Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect

Patterns of unemployment An insider-outsider analysis

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:3597.912(CEPR-DP--960) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Bequests as a heir "discipline device"

This paper develops a model ofinter vivos gifts and bequests in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection. Altruistic parents do not perfectly know how much effort their children make to earn their living, nor do they know their true level of ability.Inter vivos gifts take place prior to the realization of the children's earnings whereas at the moment of bequests, parents do observe them. We show that an optimal transfer policy generally uses a mix ofinter vivos gifts — deemed as more efficient — and bequests — deemed as more redistributive

Looking for Their Dick Vermeil: How Prior Performance Influences the Selection Decision

Organizational performance, Executive replacement, Inside/Outside promotion, Selection decision, Adaptive organizations, Managerial succession,