15 research outputs found

    Issues of Measuring Factor specificity and Political Resistance to Free Trade

    No full text
    ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์ฑ…์˜ ๊ฒฐ์ •์„ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ผ ์ •์ฑ… ์—ฐํ•ฉ์ด ์ž๋ณธ๊ณผ ๋…ธ๋™ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰๊ฐ„์˜ ์ดํ•ด ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ์‚ฐ์—…๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ํ˜„์ƒ์€ ๋ฆฌ์นด์•„๋„-๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ์˜ˆ์ธก๊ณผ ์ผ์น˜ํ•œ ๋‹ค. ๋ฆฌ์นด์•„๋„-๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์น˜์— ์ ์šฉํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ํ•ต์‹ฌ ๊ฐœ๋…์ธ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์š”์†Œ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ์˜ ์ธก์ • ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ตœ๊ทผ ๋ช‡๋ช‡ ํ•™์ž๋“ค์€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์š”์†Œ์˜ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ ์„ ์‚ฐ์—…์กฐ์ง๋ก ์—์„œ ์“ฐ์—ฌ์ง€๋Š” ์š”์†Œ์ด๋™์„ฑ์˜ ์ง€ํ‘œ๋“ค์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์ธก์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ง€ํ‘œ๋“ค์€ ํ†ต์ƒ ์ด๋ก ์—์„œ ์ ์‹œํ•˜๋Š” ์š”์†Œ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ์„ ์ธก์ •ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ณด๊ธฐ๋Š” ํž˜ ๋“ค๋‹ค. ์‹œ์žฅ ๊ตฌ์กฐ ๋ฐ ์‚ฐ์—… ์กฐ์ง์˜ ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์ด ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์ฑ…์˜ ๊ฒฐ์ •์— ์ผ์ •ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์€ ์ด๋ก ์˜ ์—ฌ์ง€๊ฐ€ ์—†์œผ๋‚˜, ์š”์†Œ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ์˜ ์ฐจ์ด์—์„œ ๋น„๋กฏ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ํ”ผํ•ด ์™€ ์ •์น˜์  ์ €ํ•ญ์˜ ์‚ฐ์—…๊ฐ„ ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ฃผ์ง€๋Š” ์•Š๋Š”๋‹ค. ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ๋Š” ํ†ต์ƒ ์ด๋ก  ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์  ํ•จ์˜์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ง ๋ฐ ๋น„์ƒ์‚ฐ์ง ๊ทผ๋กœ์ž์—๊ฒŒ ์ง€๋ถˆ๋˜๋Š” ์ด์ž„๊ธˆ์ด ์ด์ƒ ์‚ฐ์—์„œ ์ฐจ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์œจ์„ ์š”์†Œ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ์˜ ์ธก์ • ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์œผ๋กœ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด์ž„๊ธˆ๋น„์œจ์ด ๋†’์€ ์‚ฐ์—…์ผ์ˆ˜๋ก ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์š”์†Œ์˜ ํŠนํ™” ์ •๋„๊ฐ€ ํฌ๊ณ  ๋…ธ๋™ ๋ฐ ์ž๋ณธ์˜ ์ด๋™์„ฑ์ด ๋‚ฎ์•„์ง์œผ๋กœ์จ, ์ž์œ  ๋ฌด์—ญ ์ •์ฑ…์— ์ €ํ•ญํ•  ๋™๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ์ปค์ง„๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋œ ์š”์†Œ์ด๋™์„ฑ์˜ ์ง€ ํ‘œ๋“ค๊ณผ ์ด์ž„๊ธˆ๋น„์œจ์˜ ๋น„๊ต๋Š” ์ด์ƒ์‚ฐ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ด์ž„๊ธˆ๋น„์œจ์ด ๋ณด๋‹ค ์œ ํšจํ•œ ์š”์†ŒํŠน์ •์„ฑ ์˜ ์ธก์ • ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์ž„์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ค€๋‹ค. Recent studies of trade politics introduce continuous indicators of factor mobility, such as differentials in wages and profits (Hiscox 2002), income level (Scheve 2001), and research and development spending (Alt et al, 1999). Most indicators of factor mobility suggested by various authors originate from empirical studies of industrial organization. It is dubious whether such measures are discernible from effects derived from market conditions other than factor specificity. Most indicators of market structure are not related closely to the concept of factor specificity stated in the pure theory of trade. The confusion becomes a serious problem when indicators of market structure and performance are directly adopted as measures of factor specificity. Any description of market structure is a phenomenon that needs explanation by other political and economical variables, not an independent variable indicating basic conditions of market structure such as factor specificity. I suggest wages and salaries (payroll) to value added ratio (PVA) as an alternative measurement of factor specificity. PVA can capture both economical and technological characteristics of industries varying by proportional differences in factor specificity. The more the industry requires specific factors, the higher the ratio of distributive shares of wages and salaries to value added. PVA mirrors the elasticity of substitution between general and specific factors, on one hand, and, on the other hand, reflects the strategic behavior of firms to increase rents from product specialization. The expectation is that those engaged in an industry of higher average PVA would have more incentive to protest free trade that will cause price drops of the commodity they produce. A comparison of performances between alternative measurement schemes shows that PVA is an appropriate measurement of factor specificity and the potential intensity of political resistance against free trade policy

