49 research outputs found

    Building an empirical model for evaluating local government`s policy output : Focusing on the quality-of-life and local competitiveness indicators

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธๅคงๅญธๆ ก ่กŒๆ”ฟๅคงๅญธ้™ข :่กŒๆ”ฟๅญธ็ง‘ ่กŒๆ”ฟๅญธๅฐˆๆ”ป,1996.Docto

    A study on the path-dependency of the public employee quota system: The lump-sum perconnel expenditure system in local government

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    ์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜์กด์„ฑ ๊ด€์ ์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•˜์—ฌ ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ž์น˜๋‹จ์ฒด์˜ ๊ณต๋ฌด์› ์ •์›๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ œ๋„ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ณผ์ •์„ ๊ณ ์ฐฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์ฒซ์งธ, ๊ธฐ์กด ์ œ๋„์˜ ์ž”์žฌ๊ฐ€ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ•ฉ๋ฆฌ์  ์„ ํƒ์„ ์ œ์•ฝํ•˜๋Š” ์ œ๋„์  ํƒ€์„ฑ์ด ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์•ก์ธ๊ฑด๋น„ ๊ทœ๋ชจ ์ฑ…์ •์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ํ˜„์žฌ์˜ ์ •์›์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ธ์ •, ๋ณด์ •์ •์›์˜ ์œ ์ง€, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ง์†๊ธฐ๊ด€ยท์‚ฌ์—…์†Œยท์ถœ์žฅ์†Œ ์„ค์น˜๊ธฐ์ค€์˜ ์ž”์กด ๋“ฑ์€ ๊ธฐ์กด ์ œ๋„์˜ ์ž๊ธฐ๊ฐ•ํ™”์  ๊ธฐ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ž‘๋™๋œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ๋ฃŒ๋˜๋ฉฐ, ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ œ๋„๋กœ์˜ ์ „ํ™˜์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์ž ์žฌ์  ๋น„์šฉ์„ ๋ฐœ์ƒ์‹œ์ผœ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜์กด์  ๋ณ€ํ™”ํŒจํ„ด์„ ๊ฐ€์ ธ์™”๋‹ค๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ์ค‘์•™๋ถ€์ฒ˜ ๊ด€๋ฃŒ๋“ค์˜ ์‚ฌ๊ณ ์™€ ๊ฐ€์น˜์ฒด๊ณ„์— ์˜ํ•ด ๊ธฐ์กด ์ œ๋„์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ์  ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ด ์ง€์†๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜์กด์„ฑ์ด ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ค‘์•™๊ด€๋ฃŒ๋“ค์€ ์ž์น˜๋‹จ์ฒด์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์™„์ „ํ•œ ์ž์œจ์„ฑ ๋ณด์žฅ์€ ๊ณ ์œ„์ง ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํŒฝ์ฐฝ๊ณผ ๊ทธ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์ž์น˜๋‹จ์ฒด์˜ ๊ธฐํ˜•์  ์ธ๋ ฅ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ์ค‘์•™์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ตœ์ข…์  ๊ฒฌ์ œ์žฅ์น˜๊ฐ€ ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฐ€์น˜์ฒด๊ณ„ ๋˜๋Š” ์‹ ๋…์„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์…‹์งธ, ์ด์•ก์ธ๊ฑด๋น„์ œ์˜ ๋„์ž…์€ ํ‘œ์ค€์ •์›์ œํ•˜์—์„œ ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋˜ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ํ•˜์œ„์ œ๋„๋“ค์ด ํ์ง€ ๋˜๋Š” ๋Œ€์ฒด๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์ดํƒˆ์  ์–‘ํƒœ์™€ ๊ธฐ์กด ์ œ๋„์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ๋‚ด์šฉ์ด ์ง€์†๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜์กด์  ํŠน์„ฑ์ด ํ˜ผ์žฌ๋œ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์ „ํ™˜์  ํŠน์ง•์„ ๋ณด์ด๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์ „ํ™˜์  ํŠน์„ฑ์— ๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•œ ์š”์ธ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ๋Œ€ํ†ต๋ น์˜ ๋ถ„๊ถŒ์˜์ง€, ์ฃผ์š” ์ •์ฑ…๊ฒฐ์ •์ž์˜ ์ „๋žต์  ์„ ํƒ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ๋ ฅ๊ณผ ์ง€๋ฐฉ๋ถ„๊ถŒ์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜๋Š” ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์  ์š”๊ตฌ ๋“ฑ์„ ๋“ค ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. The purpose of this article is to examine the change of the public employee quota system in local government from a path-dependence perspective. First of all, this analysis finds that the institutional inertia of the old institution restricts the rational choices of the new one. In deciding the level of the lump-sum personnel expenditure in local government, admission of the existing local employee quota, maintenance of the supplementary quota, and remnants of the standards for establishing subordinate organizations are thought to be caused by the self-reinforcing mechanisms of the old system, which resulted in path-dependent change of institutions by producing potential cost of transformation into the new system. Second, it shows that the belief system of central public employees continues to reinforce the core part of the existing system. Third, the introduction of the lump-sum personnel expenditure system is characterized by a switch-over from the old path, which is influenced by the president's strong willingness to decentralize, strategic choices of primary policy-makers, and an environmental need for national competitiveness and local decentralization

    The Effects of Performance-based Pay from the Experience of Eleven Public Enterprises

