon, and new refining methods allow it to be reduced and purified without extensive reliance on materials unavailable on the moon. Silicon and amorphous silicon solar cells could be manufactured on the moon for use in space. Concepts for the production of a baseline amorphous silicon cell are discussed, and specific power levels are calculated for cells designed for both lunar and Earth manufacture

Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court

President Reagan\u27s appointment of Antonin Scalia to the United States Supreme Court raises concern among liberals that Justice Scalia will help lead the Court away from a number of liberal positions toward a new conservatism. The Reagan Administration\u27s requirement that judicial appointments advance the Administration\u27s preference for judicial restraint and strict constructionism enhances this concern. These new executive requirements mean that federal courts should accord greater authority to the democratically elected branches of the government. Justice Scalia\u27s primary areas of study, administrative law and separation of powers, reflect his adherence to judicial self-restraint. One aspect of administrative law and separation of powers that could have a great negative influence on environmental litigation is the doctrine of standing, especially as standing relates to obtaining judicial review of administrative decisions. Scalia has advocated a position on standing that could severely limit the ability of litigants to obtain judicial review where they allege an environmental injury. This Comment focuses on the possibility that Scalia will be able to erect a stricter standing doctrine inimical to environmental interests. Section II examines the doctrine of standing and the favored position that courts have granted environmental litigants. In Section III, this Comment discusses how Scalia, at least theoretically, is opposed to such a favored position for environmental litigants. Section IV analyzes Scalia\u27s position on standing as manifested in his opinions on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Finally, this Comment concludes by discussing how these factors, combined with Scalia\u27s philosophy of judicial self-restraint, illuminate the possible position Scalia will take in environmental cases that come before the Supreme Court. The overall purpose of this Comment is to examine both Scalia\u27s theoretical writings and his judicial opinions to explore how the practicalities of judicial decisionmaking have modified Scalia\u27s scholarly positions. In this manner, the Comment explores the tensions inherent between the twin roles of scholar and jurist. In conjunction with this analysis, this Comment also examines how Scalia is still able to advance his theoretical and philosophical beliefs concerning judicial self-restraint. In this way, this Comment highlights what factors go into Scalia\u27s decisionmaking. This Comment thus provides a framework for analyzing how Scalia will approach particular cases that come before the Supreme Court

Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action

The passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has engendered a significant forum shift in class action securities fraud litigation, from federal to state court. This unintended by-product of the Act has reignited debate over our dual federal-state system of securities regulation and in turn has inspired a discussion as to whether Congress should now preempt state securities fraud causes of action. This article argues that preemption is an appropriate, but not the only, solution to these concerns. To support this argument, this article first traces the history of dual state-federal securities regulation within the context of private rights of action. The article then analyzes the new incentives to file state court litigation and extends current empirical analyses by examining more closely the nature and extent of post-Reform Act state litigation. The compiled data demonstrate significant differences between state and federal litigation that suggest that plaintiffs are using state courts to avoid some of the Reform Act\u27s procedural hurdles, a strategy that threatens to undermine the policy choices Congress made in the Act. The article then analyzes the traditional theoretical bases for allocating governmental authority to the states in our federal system, in particular the benefits associated with interstate competition. Such competition cannot occur in the system as currently structured but the article suggests a choice of law regime that may permit competition. Recognizing that such a structural change is unlikely to be adopted, the article concludes by critiquing current preemption proposals

Law, Ideology, and Strategy in Judicial Decisonmaking: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions

Legal academics and political scientists continue to debate whether the legal, attitudinal, or strategic model best explains judicial decision making. One limitation in this debate is the high-court bias found in most studies. This article, by contrast, examines federal district court decisions, specifically interpretations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Initial interpretations of the Act articulated distinct liberal and conservative positions. The data compiled here support the hypothesis that the later emergence of an intermediate interpretation was the result of strategic statutory interpretation rather than simply judges acting consistently with their ideological preferences, although there is some evidence that judges adopting the most conservative interpretation of the Act were acting consistently with the attitudinal model. There is weaker evidence to support the legal model, an unsurprising result given the severe test the study design creates for that model

Real Insider Trading

In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to assess how enforcers operationalize insider trading doctrine. The cases enforcement authorities bring are shaped by a complex and cross-cutting set of institutional and individual incentives, cognitive biases, legal requirements, the history of failed enforcement efforts, and the way in which the agency and the self-regulatory organizations deploy their investigatory resources. SEC enforcement is dominated by small stakes, opportunistic trading by mid-level employees and their friends and family, most often involving M&A transactions. Those cases settle quickly, half within thirty days of filing. Criminal enforcement is generally reserved for more serious cases, measured by, among other things, the type of defendant, the size of the insider trading network, and the profits earned. In both settings, there is little evidence that enforcers are systematically stretching the boundaries of insider trading doctrine