    The Political Economy of the Globalization of Production in the U.S. Automotive Industry

    No full text
    ์ผ๋ณธ๊ณผ ์œ ๋Ÿฝ์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์—…์ฒด๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ์‹œ์žฅ์„ ํฌ๊ฒŒ ์ž ์‹๋‹นํ–ˆ๋˜ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋Š” 1990๋…„๋Œ€ ๋ถ€ํฅ์„ ๋งž์ดํ•˜์˜€๊ณ  ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์„ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ์•„์›ƒ์†Œ์‹ฑ์— ์˜์กดํ•˜๋Š” ๋ชจ์œจ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋ฐฉ์‹์„ ๋ณธ๊ฒฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋„์ž…ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ง€๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ๋ฐฉ์‹์€ 2008๋…„ GM๊ณผ ํฌ๋ผ์ด์Šฌ๋Ÿฌ์˜ ํŒŒ์‚ฐ ์‚ฌํƒœ ์ง์ „๊นŒ์ง€๋„ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ๋ชจ๋ธ๋กœ ๊ฐ๊ด‘์„ ๋ฐ›์•˜๋‹ค ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์‹ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ๋ฐฉ์‹์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜๋Š” ๋งŽ์€ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ง€๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์˜ ๋ถˆ์ถฉ๋ถ„ํ•œ ์‹คํ˜„์—์„œ ์ฐพ๋Š”๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ 2000๋…„๋Œ€ ๋“ค์–ด ๋ณธ๊ฒฉํ™”๋œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ๋ฐฉ์‹ ๊ฐœํŽธ์€ 1970๋…„๋Œ€๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์ง€์†๋˜์–ด ์˜จ ์ˆ˜์ž… ์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ๋Œ€์‘ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋กœ ํŒŒ์•…๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์™ธ๊ตญ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ํšŒ์‚ฌ๋“ค์˜ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ํ˜„์ง€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๊ณผ ํŒ๋งค๊ฐ€ ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ๋ณดํ˜ธ์ฃผ์˜ ์ •์ฑ…์ด๋‚˜ ๊ธฐํƒ€์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์„ ๋™์›ํ•œ ์ด์œค ํ™•๋ณด๊ฐ€ ์–ด๋ ค์›Œ์ง€์ž ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ์žฌํŽธ์„ ์‹œ๋„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค GM. ํฌ๋“œ๏ผŒ ํฌ๋ผ์ด์Šฌ๋Ÿฌ๊ฐ€ ๋„์ž…ํ•œ ๋ชจ์œจ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋ฐฉ์‹์€ ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ ๊ณต๊ธ‰ ์—…์ฒด๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์šฐ์›”์  ์ง€์œ„๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๋น„์šฉ ์ ˆ๊ฐ ์ „๋žต์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ์ „๋žต์€ ๋ณธ์งˆ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ง€๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ์†์„ฑ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ์š”๊ตฌํ–ˆ๋˜ 1980 ๋…„๋Œ€ ๋Œ€์‘์ด๋‚˜ ๊ณผ์ •์  ์ง€์œ„๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์„ ์œ ์ง€ํ–ˆ๋˜ 1970๋…„๋Œ€์˜ ๋Œ€์‘๊ณผ ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๋‹ค๋ฅด์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋Œ€์‘ ์ „๋žต์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ํ˜ธํ™ฉ๊ณผ ์ €์œ ๋ผ๋Š” ์กฐ๊ฑด ์†์—์„œ๋งŒ ์ž‘๋™ํ•  ์ˆ˜์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. Many studies on the U.S. automotive industry after the 1990s have praised the advent of the modular production networks as a new American model of industrial organization. The U.S. automotive industry has been thought to resume its competitiveness against foreign automobile companies owing to the superiority of new model of modular production to just in time and lean manufacturing model. The U.S. automotive industry has been hailed as in the leading position of the new trend with global mega-suppliers. However, these studies failed to relate the 2008 crisis of the U.S. auto industry to the very new model of global production. This article traces the political response of the U.S. automobile industry confronting foreign competitions and extends it to the globalization strategy after the 1990s. The political response of the "Big Three" of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler to save profits in the 1970s and 1980s evolved into the globalization strategy after the 1990s, which has exploited domestic auto parts suppliers demanding more responsibilities of production and more cost cuts in the name of modular production system.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2008๋…„ ์ •๋ถ€(๊ต์œก๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ถ€)์˜ ์žฌ์›์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž„(KRF-2008-B00005

    A Bargaining Analysis of the Strength and Limit of US Hegemonic Power for Lifting Trade Barriers

