The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers

This essay discredits current empirical models that are designed to “judge” or rank appellate judges, and then assesses the harms of propagating such models. First, the essay builds on the discussion of empirical models by arguing that (1) the judicial virtues that the legal empiricists set out to measure have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately. The essay then concludes that by generating unreliable claims about the relative quality of judges, these studies mislead both decision-makers and the public, degrade discussions of judging, and could, if taken seriously, detrimentally alter the behavior of judges themselves

The Foreign Policy of Our Government\u27s Least Dangerous Branch

I am honored to be here today to deliver the Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture, named in honor of an exemplary lawyer, a consummate public servant, and a pillar of the New York Bar. And I am grateful for the kind introduction of Barry Garfmkel, another exemplary lawyer and pillar of the New York Bar. One aspect of today\u27s lecture-namely America\u27s place in the world-is a subject for strategic thinkers, historians, and philosophers. Lest there be any doubt about my pretensions, I am none of these. At best, I am a reader of strategic thinkers, historians and philosophers, and other intellectuals