38 research outputs found

    The Phenomenology of Mentality

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    peer reviewedThis paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception (hereafter IP). Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections.The Phenomenology of Mentality (F.R.S.-FNRS Research Project / PDR

    Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection

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    This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis. Section 2 spells out the notion of misleading expression by means of the surface-grammar/truth-conditions distinction, which I argue is implicit in their accounts. Section 3 zooms in on a specific class of misleading expressions, namely expressions about ficta. Finally, Section 4 draws the consequences of what precedes for a correct understanding of the notion of meaning

    An unexpected extended conformation for the third TPR motif of the peroxin PEX5 from Trypanosoma brucei

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    A number of helix-rich protein motifs are involved in a variety of critical protein-protein interactions in living cells. One of these is the tetratrico peptide repeat (TPR) motif that is involved, amongst others, in cell cycle regulation, chaperone function and post-translation modifications. So far, these helix-rich TPR motifs have always been observed to be a compact unit of two helices interacting with each other in antiparallel fashion. Here, we describe the structure of the first three TPR-motifs of the peroxin PEX5 from Trypanosoma brucei, the causative agent of sleeping sickness. Peroxins are proteins involved in peroxisome, glycosome and glyoxysome biogenesis. PEX5 is the receptor of the proteins targeted to these organelles by the "peroxisomal targeting signal-1", a C-terminal tripeptide called PTS-1. The first two of the three TPR-motifs of T.brucei PEX5 appear to adopt the canonical antiparallel helix hairpin structure. In contrast, the third TPR motif of PEX5 has a dramatically different conformation in our crystals: the two helices that were supposed to form a hairpin are folded into one single 44 Angstrom long continuous helix. Such a conformation has never been observed before for a TPR motif. This raises interesting questions including the potential functional importance of a "jack-knife" conformational change in TPR motifs. (C) 2001 Academic Press

    Lipoxygenase pathway and antioxidant system in salt stressed tomato seedlings (Lycopersicon esculentum Mill.)

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    Soil or growing media salinity is an increasing problem in agriculture throughout the world. Therefore, there is a real interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms set by the plants to respond to this stress. The present study concerns tomato, which is one of the most important cultivated vegetables. Tomato seeds (Lycopersicon esculentum var. ‘Moneymaker’) were disinfected and a salt stress (NaCl 100 mM) was applied 8 days after the onset of germination. Samples were collected after 4 days of stress. In this study, attention was focused on the antioxidant system and the lipoxygenase pathway because salt stress is often associated with an increased production of reactive oxygen species and polyunsaturated fatty acids are one of the most susceptible targets to oxidative attacks. The perception of the stress by the plantlets was confirmed by the overexpression of an aquaporin-coding gene (aqua2). Concerning the antioxidant system, the activities of ascorbate peroxydase and catalase enzymes were studied but no significant variation was observed between stressed seedlings and controls. Similar results were obtained for ascorbate measurements. Complementarily, the lipoxygenase pathway was studied at three levels in the plantlets. The expression of two genes (lipoxygenase-A and oxo-phytodienoic acid reductase) was first followed at the mRNA level by RT-PCR. The oxylipin content was determined by HPLC and the lipoxygenase activity as well as the hydroperoxide degradation activity were measured spectrophotometrically. The obtained results indicate that no clear accumulation of oxylipin occurs in our stress conditions. However, an increase in lipoxygenase and hydroperoxide degradation activities was observed and seems to indicate that several enzymes of the lipoxygenase pathway are involved in the plant response to salt stress

    Brentano et les parties du mental: Une approche méréologique de l'intentionnalité phénoménale

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    In this paper I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole-relations rather than as a supervenience- or identity-relation. To begin, I discuss some reasons for being a (neo )Brentanian about the mind and briefly introduce the main characteristics of Brentano’s internalist description program. Then, I turn to the current ‘inseparatist’ way of dealing with intentionality and phenomenality, focusing on the demand for unity coming from advocates of phenomenal intentionality. I suggest that the unity of the mind may be put in a new light if we put aside metaphysical-epistemological questions, go back to Brentano’s description program, and endorse his thesis that the mental is something unified in which various parts must be distinguished. In the last section, I draw some lessons from this approach, holding that, for any representational content R, R is (in Brentano’s terms) an abstractive or ‘distinctional’ part of the relevant state, and that, for any qualitative aspect Q, Q is an abstractive or ‘distinctional’ part of the relevant representational content R.Renaissance de la Philosophie au tournant du XXe siècle: L'école de Franz Brentano (1866-1955
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