    No full text
    1980๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ๋ฐ˜ ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ๋‹ค์ž๊ฐ„ ํ˜‘์ƒ์— ์˜ํ•œ ์ƒํ˜ธ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ์›์น™์„ ์‚ฌ์‹ค์ƒ ํ๊ธฐํ•˜๊ณ , ์ผ๋ จ์˜ ์–‘์ž๊ฐ„ ํ˜‘์ƒ์„ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ์ฃผ์š” ๋ฌด์—ญ ์ƒ๋Œ€๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์ฑ…์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•์š”ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ํŒจ๊ถŒ์  ์ง€ํœ˜๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ ์ด๊ณ  ์ผ๋ฐฉ์ ์ธ ๊ฐ•์š”๊ฐ€ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ต์—ญ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜ ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์ฑ… ๋ณ€ํ™”์˜ ์š”์ธ์œผ๋กœ ์ž‘์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋Š” ์ง€๋Š” ๋ถ„๋ช…ํ•˜์ง€๊ฐ€ ์•Š๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ์ƒ๋Œ€์  ํž˜์˜ ์šฐ์œ„๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ ๋ณดํ˜ธ๋ฌด์—ญ ์žฅ๋ฒฝ์„ ์ œ๊ฑฐํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ์–‘์ž๊ฐ„ ํ˜‘์ƒ์— ์ƒ๋Œ€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์„ ์ด๋Œ์–ด ๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ์€ ๋ถ„๋ช…ํ•ด ๋ณด์ด์ง€๋งŒ, ํŒจ๊ถŒ์  ์ง€์œ„๊ฐ€ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ž์œ  ๋ฌด์—ญ ํ˜‘์ƒ์˜ ์„ฑ๊ณต์„ ๋ณด์žฅํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ง€๋Š” ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ๋ช…ํ™•ํ•œ ์ด๋ก ์  ์„ค๋ช…์ด ์š”๊ตฌ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ธ€์—์„œ๋Š” ์ •์น˜๊ฒฝ์ œ ํ•™์ž๋“ค์— ์˜ํ•ด ๋ฐœ์ „๋œ ํ˜‘์ƒ์ด๋ก (the theory of bargaining)์„ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ๋ถ„์„ํ‹€๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ, ํŒจ๊ถŒ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ•์š”ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ํ†ต์ƒ ์ •์ฑ… ๋ณ€ํ™”์˜ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํ•œ๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ๋‹ค. ํ˜‘์ƒ ์ƒ๋Œ€๊ตญ๋“ค์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋ณด๋ณต ์กฐ์น˜๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ์˜ˆ์ƒ๋˜๋Š” ํ”ผํ•ด๋ฅผ ๋ง‰๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ฐ•์š”๋œ ํ†ต์ƒ ํ˜‘์ƒ์— ์‘ํ•˜๊ธฐ๋Š” ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ, ๋ณดํ˜ธ์ฃผ์˜ ์žฅ๋ฒฝ์„ ๋‚ฎ์ถ”๋ ค๋Š” ์•ฝ์†์ด๋‚˜ ํ˜‘์ •์ด ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์š”๊ตฌ ์ˆ˜์ค€์— ๋ฏธ์น  ์ˆ˜ ์—†์Œ์„ ํ˜‘์ƒ ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์„ค๋ช…ํ•œ๋‹ค. The bargaining setting of a forced trade talk can be created only when the US possesses relatively dominant power. A hegemonic state is, in this sense, one that possesses the ability to make others share its burdens by spreading its economic losses onto others shoulders. I suggest a bargaining model of forced trade talk that examine the strength and limits of hegemonic power in obtaining concessions. In the bargaining, the US can gain a full concession from a target if the partner state is extremely weak. When the bragaining is wholly driven by the US economic power, smaller economied would give more concessions to US demands. The amount of benefits, however, can be negligible compared to potential benefits from larger targets. The US surely can benefit more from opening larger markets, but larger econornies are less afraid of retaliation than smaller states. The US needs to consider tactics to increase its share from the bargaining. In the quest to increase the amount of total gains from negotiations and to enhance the chance of reaching agreements, there arises the possibility of utilizing linkage politics. The US may look for strategies that can alter a partner's evaluation of econornic gains. When the US succeeds in finding an issue to link with an economic issue, both the chance of reaching agreement and the potential gains from bargaining increase for the US. The economic power asymmetry structures the terms of concessions from the target. The political relationship between the US and the target changes the single dimensional conflict of the win-lose game into a linkage game in which additional benefits exist