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and the Politics of Governmental Investigations

In May 2009, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act which created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, an independent, bipartisan panel tasked to examine the causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States. Franklin Roosevelt never created an independent commission to investigate Wall Street, but the Pecora hearings, the eponymous investigation of Wall Street wrongdoing run by a former New York prosecutor, captivated the country. For sixteen months in the worst depths of the Great Depression, Ferdinand Pecora paraded a series of elite financiers before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. In one hearing after another, he chronicled how the leaders of Wall Street had manipulated stocks, dodged taxes, fleeced their shareholders, and collected enormous bonuses for peddling shoddy securities to unsuspecting American investors. Sensational headlines galvanized public opinion for reform and created the climate in which Congress was able to re-shape much of the modem structure of federal financial regulation. In the first hundred days of Roosevelt\u27s administration, Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933. Earlier, Congress had passed the Securities Act of 1933. A year later came the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Now, more than a year after the FCIC released its final report, it is clear that the Commission did not live up to the legacy of its Depression-era predecessor. It was not until six months after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted that the FCIC released its report on the causes of the financial crisis. This article compares the politics that underlay the FCIC investigation with those not only of the Pecora investigation but with those of what is generally perceived as a more successful independent commission—the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). When Congress created the FCIC it rejected proposals to conduct a congressional investigation more in line with the Pecora investigation and instead chose to model the FCIC explicitly on the 9/11 Commission. This paper highlights two reasons why the FCIC was not the Pecora investigation redux and why it failed to achieve the same consensus as the 9/11 Commission. The first explanation involves how the goals for these different investigations were defined. As explained in more detail in Section II, the Pecora investigation appears to have represented an innovative and novel application of congressional investigatory power. While the Pecora probe was ostensibly designed to investigate conditions in the securities markets in preparation for potential legislation, it differed from prior congressional efforts because its motivation was external to the legislature. The second reason why the FCIC hearings never looked like the Pecora hearings was because the former\u27s design and structure bore absolutely no resemblance to the latter. Rather than being an investigation by a standing congressional committee subject to the near dictatorial control of the committee\u27s chair, the FCIC was an independent, bipartisan commission that needed consensus to operate effectively. As explained in Section III, the FCIC was subject to the same limitations and political pressures that beset the 9/11 Commission\u27s investigation. Both commissions faced numerous obstacles to conducting vigorous investigations: the partisan selection of commissioners combined with broad commission mandates, woefully small budgets, short time frames for conducting their investigations, and weak subpoena powers. The 9/11 Commission\u27s chairman, former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, went so far as to argue that his commission was designed to fail

Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions

From breast implants to cigarettes, mass tort class actions are a prominent and controversial part of the contemporary litigation landscape. A critical component of these actions is the ability of class members to “opt out” and thereby exclude themselves from the effect of any class judgment. The tension between individual autonomy and the desire for global resolution of mass controversies has led to an intense debate concerning the circumstances under which opt-out rights should be constrained, if at all. This Article makes five distinct contributions to the class action literature. First, the Article applies the game theoretic concept of the “core” to class action litigation. Core theory describes the conditions under which coalitions tend to be stable and provides a ready analogue to class litigation. The Article next demonstrates that global class resolutions often require that litigants\u27 bargaining strategies, including opt-out rights, be constrained in order to create a core. Third, the Article demonstrates that opt-out rights often do not serve their intended purpose and can act primarily to frustrate the resolution of complex claims. Fourth, the Article proposes the conjecture that a core theoretic model while simplified and reductionist, is sufficiently robust to generate essentially all of the problems observed in class litigation. Agency and other problems that have been at the heart of much class action scholarship certainly exist, but may not be analytically essential to an explanation of observed settlement and litigation patterns. Finally, core theory highlights an inherent paradox in class actions. In cases where claims for individual autonomy are strongest, opt-out rights are powerful bargaining tools that can destroy class actions and dramatically shift power within classes. In classes with traditionally weaker claims for preserving individual autonomy, opt-out rights may be both unnecessary and unlikely to disrupt class-wide resolutions. The recognition of opt-out rights in cases where it is feasible for litigants to exercise them can thus destroy the effectiveness of the class mechanism that serves as the foundation for those rights in the first instance. Individual autonomy may thus be fundamentally incompatible with obtaining global resolution in mass tort and other kinds of class actions