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    ๊ณต๊ธฐ์—… ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ์šด์šฉ์„ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ธ๊ณ  ์‹คํšจ์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์˜๋ฌธ์ด ๊พธ์ค€ํžˆ ์ œ๊ธฐ๋˜์–ด ์™”๋‹ค. ์ตœ๊ทผ๊นŒ์ง€๋„ ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ตญ๋‚ด์™ธ ๋…ผ์Ÿ์ด ์—ฌ์ „ํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ์ด์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ํ•™์ˆ ์  ๋…ผ์Ÿ๋„ ์ƒ๋‹นํ•˜๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ๊ตญ๋‚ด์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์•„์ง๋„ ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์˜ ์‹ค์ œ ํšจ๊ณผ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹ค์ฆ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ฐพ๊ธฐ ์–ด๋ ต๊ณ , ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ์„ฑ๊ณผ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ํšจ๊ณผ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ์ฃผ๋กœ ์ฃผ๊ด€์  ์ธ์‹์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ํ•œ๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” 11๊ฐœ ๊ตญ๋‚ด (์ค€)์‹œ์žฅํ˜• ๊ณต๊ธฐ์—…์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ 2005~2010๋…„ ๋™์•ˆ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๋ณด์ˆ˜์ œ(์—ฐ๋ด‰์ œ ์ง์›๋น„์ค‘, ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์—ฐ๋ด‰ ๊ฒฉ์ฐจ, ์„ฑ๊ณผ์—ฐ๋ด‰๊ฒฉ์ฐจ, ๊ธฐ๊ด€์žฅ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ๋น„์ค‘)์™€ ๊ธฐ๊ด€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ(์ผ์ธ๋‹น ๋งค์ถœ์•ก, ์ผ์ธ๋‹น ๋ถ€๊ฐ€๊ฐ€์น˜, ๊ฒฝ์˜ํ‰๊ฐ€์ ์ˆ˜) ์‚ฌ์ด์˜ ์—ฐ๊ด€์„ฑ์„ ์‹ค์ฆ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ์‹ค์ฆ๋ถ„์„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅด๋ฉด ๊ฒฝ์˜ํ‰๊ฐ€์ ์ˆ˜์™€ ๊ฐ์ข… ์„ฑ๊ณผ๋ณด์ˆ˜์ œ๋„ ์‚ฌ์ด์—๋Š” ํ†ต๊ณ„์  ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์—†๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด, ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์—ฐ๋ด‰ ๊ฒฉ์ฐจ๋‚˜ ์—ฐ๋ด‰์ œ ์‹œํ–‰ ์ง์› ๋น„์ค‘์€ ๋ถ€๊ฐ€๊ฐ€์น˜์•ก๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ์ง€ํ‘œ์™€๋Š” ๊ด€๋ จ์ด ์—†๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ ๊ธฐ๊ด€์žฅ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ๋น„์ค‘์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์ผ์ธ๋‹น ๋ถ€๊ฐ€๊ฐ€์น˜์™€ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ด€์„ฑ์„ ๋ณด์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์„ฑ๊ณผ์—ฐ๋ด‰๊ฒฉ์ฐจ๊ฐ€ ํ™•๋Œ€๋ ์ˆ˜๋ก ์ผ์ธ๋‹น ๋งค์ถœ์•ก์ด ์˜คํžˆ๋ ค ์ค„์–ด๋“œ๋Š” ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ๋ณธ๋ž˜์˜ ์ทจ์ง€์— ๋ฐ˜ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋„ ๋‚˜์™”๋‹ค. ์ด์ƒ์˜ ๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ 11๊ฐœ ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๋ณด์ˆ˜์ œ์™€ ๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ฑ๊ณผ ์‚ฌ์ด์˜ ์—ฐ๊ด€์„ฑ์„ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌํ•˜๊ธฐ ์–ด๋ ต๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ฃผ์žฅํ•œ๋‹ค. ํ–ฅํ›„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ณผ์ œ๋กœ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€ ์ „์ฒด๋กœ ๊ทธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฒ”์œ„๋ฅผ ํ™•์žฅํ•˜์—ฌ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ๊ด€์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ธก์ • ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์˜ ์„ค๊ณ„์™€ ์šด์šฉ๋ฐฉ์‹ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ ์šฉ ๋ถ„์•ผ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํŒ๋‹จ๋˜๋ฉฐ, ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐ€ ๊ด‘๋ฒ”์œ„ํ•œ ์กฐ์ง์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์— ๊ด€ํ•œ (์ค€)์‹คํ—˜์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ํ™•๋ณดํ•˜์—ฌ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํƒ€๋‹น์„ฑ์„ ๋†’์ผ ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค.The effectiveness of pay for performance(PFP) in public enterprises has continued to be debated in South Korea. The debate around the world is still hot and the impact of pay for performance on organizational performance(OP) is still controversial in the academic world. However, there has been little empirical research on this topic, where several studies have critical limitations relying on subjective (not objective) measures of performance. This study explores the relationship between pay for performance and organizational performance in eleven (quasi) market-type public enterprises from 2001 to 2010. The empirical results showed no relationship between the non-quantitative area score of management evaluation and organizational performance. Both the variation of basic annual salary and the proportion of pay for performance for employees had no significant impact on the sales performance of and per capita added value. However, the proportion of pay for performance in annual CEO salary had a significant impact on the per capita added value. On the other hand, there was a significant negative relationship between pay for performance and per capita sales. These findings suggest an unclear relationship between pay for performance and organizational performance. Further research needs to examine the impact of pay for performance, using (quasi) experimental data with all of the public enterprises. It is also necessary to explore how the impact of pay for performance on organizational performance differs between various types of performance-based and task characteristics
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