    The U.S-ROK Alliance in the Unipolar System

    No full text
    ํ•œ๋ฏธ๋™๋งน์€ ํ•œ๋ฐ˜๋„๋ฅผ ๋„˜์–ด์„œ ์ง€์—ญ์  ์•ˆ์ •์— ๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ์œ„ํ˜‘์— ๋Œ€์ฒ˜ํ•˜๋Š” ํฌ๊ด„์  ๋™๋งน์œผ๋กœ ์žฌ๊ทœ์ •๋˜๋ฉด์„œ ๋ณธ์งˆ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณ€ํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํ•œ๋ฏธ๋™๋งน์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋œ ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์„ ๋ฐํžˆ๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ๋‹จ๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„ํ•˜์—์„œ ์ „๊ฐœ๋˜๋Š” ๋™๋งน ์ •์น˜์˜ ํŠน์ง•์„ ๋ถ„๋ช…ํžˆ ์ดํ•ดํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‹จ๊ทน์งˆ์„œํ•˜์˜ ๋™๋งน์€ ๋™๋งน์˜ ๋ชฉ์ , ๋™๋งน์˜ ๋น„์šฉ๊ณผ ์ด๋“์˜ ๋ถ„๋‹ด, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋™๋งน์˜ ๊ฒฐ์†๋ ฅ ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ์–‘๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„ํ•˜์˜ ๋™๋งน๊ณผ๋Š” ํ™•์—ฐํžˆ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„๋œ๋‹ค. ๋ƒ‰์ „ ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ์ข…์‹๊ณผ ๋‹จ๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ๋“ฑ์žฅ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์  ์œ„ํ˜‘ ์–ต์ง€ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ํ•œ๋ฏธ์•ˆ๋ณด๋™๋งน์˜ ํšจ์šฉ์„ฑ์ด ์ƒ์‹ค๋˜๋ฉด์„œ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ๋™๋งน ์ •์น˜๊ฐ€ ์ „๊ฐœ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹จ๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ๋™๋งน ์ •์น˜๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์•ˆ๋ณด ์ „๋žต์  ์„ ํƒ์— ์˜ํ•ด ์ขŒ์šฐ๋œ๋‹ค. ์–‘๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„ํ•˜์—์„œ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •๋˜์—ˆ๋˜ ๋™๋งน์˜ ๊ฒฐ์†๋ ฅ์€ ๋‹จ๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„ํ•˜์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ฑฐ์˜ ์˜๋ฏธ๊ฐ€ ์—†์–ด์กŒ๋‹ค. ์–‘๊ทน ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ๋™๋งน ๊ด€๊ณ„์—์„œ ์ดˆ๊ฐ•๋Œ€๊ตญ๋“ค์˜ ์ „๋žต์  ์ด์ต์— ์˜ํ•ด ๋ณดํ˜ธ๋ฐ›๋˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์€ ์ด์ œ ๊ตญ์ง€์  ์œ„ํ˜‘์„ ์ง์ ‘ ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋™๋งน ๊ฒฐ์†๋ ฅ์˜ ์•ฝํ™”๋กœ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋™๋งน ๋Œ€์ƒ๊ตญ์€ ์•ˆ์ „์„ ๋ณด์žฅ๋ฐ›๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ์ •์น˜์ , ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋” ๋งŽ์€ ํ—Œ์‹ ๊ณผ ๋น„์šฉ์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ๋™๋งน ์œ ์ง€๋ฅผ ์›ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค๊ณผ ์•ˆ๋ณด ์ด์ต์„ ๊ณต์œ ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์•ˆ๋ณด ์ด์ต์— ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋™๋งน๋งŒ์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํ•œ๋ฏธ๋™๋งน์„ ์œ ์ง€ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ํ•œ๊ตญ์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ๊ตฌ์ƒํ•˜๋Š” ํฌ๊ด„์  ๋™๋งน์˜ ๋ชฉํ‘œ์— ๋ถ€ํ•ฉํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋” ๋งŽ์€ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ๋น„์šฉ๊ณผ ์ •์น˜์  ๋ถ€๋‹ด์„ ๊ฐ์ˆ˜ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ํ•œ๋ฐ˜๋„์˜ ์•ˆ์ •๊ณผ ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ์ด์ต์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ณดํ—˜์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•ด ์ค„ ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ™•์‹ ์ด ๋ถ„๋ช…ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ์ƒํ™ฉ์— ์„œ ํ•œ๋ฏธ๋™๋งน์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ ์‹ผ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑ๊ณผ ์ €ํ•ญ์€ ์ง€์†๋  ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ํฌ๋‹ค. The U.S.-ROK Alliance has been transforming from a military treaty to a comprehensive alliance to meet new challenges of global threats. However, the main force of alliance formation has been neglected in the debates on the changes in the nature of the alliance. Many criticize the realist approach of the Korean governments to the threats imminent to the stability of the Korean Peninsula. While conflicts surrounding the alliance transformation might have been caused either from the nationalistic mood in Korea or the narrow conceptions of South Korean security defense, a truly critical factor that has changed the nature of the alliance is the collapse of the Cold War and the rise of a unipolar world. In the U.S.-led unipolar world, the traditional alliances should be based upon the fundamentally different rasion-dรชtre compared to the previous one. Alliance politics in the unipolar system dissolves the cohesion of an alliance as the threat that formed the alliance disappears. Allies still need to deal with threats and adversaries but the U.S. as the unipole no longer shares the security concerns with allies since all of the threats become localized or non-structural. For the U.S., the conventional threats of North Korea to South Korea turn into parochial concerns. The U.S. would need the U.S.-ROK Alliance in so far as it serves the goal of the U.S. East Asian regional security strategy, not to protect self-reliant South Korea. The U.S. demands larger contributions and more responsibilities from South Korea to enhance the role of the alliance. This change could lead to serious conflicts if the two allies fail to provide the assurances of the validity of the new comprehensive alliance to their own constituencies

