Share prices, house prices and monetary policy

Recent developments in stock and house prices revived the debate on the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. The article first explores the links between asset price fluctuations, macroeconomic developments and monetary policy, highlighting the possibility of asset price booms and bursts in an environment of stable consumer prices and the challenges for monetary policy. The problem of identification of “bubbles” is then illustrated by an assessment of recent developments in stock prices in the United States and the euro area and in house prices in the euro area, with special attention for the fast-increasing house prices in some countries and for the Belgian situation. Finally, the article briefly explains how asset prices are taken into account in the monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem.monetary policy, transmission process, stock prices, residential property prices, Eurosystem

Repression of Floral Meristem Fate Is Crucial in Shaping Tomato Inflorescence

Tomato is an important crop and hence there is a great interest in understanding the genetic basis of its flowering. Several genes have been identified by mutations and we constructed a set of novel double mutants to understand how these genes interact to shape the inflorescence. It was previously suggested that the branching of the tomato inflorescence depends on the gradual transition from inflorescence meristem (IM) to flower meristem (FM): the extension of this time window allows IM to branch, as seen in the compound inflorescence (s) and falsiflora (fa) mutants that are impaired in FM maturation. We report here that JOINTLESS (J), which encodes a MADS-box protein of the same clade than SHORT VEGETATIVE PHASE (SVP) and AGAMOUS LIKE 24 (AGL24) in Arabidopsis, interferes with this timing and delays FM maturation, therefore promoting IM fate. This was inferred from the fact that j mutation suppresses the high branching inflorescence phenotype of s and fa mutants and was further supported by the expression pattern of J, which is expressed more strongly in IM than in FM. Most interestingly, FA - the orthologue of the Arabidopsis LEAFY (LFY) gene - shows the complementary expression pattern and is more active in FM than in IM. Loss of J function causes premature termination of flower formation in the inflorescence and its reversion to a vegetative program. This phenotype is enhanced in the absence of systemic florigenic protein, encoded by the SINGLE FLOWER TRUSS (SFT) gene, the tomato orthologue of FLOWERING LOCUS T (FT). These results suggest that the formation of an inflorescence in tomato requires the interaction of J and a target of SFT in the meristem, for repressing FA activity and FM fate in the IM

Critically evaluating collaborative research: why is it difficult to extend truth tests to reality tests?

We argue that critical evaluation achieves the reflexivity needed to facilitate collaboration by proposing boundary-negotiating artefacts to configure a joint action domain. Those objects become mediators for innovation by triggering controversies, conceived preventatively via an organized extension of what Boltanski calls ‘truth tests’ to ‘reality tests’ so that they dynamize ongoing affairs. However, critical evaluation must also anticipate actors’ reappropriation of boundary-negotiating artefacts in the effort to protect their rights, stakes or room for manoeuvre. Three scenarios commonly arise: avoidance or utopian projecting, enactment of inverted reality tests, and disavowal through role exchange. The article develops these propositions through the reconstruction of a modified theory-based evaluation of a collaborative research programme. The programme set out to explore how evidence from health research could be used rapidly and effectively in the context of practical problems and organizational challenges, so an internal evaluation was set up to facilitate learning during the process. What ensued, however, was a loss of trust between partners, resolved only by repositioning the evaluation as a reflective academic study, reducing its reflexive capacity to intervene on the level of activity and organizational integration. We conclude that doing successful critical evaluation and, more generally, achieving political pertinence for social scientific discourses depends on creating the conditions in which actors are able to take the risks and share the costs associated with the enhanced level of reflexivity necessary to engage in collective action as well as knowledge production

Maturity Mismatch and Governance of Microfinance Cooperatives: Lessons from History

This article shows how today’s West African microfinance cooperatives could learn from the experience of 19th century German financial cooperatives (FCs) to address their members’ need for long-term loans, especially in rural areas. FCs have short-term internal resources, consisting mainly of members’ savings. Thus, providing long-term loans requires dealing with a maturity mismatch, which in turns leads to governance issues. The 19th century German FCs provided long-term loans (10 years and more) thanks to two mechanisms: the liquidity facilities provided by regional centrals and an efficient corporate governance system based on cooperative auditing associations. We discuss the feasibility of implementing those mechanisms in today’s West African microfinance cooperatives and come up with practical policy-oriented recommendations.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Les coopératives d’épargne et de crédit en microfinance face aux problématiques de gouvernance et de croissance.

Avec plus de 59 millions de membres et encore en pleine croissance, les coopératives d’épargne et de crédit (coopec) dans les pays du Sud font pourtant l’objet de relativement peu d’attention au sein du secteur de la microfinance. Les principales critiques adressées à ces organisations concernent les faiblesses de leur gouvernance. Leur fonctionnement démocratique et les spécificités qui en découlent ont de nombreux avantages mais complexifient la gouvernance. Cet article synthétise les problèmes de gouvernance et les défis induits par la croissance des coopec. Il analyse ensuite les mécanismes existant pour y faire face à l’aide d’une adaptation de la théorie de Charreaux.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Les coopératives d’épargne et de crédit en microfinance face aux problématiques de gouvernance et de croissance.

Avec plus de 59 millions de membres et encore en pleine croissance, les coopératives d’épargne et de crédit (coopec) dans les pays du Sud font pourtant l’objet de relativement peu d’attention au sein du secteur de la microfinance. Les principales critiques adressées à ces organisations concernent les faiblesses de leur gouvernance. Leur fonctionnement démocratique et les spécificités qui en découlent ont de nombreux avantages mais complexifient la gouvernance. Cet article synthétise les problèmes de gouvernance et les défis induits par la croissance des coopec. Il analyse ensuite les mécanismes existant pour y faire face à l’aide d’une adaptation de la théorie de Charreaux.Coopérative; gouvernance; croissance; microfinance; coopec; conflit d’intérêt; différentiel de pouvoir; théorie de l’agence; mécanismes de gouvernance; contrôle par les membres.

What Explains Microfinance Distribution Surplus? A Stakeholder-oriented Approach

What are the drivers of productivity surplus distribution to microfinance stakeholders? This paper shows that the size of the institution is the main indicator that can explain the gain in productivity surplus but also the surplus given to clients (decrease of interest rates) and staff. Moreover, cooperatives keep a significantly lesser part of their surplus for future growth, reserve, or distribution to investors. Finally, larger, more subsidised MFIs, and particularly cooperatives, tend to give a greater part of their surplus to their employees.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Maturity Mismatch and Governance of Microfinance Cooperatives: Lessons from History

This article shows how today’s West African microfinance cooperatives could learn from the experience of 19th century German financial cooperatives (FCs) to address their members’ need for long-term loans, especially in rural areas. FCs have short-term internal resources, consisting mainly of members’ savings. Thus, providing long-term loans requires dealing with a maturity mismatch, which in turns leads to governance issues. The 19th century German FCs provided long-term loans (10 years and more) thanks to two mechanisms: the liquidity facilities provided by regional centrals and an efficient corporate governance system based on cooperative auditing associations. We discuss the feasibility of implementing those mechanisms in today’s West African microfinance cooperatives and come up with practical policy-oriented recommendations.Microfinance; Cooperative; Governance; long-term loan; maturity mismatch