20 research outputs found
1970λ λ κ΅κ°μ λλ―Όκ΄κ³μ κ΄ν μ°κ΅¬ : μλ§μμ΄λμ΄ λλ―Όμ μ μΉμ νλμ λ―ΈμΉ μν₯μ μ€μ¬μΌλ‘
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Όλ¬Έ(μμ¬)--μμΈε€§εΈζ ‘ 倧εΈι’ :ε€δΊ€εΈη§,1995.Maste
Post-Socialist Political Economy and Comparative Politics
νμ¬νμ£Όμ 체μ μ νμ λΉκ΅μ μΉμ κ³ μ μ μ£Όμ λ₯Ό μλ‘κ² κ³ μ°°ν μ μλ κΈ°νλ₯Ό μ 곡νλ€. νμλ μμ₯κ°νκ³Ό κ΄λ ¨νμ¬ κ³΅μ°μ£Όμ μ κΆ νμ μμ₯κ°ν, νμ¬νμ£Όμ μμ₯κ°νμ μ λ΅ λ±μ λ€λ£¬λ€. νΉν νμ¬νμ£Όμ μμ₯κ°νμμ μ κΆ ννμ μμ₯κ²½μ νμ±μ μκ΄μ±μ λ€λ₯Έ μ§μμ κ²½νκ³Ό λΉκ΅νλ€. νμ¬νμ£Όμ κ΅κ°μ λ νμ±κ³Ό κ΄λ ¨νμ¬ μ΅κ·Ό λΉκ΅μ μΉνμ΄ μ΄λ£©ν νμμ μ€μ¬μ κΈ°μ΄ν κ΅κ°κ±΄μ€λ‘ μ μκ°νκ³ μ΄λ₯Ό λ°νμΌλ‘ νμ¬νμ£Όμ κ΅κ°κ±΄μ€μ λΆμνλ€. λ§μ§λ§μΌλ‘ λ―Όμ£Όν μ΄νλ‘ μ λν λ°μ±μΌλ‘ λλλκ³ μλ μ κ±°κΆμμ£Όμλ‘ μ ν΅ν΄ νμ¬νμ£Όμ μ μΉλ³λμ λν λΉκ΅μ°κ΅¬μ κ°λ₯μ±μ μ΄ν΄λ³Έλ€.Post-socialist transitions have offered us excellent opportunities to test classic issues in comparative politics such as market reform, state(institution) building, and regime change. With respect to market reform, I discuss reform attempts and their consequences under the rule of communism and post-socialist market reform strategies that might overcome reform dilemma. In addition, I examine studies of how regime types were associated with market transition in post-socialist contexts different from other market transitions. State building in post-socialism is examined in terms of rational choice perspective. Post-socialist regime changes have cast serious doubts on democratic consolidation school. In this paper I examine the applicability of electoral authoritarianism to post-socialist regime changes. I conclude this paper by suggesting that remaining challenge is to build theory-laden, preferably actor-based accounts to explain divergent post-socialist experiences
A Comparative Analysis of Property Rights Reform and State Capacity in Russia (1991~1999)
κ³΅μ° κ΅κ°μ λ μ λμ νΉμ§μ κ΅κ°μμ μ κΈ°λ°μ λ κ³νκ²½μ μ λΉ-κ΅κ°μ΄λ€. λ°λΌμ ν곡μ°ν κ³Όμ μμ λΉ-κ΅κ°λ‘λΆν° κ²½μ μ¬ν λ° μλ―Όμ¬ν λ± λ€μν μ¬ν μμμ΄ λΆνλλ€. μ΄λ¬ν κ³Όμ μμ νκ³΅μ° μ리νΈλ κ΅κ°μ 곡μ κΈ°λ₯μ μ½νμμΌ κ΅κ°μ μ λ΅μ μμμ μμ μκ²λ‘ μ΄μ νκ³ μ νλ€. μμ λ½ κ΅κ°κ±΄μ€ κ³Όμ μμ κ΅κ°μ리νΈκ° μ¬νλ‘λΆν° μμμ μΆμΆνκΈ° μν΄ κ΅κ°μ λλ₯Ό κ°νμν€λ κ²κ³Όλ μ¬λ λ°λλλ μμμ΄λ€. μ΄λ¬ν μ리νΈμ κ΅κ°μ½ν μ λ΅μ λ€μν μ΄νμ λ΅μ μν΄ μ΄μ§ νΉμ μ μ§λ μ μλ€. κ·Έ μ€ νλκ° λ°λ‘ ν곡μ°κ΅κ°μ μ¬μ¬κΆ μ¬ν립 μ λ΅μ΄λ€. κΈκ²©ν μ¬μ ν μ μ±
μ νκ³΅μ° μ리νΈμ κ΅κ°μ½ν μ λ΅μ κ°νμμΌ κ΅κ° νλΆκ΅¬μ‘°κΆλ ₯μ μ½νλ‘ κ·κ²°λλ€. μ΄μ λ¬λ¦¬ λΆλΆμ μ¬μ°κΆ μ¬ν립 μ μ±
μ κ΅κ°μ리νΈμ κ΅κ°μ½ν μ΄ν΄λ₯Ό μ½νμμΌ μμ₯μ΄νκ³Όμ μμ νλΆκ΅¬μ‘°κΆλ ₯μ νλ½μ λ§μ μ μλ€.Party-states and state-owned planned economies characterized the communist states. Because of these institutional roots, economic, political, and civil societies had to be institutionally differentiated from the party-state in the post-communist transition. In this process, state elites had a strong incentive to weaken state institutions in order to facilitate the transfer of state-owned properties into their private riches. Their