    Louis Hartzs The Liberal Tradition in America Reconsidered

    No full text
    1955๋…„ ์ถœ๊ฐ„๋œ ๋ฃจ์ด์Šค ํ•˜์ธ ์˜ ใ€Ž๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ์ „ํ†ตใ€์€ ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •์น˜์‚ฌ์‚ฌ์—ฅ ๊ฐ•๋ ฅํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ๋ ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ด๋‹ค. ใ€Ž๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ์ „ํ†ตใ€์€ ์ถœ๊ฐ„ ์ฆ‰์‹œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ํ•ฉ์˜์ฃผ์˜ ํ•™ํŒŒ์˜ ์™„์„ฑ์œผ๋กœ ๊ทน์ฐฌ์„ ๋ฐ›์•˜์œผ๋‚˜ ์ดํ›„ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑํ•™ํŒŒ์˜ ์ง€์†์ ์ธ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์œผ๋กœ, 1980๋…„๋Œ€์—๋Š” ์˜ค๋ฅ˜๋กœ ๊ฐ€๋“ ์ฐฌ ์ž˜๋ชป๋œ ์Šค์นผ๋ผ์‹ญ์˜ ์ „ํ˜•์œผ๋กœ๊นŒ์ง€ ํ„ํ•˜๋˜์—ˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. 1990๋…„๋Œ€๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ํ•˜์ธ ๋Š” ์žฌ์กฐ๋ช…์„ ๋ฐ›๊ธฐ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ•˜์˜€๊ณ  ์ตœ๊ทผ์˜ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ํ•˜์ธ ์˜ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ถ„์„์ด ์ง€๋‹ˆ๋Š” ํ’๋ถ€ํ•œ ๊ฐœ๋…์— ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑํ•™ํŒŒ์˜ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋“ค๋„ ์žฌ์ ๊ฒ€ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ธ ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์—ญ์‚ฌํ•™๊ณ„์™€ ์ •์น˜ํ•™๊ณ„์˜ ์ง€์†์ ์ธ ๋…ผ์Ÿ๊ณผ ์žฌ์กฐ๋ช…์€ ๋ณ„๋„๋กœ ํ•˜์ธ ์˜ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ถ„์„์€ ํŠนํžˆ ์™ธ๋ถ€์˜ ๊ด€์ฐฐ์ž๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ๋Š” ๋Œ€๋‹จํžˆ ์œ ์šฉํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •์น˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„ํ‹€์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์  ์ •์‹ ์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ์„ ์ด๋ฃจ๋ฉด์„œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๊ตญ๋‚ด์™ธ ์ •์ฑ…์˜ ์ด๋…์  ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์„ ์ด๋ฃจ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ž์œ , ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€ ์ •ํ™•ํžˆ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐ”๊ฐ€ ๋ฌด์—‡์ด๋ฉฐ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜์  ์‹ ๋…์ด ๋ฏธ์นœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์ดํ•ดํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€ ์‰ฝ์ง€์•Š์€ ๊ณผ์ œ์ด๋‹ค. More than fifty years after its publication in 1955, Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America continues to wield its influence on the analysis of American political thought. As soon as its publication, Louis Harts's work praised as the culmination of consensus view on American politics. Hartz and his American Liberalism became, however, the foremost target of many criticisms since they posed bold and unpleasing challenges to the American way. Critics of them were so successful to disdain him as the model of bad scholarship and his work had been almost forgotten in the 1980s. From the 1990s scholars both form history and political science started to reexamine his work. Nowadays many find his work is still a valid framework even to explain conflictual cases which has been used to attack Hartz himself. Furthermore American Liberalism formulated by Hartz can work as a very useful intellectual guidance for foreigners since Hartz was one of the few American scholar who studied american politics in terms of comparison. This essay is to further our understanding of American as one of the best sources for the study of American political institutions, foreign policy, and even American social science

    Political Parties and Voters: A Revisit of E. E. Schattschneiders The Semi-sovereign People

