Elite opinion and foreign policy in post-communist Russia

Russian elite opinion on matters of foreign policy may be classified as ‘Liberal Westerniser’, ‘Pragmatic Nationalist’ and ‘Fundamentalist Nationalist’, terms that reflect longstanding debates about the country’s relationship with the outside world. An analysis of press statements and election manifestoes together with a programme of elite interviews between 2004 and 2006 suggests a clustering of opinion on a series of strategic issues. Liberal Westernisers seek the closest possible relationship with Europe, and favour eventual membership of the EU and NATO. Pragmatic Nationalists are more inclined to favour practical co-operation, and do not assume an identity of values or interests with the Western countries. Fundamentalist Nationalists place more emphasis on the other former Soviet republics, and on Asia as much as Europe, and see the West as a threat to Russian values as well as to its state interests. Each of these positions, in turn, draws on an identifiable set of domestic constituencies: Liberal Westernisers on the promarket political parties, Pragmatic Nationalists on the presidential administration and defence and security ministries, and Fundamentalist Nationalists on the Orthodox Church and Communists

The Results of Privatization in Russia and the Tasks of the New Stage

>p>In the process of elaborating future privatization steps and evaluating what has been done, it is extremely important not to become fixated on any one ministry, department, or government, but rather to develop a broad discussion in which all political forces in Russia may participate. Without such a discussion, there is no purpose served by developing a conception of a complex problem like privatization.>/p>>p>Privatization in Russia is based on the Law on Privatization, a state program. At the same time, for well-known reasons a considerable part of the existing privatization legislation is based on presidential ukases and government decrees. Essentially, in late 1992 and early 1993, the Supreme Soviet initially withdrew, but then decided simply to impede privatization, adopting a whole list of decrees one after another that prohibit, repeal, halt, and disrupt the process. Such a scale and depth of the reform process are inconceivable without a developed normative base. Such a base exists today, and it covers a large part of the principal problems in this sphere, even though it naturally cannot be said that all legal and normative problems of privatization have already been resolved. The third volume of normative documents on privatization was published recently, and this is fundamentally important.>/p>