strategy to weaken the state was quite in contrast to that of state elites in Western European state-building. Various transition strategies affected post-communist state elites who wished to loot the state. One of them was property rights reform of state-owned properties. A complete privatization encouraged and helped state elites to extract resources from the state and harm its capacity. In particular, it was observed that a rapid downfall of state capacity was attributable to a complete privatization carried out under an imperfect democracy. On the other hand, a partial property rights reform discouraged state elites to prey on the state and helped the state to maintain its administrative capacity throughout the transitional period
Rent-seeking Types of Elites and Regime Trajectories in Russia, North Korea, and China
λ¬μμ, λΆν, μ€κ΅ μ리νΈμ μ§λμΆκ΅¬ μ νμ κ°κ° κ΅κ°ν¬μν, κ΅κ°κ·μν, κ΅κ°μμ‘΄νμΌλ‘ ꡬλΆνλ€. λ¬μμμ κ΅κ°ν¬μν μ§λμΆκ΅¬μΈ κ΅μ§μ κ±°λλ₯Ό ν΅ν κ΅λΆμνμ λ΅μ μ΄κΈ° λΆμμ ν λ―Όμ£Όμ νμ μ§μμ μ νμ μΉνμ±μ μ§λ
λ€. νμ§λ§ μ΄λ¬ν μ§λμΆκ΅¬κ° λ
립μ μλ³Έκ°κ³κΈμ λΆμ¬, κΈμ¦νλ κ²½μ μ λΆνλ±μ± λ±μ μΌκΈ°νλ©΄μ λ¬μμμ μ λμ νμ μ§μλ κΆμμ£Όμλ‘ λ³λͺ¨νλ€. λΆνμ μ리νΈλ κ·Ήμ¬ν κ²½μ λκ³Ό κ³ λλ‘ λ°λ¬ν κ΅κ°κΈ°κ΅¬λΌλ κ²½μ μ μ λμ 쑰건 νμμ κ΅κ°λ‘ κ·μνμ¬ μμ μ μ μΉκ²½μ μ μ§μλ₯Ό μ μ§ λ³΄μ‘΄νλ€. μ΄λ μ리νΈμ μμ°νΉμ μ±μ λμ΄λ©΄μ λ¨κΈ°μ μ΄λλ§ κΆμμ£Όμλ₯Ό κ³΅κ³ ν νλ€. μ€κ΅μ μ리νΈλ νλ°μ μΌλ‘ ν½μ°½νλ μμ₯κ²½μ μ μμ μ μ§λμΆκ΅¬ κΆλ¦¬λ₯Ό μ§μ§ν΄μ£Όλ λΉ-κ΅κ°μ¬μ΄μμ λ€μν κ²½μ μ μ§λλ₯Ό μ·¨λνλ€. λ°λΌμ μ μΉμ λμ μ ν΅ν΄ λ€μμ£Όμμ μ μΉμ§μ νμ±μ 맀μ§ν κ²½μ μ μ΄μ κ° μ΄λ€μκ²λ μμλ€. μ€νλ € μ νμ κΆμμ£Όμμ κ³΅κ³ νλ₯Ό ν΅ν΄ μ΄λ€μ μμ₯μμ λ°μν λΆμ μ¬λΆλ°°λ₯Ό λλͺ¨νλ€.
This study classifies elites in Russia, North Korea, and China in terms of the types of rent-seeking: state-capturing, state-vested, state-dependent. Russian elites captured the state through strategic local transactions to loot out state properties into their private riches. They preferred an unconsolidated democracy to a strong authoritarianism. However, their relentless capture of state properties led to a rapid increase of economic inequality and a weak civil society to erode the foundations of the fledgling democracy and eventually facilitated an authoritarian turn in Russia. Elites in North Korea, because of its extreme poverty and highly developed state apparatus, clung to the state in order to maintain their various privileges. As a result of their state-vested rent-seeking strategy, the specificity of their power resources increased and sustained the stability of the poverty-ridden party-state. The Chinese elites relied on discretionary and arbitrary employments of regulatory rules and de-facto property rights of state-owned properties to extract wealth from the rapidly growing market. Therefore, they preferred an authoritarian regime to a pluralistic political order. However, they worked to limit its central authority in order to preserve their lucrative rent-seeking sources at the same time