    No full text
    ์ง€๋‚œ 20์—ฌ ๋…„๊ฐ„ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •์น˜๋Š” ์ •๋‹น ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ๊ณผ ์ •์ฑ…์  ์ถฉ๋Œ์˜ ์‹ฌํ™”๋กœ ์ •๋ถ€ ์ „๋ฐ˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ•œ ๋ถˆ์‹ ์„ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํ†ต์ƒ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–‘๊ทนํ™”๋กœ ์ง„๋‹จ๋˜๋Š” ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •์น˜์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜ ํ•ด๊ฒฐ์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์„ ๊ฑฐ์ œ๋„์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋‚˜ ์ž…๋ฒ• ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ์–‘๋‹น ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ถฉ๋Œ์„ ์™„ํ™”์‹œํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ œ๋„์  ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ๋„์ž…ํ•˜์ž๋Š” ์š”๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ์ปค์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์–‘๊ทนํ™”๋กœ ์ผ์ปฌ์–ด์ง€๋Š” ์ •๋‹จ ๊ฐ„ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์˜ ์‹ฌํ™” ํ˜„์ƒ์ด ๊ณผ์—ฐ ์–‘๊ทนํ™”๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •๋˜์–ด ์งˆ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ง€, ๊ทธ๋ ‡๋‹ค๋ฉด ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ถ„์—ด์„ ๊ฐ€์ ธ ์˜จ ์›์ธ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ๋…ผ์Ÿ์ด ์ง„ํ–‰ ์ค‘์ด๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ธ€์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •๋‹น ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์˜ ๊ฐ•ํ™”๋ฅผ ์ƒท์Šˆ๋‚˜์ด๋”์˜ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑ์˜ ์ •์น˜ ํ‹€์—์„œ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์˜ ์‹ฌํ™”๋ฅผ ์ •์ฑ… ์ด์Šˆ๋ฅผ ์ƒˆ๋กญ๊ฒŒ ๊ทœ์ •ํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ ์ง€์ง€ ์„ธ๋ ฅ์„ ํ™•์žฅํ•˜๊ณ  ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋ฅผ ๋™์›ํ•˜๋ ค๋Š” ์–‘๋‹น์˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐ ์ „๋žต์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •์น˜๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•ด ์˜จ ์ง€๋ฐฐ์ ์ธ ๋ถ„์„ํ‹€์ธ ๋‹ค์šด์ฆˆ์˜ ์ค‘์œ„ ํˆฌํ‘œ ์ด๋ก ๊ณผ ๋ฉ”์ดํœด์˜ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์˜ ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ ์ด๋ก ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์˜ ์„ ํ˜ธ ๋ถ„ํฌ์™€๋Š” ๋ฌด๊ด€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ง€์†๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ •๋‹น ๊ฐ„ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์„ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ •๋‹น์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ ํ–‰์œ„์ž๋ฅผ ํŠน์ • ์ •์ฑ…์„ ์ถ”๊ตฌํ•˜๋Š” ์กฐ์งํ™”๋œ ์ด์ต์œผ๋กœ ๋ณด๋Š” ์ •์ฑ…์ค‘์‹ฌ์  ์ ‘๊ทผ๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑ์˜ ์ •์น˜๋Š” ์„ ๊ฑฐ ์Šน๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ •์ฑ…์„ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•˜๊ณ  ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž์˜ ์ง€์ง€๋ฅผ ๋™์›ํ•˜๋ ค๋Š” ์ •๋‹น์˜ ์ „๋žต์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋…์  ๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์˜ ์‹ฌํ™”๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•œ๋‹ค.The most common explanations of the radical divide between the American political parties center on the emergence of excessive partisanship and deep ideological divisions among political elites and officeholders. This phenomenon has been blamed as partisan polarization caused by Culture Wars that divided Americans into the culturally orthodox and the culturally progressive. This article tries to provide an alternative explanation of polarization relying on the framework of the scope of conflict originally developed by Schattschneider. Whether it is called polarization or sorting, American political parties have increased their influence on their members and partisan ties within the electorate have grown stronger since the 1980s. Those changes in the partisan politics have been resulted from electoral strategies adapted by political parties by which they redefined political conflicts along the issues of government intervention, social values, fiscal conservatism and geographical divisions

    Varieties of Production Globalization 2: A Comparative Analysis of Automobile Industries in the US, Germany, and Japan

