Physics reach of MoEDAL at LHC: magnetic monopoles, supersymmetry and beyond

MoEDAL is a pioneering experiment designed to search for highly ionising messengers of new physics such as magnetic monopoles or massive (pseudo-)stable charged particles, that are predicted to exist in a plethora of models beyond the Standard Model. Its ground-breaking physics program defines a number of scenarios that yield potentially revolutionary insights into such foundational questions as, are there extra dimensions or new symmetries, what is the mechanism for the generation of mass, does magnetic charge exist, what is the nature of dark matter, and, how did the big-bang develop at the earliest times. MoEDAL's purpose is to meet such far-reaching challenges at the frontier of the field. The physics reach of the existing MoEDAL detector is discussed, giving emphasis on searches for magnetic monopoles, supersymmetric (semi)stable partners, doubly charged Higgs bosons, and exotic structures such as black-hole remnants in models with large extra spatial dimensions and D-matter in some brane theories.Comment: 17 pages, 8 figures; combines two invited talks in 5th International Conference on New Frontiers in Physics (ICNFP 2016), 6-14 Jul 2016, Kolymbari, Greece; based on arXiv:1405.7662, arXiv:1411.7651, arXiv:1511.0174

The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits

The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits (rent) to specific groups. In most circumstances, these decisions are often politically contentious and frequently influenced by rent seeking behaviour. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the effects of rent seeking effort when permits are freely distributed (grandfathered). Rent seeking behaviour can influence both the share of permits which an individual firm receives and also the total supply of permits. This latter impact depends on the responsiveness of the regulator to aggregate rent seeking effort. Using a three-stage game, we show that rent seeking can influence both the distribution of rents and the ex post value of these rents, whilst welfare usually decreases in the responsiveness of the regulator.tradable permit market, rent seeking, initial allocation