    No full text
    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ๋ก ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์˜ ๊ณผ์ •๊ณผ ์–‘์ƒ์„ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์™€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ์žฌํŽธ์ด ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ์ด๋ก ์ด ์ „๋งํ•˜๋“ฏ์ด ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ์ƒ์‚ฐ์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ด๋˜์–ด ๊ฐ€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๊ณ , ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ์žฌํŽธ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์  ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค์˜ ์กด์žฌ์™€ ๊ทธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋ ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญยท๋…์ผยท์ผ๋ณธ์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์„ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋กœ ์„ ํƒํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ทธ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„ ์žฌํŽธ๊ณผ์ •์„ ๋ถ„์„, ๋น„๊ตํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝํ—˜์  ๋น„๊ต๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„ ์žฌํŽธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์  ์–‘์ƒ๊ณผ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณ„๋กœ์ƒ์ดํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ฐœ์ „์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ์ฝ”๋“œํ™”๋œ ์ง€์‹์„ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ตœ์ ๊ด€ํ–‰์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ด๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ๋ก ์ž๋“ค์˜ ์ฃผ์žฅ์€ ํ˜„์‹ค๊ณผ ๋ถ€ํ•ฉํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”๋‹ค. ์ตœ์†Œํ•œ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์•„์ง ์‹คํ˜„๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญยท๋…์ผยท์ผ๋ณธ์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์€ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์™€ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์˜ ์••๋ ฅ ํ•˜์—์„œ ๊ฐ๊ธฐ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ์ „๋žต์„ ์ถ”๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณ„๋กœ ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ์ œ๋„์  ์ œ์•ฝ ์•„๋ž˜ ํ–‰์œ„์ž๋“ค์˜ ์„ ํƒ์ด ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์žฌํŽธ์„ ์ด๋Œ์—ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ž…์žฅ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์—… ๊ฐ„ ๊ด€๊ณ„ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜ ์กด์ ์ธ ์ œ๋„์  ์š”์ธ์ด ์„ ๋„๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์„ ํƒ์„ ์ œ์•ฝํ•˜๊ณ , ์„ ๋„๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์„ ํƒ์€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„๊ฐœํŽธ์˜ ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋ฅผ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐ€ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋กœ ๊ท€๊ฒฐ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰, ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋Š” ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ์ฒด๊ณ„๋กœ์˜ ์ดํ–‰๊ณผ์ •์ด ์•„๋‹๋ฟ๋”๋Ÿฌ, ๊ทธ ๋™ํ•™์€ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์  ์š”์ธ์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ํ™˜์›์ ยท๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์ฃผ์˜์  ์ ‘๊ทผ์œผ๋กœ ์„ค๋ช…๋  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋‹ค.Since 1990s, many industries in the advanced industrial countries have reorganized their production regime by creating new production networks on the global scale in order to meet the challenges of globalization. The degree and mode of the so-called globalization of production differ among industries and among countries. Yet global value chain theorists predict that readjustment of national production regimes will converge toward a single best practiceโ€•i.e. modularity. This study examines the validity of this proposition by analyzing and comparing automobile industries of the U. S., Germany, and Japan, and argues that the path dependence of existing economic institutions brings varieties of production globalization.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2008๋…„ ์ •๋ถ€(๊ต์œก๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ถ€)์˜ ์žฌ์›์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž„ (KRF-2008-B00005)OAIID:oai:osos.snu.ac.kr:snu2012-01/102/0000043685/1SEQ:1PERF_CD:SNU2012-01EVAL_ITEM_CD:102USER_ID:0000043685ADJUST_YN:YEMP_ID:A077599DEPT_CD:216CITE_RATE:0FILENAME:์ฒจ๋ถ€๋œ ๋‚ด์—ญ์ด ์—†์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.DEPT_NM:์ •์น˜์™ธ๊ตํ•™๋ถ€EMAIL:[email protected]_YN:NCONFIRM:

    ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์˜ ๋‹ค์–‘์„ฑ โ…ก: ๋ฏธ๊ตญยท๋…์ผยท์ผ๋ณธ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ๋น„๊ต๋ถ„์„

    No full text
    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ๋ก ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์˜ ๊ณผ์ •๊ณผ ์–‘์ƒ์„ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์™€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ์žฌํŽธ์ด ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ์ด๋ก ์ด ์ „๋งํ•˜๋“ฏ์ด ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ์ƒ์‚ฐ์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ด๋˜์–ด ๊ฐ€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๊ณ , ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ์žฌํŽธ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์  ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค์˜ ์กด์žฌ์™€ ๊ทธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋ ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญยท๋…์ผยท์ผ๋ณธ์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์„ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋กœ ์„ ํƒํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ทธ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„ ์žฌํŽธ๊ณผ์ •์„ ๋ถ„์„, ๋น„๊ตํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝํ—˜์  ๋น„๊ต๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„ ์žฌํŽธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์  ์–‘์ƒ๊ณผ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณ„๋กœ ์ƒ์ดํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ฐœ์ „์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ์ฝ”๋“œํ™”๋œ ์ง€์‹์„ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ๋ชจ๋“ˆ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ตœ์ ๊ด€ํ–‰์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ด๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์น˜์‚ฌ์Šฌ๋ก ์ž๋“ค์˜ ์ฃผ์žฅ์€ ํ˜„์‹ค๊ณผ ๋ถ€ํ•ฉํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”๋‹ค. ์ตœ์†Œํ•œ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์•„์ง ์‹คํ˜„๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ, ๋…์ผ, ์ผ๋ณธ์˜์ž๋™์ฐจ ์‚ฐ์—…์€ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”์™€ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์˜ ์••๋ ฅ ํ•˜์—์„œ ๊ฐ๊ธฐ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ์ „๋žต์„์ถ”๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณ„๋กœ ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ์ œ๋„์  ์ œ์•ฝ ์•„๋ž˜ ํ–‰์œ„์ž๋“ค์˜ ์„ ํƒ์ด ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ๋ฐฉ์‹์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„์žฌํŽธ์„ ์ด๋Œ์—ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ž…์žฅ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์—… ๊ฐ„ ๊ด€๊ณ„ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ์˜์กด์ ์ธ ์ œ๋„์  ์š”์ธ์ด ์„ ๋„๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์„ ํƒ์„ ์ œ์•ฝํ•˜๊ณ , ์„ ๋„๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์„ ํƒ์€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์ฒด๊ณ„๊ฐœํŽธ์˜ ์ƒ์ดํ•œ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋ฅผ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐ€ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋กœ ๊ท€๊ฒฐ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰, ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋Š” ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ์ฒด๊ณ„๋กœ์˜ ์ดํ–‰๊ณผ์ •์ด ์•„๋‹ ๋ฟ๋”๋Ÿฌ, ๊ทธ ๋™ํ•™์€ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์  ์š”์ธ์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ํ™˜์›์ ยท๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์ฃผ์˜์  ์ ‘๊ทผ์œผ๋กœ ์„ค๋ช…๋  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋‹ค.N

    Varieties of Production Globalization I: An Analytical Scheme for Comparison

    No full text
    ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 1990๋…„๋Œ€ ์ด๋ž˜ ๊ธ‰์†ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”, ์ฆ‰ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ๊ตฌ์ถ•๊ณผ ๊ทธ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๊ฒฝ์ œ ์ฒด์ œ์˜ ์žฌํŽธ ์–‘์ƒ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๋Š” ์ด๋ก ์  ํ‹€์„ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๊ธˆ์œต์ด๋‚˜ ๋ฌด์—ญ์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„๋˜๋˜ ๊ฒฝํ–ฅ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฐ˜์„ฑ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๊ฒฝ์ œ์—์„œ ๊ณ ์šฉ๊ณผ ์†Œ๋“๋ถ„๋ฐฐ ๋“ฑ์— ์ง์ ‘์ ์œผ๋กœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. 1980๋…„๋Œ€ ์ด๋ž˜ ๊ตญ์ œ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์˜ ๊ฒฉํ™”, ๋น ๋ฅธ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์˜ ์ง„๋ณด, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ธ‰๋ณ€ํ•˜๋Š” ์‹œ์žฅ์— ์ ์‘ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์„ ์ง„ ์ž๋ณธ์ฃผ์˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค์€ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์„ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์žฌํŽธํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ๊ฐœํŽธ์€ 1970๋…„๋Œ€๊นŒ์ง€ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋˜ ๋‹ค๊ตญ์  ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ๋ฐœ์ „๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋ชจ์Šต์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ค€๋‹ค. ์ตœ๊ทผ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ์€ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์ˆ˜์ง์  ํ†ตํ•ฉ์˜ ์กฐ์ง๊ตฌ์กฐ ํ•˜์—์„œ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ๋‹ค๊ตญ์  ๊ธฐ์—…๊ณผ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ, ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์  ์š”์†Œ๋“ค์„ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์œ ์—ฐํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํก์ˆ˜ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ „ ๊ณต์ •์„ ๋ถ„์ ˆํ™”ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๊ตญ์ ์˜ ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค์„ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์ด ๊ฒฐํ•ฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๊ฒฐ๊ตญ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ์žฌํŽธ์€ ํ•ด์™ธ์ ์ ‘ํˆฌ์ž์™€ ์™ธ์ฃผ ํ˜น์€ ํ•ด์™ธ์กฐ๋‹ฌ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๋‘ ์ถ•์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ์žฌํŽธ์€ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์žฌํŽธ์„ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์‹ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜์ž๋“ค์ด ์˜ˆ๊ฒฌํ•˜๋“ฏ์ด ํ•˜๋‚˜์˜ ํ˜•ํƒœ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ต๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ดˆ๊ตญ์  ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ์ด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณ„๋กœ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ๋ฌธํ—Œ๋“ค์˜ ๋ถ„์„์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์–‘ํƒœ์˜ ์กด์žฌ๋ฅผ ํ™•์ธํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ทธ ์›์ธ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๋Š” ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค๊ณผ ์ธ๊ณผ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ์‚ดํŽด๋ด„์œผ๋กœ์จ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ƒ์‚ฐ์˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋น„๊ต๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ ์ธ ์ด๋ก ํ‹€์„ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. This paper aims at building an analytical scheme with which can analyze the varieties of global production networks and their impacts upon national economies. In contrast to the prevalent studies on globalization which focus on the dimensions of finance and trade, this paper call attention to the production side of globalization which enforces the "real economy" of nation-states to change substantially. In order to meet the challenges resulting from tougher international competition, rapid changes of technology, and tubulent markets, companies in the advanced economies have reorganized their existing production regime by creating new production networks on the global scale. The global networks of production are different from the multinational corporations based on the hierarchical structure which prevailed until the 1970s. The recently established global networks of production processes and a new combination of various national companies to absorb their advantages flexibly. Although the globalization of production enforces the readjustment of national economies, the reshuffle does not converge toward a single from, contrary to the expectation of neoliberals. Based on an extensive study on existing lierature regarding changes of global and national production systems, this paper aims at building an analytical scheme with which to investigate the differences of various regimes of global production and to analyze the various factors and their hypothetical causalities to the diversity of global production regimes.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2008๋…„ ์ •๋ถ€(๊ต์œก๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ถ€)์˜ ์žฌ์›์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญํ•™์ˆ ์ง„ํฅ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž„(KRF-2008-B00005
    corecore