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    ํ•œ๊ตญ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ๊ณผ ๋ถ€์ฑ„, ์†Œ๋น„ ๋ถ„์„

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :์‚ฌํšŒ๊ณผํ•™๋Œ€ํ•™ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™๋ถ€,2019. 8. ๊น€์˜์‹.๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ฏธ์‹œ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ถ€์ฑ„, ์†Œ๋“, ์†Œ๋น„ ๊ฐ„ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋Š” ํ•œ๊ตญ ํ†ต๊ณ„์ฒญ์ด ์ฃผ๊ด€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ž‘์„ฑํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๊ธˆ์œต๋ณต์ง€์กฐ์‚ฌ์˜ 2012๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 2017๋…„๊นŒ์ง€์˜ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ์กฐ๋‹ฌ ํ–‰ํƒœ์™€ ์†Œ๋น„์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์—์„œ ๊ธฐ์กด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์™€ ์ฐจ๋ณ„์ ์„ ๊ฐ€์ง„๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ์ฃผ์š” ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ๋กœ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ(leverage ratio)์— ๋ฏธ์นœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ์ด ํ™•๋Œ€๋œ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๋Š” ๊ทธ๋ ‡์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋˜ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๋ณด๋‹ค ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์„ ๋น ๋ฅด๊ฒŒ ์ถ•์†Œํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๋ณด๋‹ค ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๋ฉด ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ์ด 1 ํ‘œ์ค€ํŽธ์ฐจ ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•œ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์€ 1.3 ~ 1.5% ํฌ์ธํŠธ ํ•˜๋ฝํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์— ๋ฏธ์นœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์€ ์ฐจ์ž… ์ œ์•ฝ๊ณผ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์—ฐ๋ น ๋“ฑ ์‚ฌํšŒ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ํŠน์„ฑ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค๋ฅด๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์˜ˆ์ปจ๋Œ€ ์ˆœ์ž์‚ฐ์ด ์ ์€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๋‚˜ ์ฃผํƒ์„ ์†Œ์œ ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์„ ๋ณด๋‹ค ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์กฐ์ •ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์Œ์œผ๋กœ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋น„ ํ•จ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜๊ณ  ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋น„ ํ–‰ํƒœ์— ๋ฏธ์นœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ํ‰๊ท ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ์˜ ํฐ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฒฝํ—˜ํ•œ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋น„ ํƒ„๋ ฅ์„ฑ์€ ๊ทธ๋ ‡์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๋ณด๋‹ค ๋‚ฎ์€ ๊ฒฝํ–ฅ์ด ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ์˜ ํฐ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฒฝํ—˜ํ•œ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๋Š” ๋‹น๊ธฐ์˜ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ํ•ญ๊ตฌ์  ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹Œ ์ผ์‹œ์  ๋ณ€ํ™”์ธ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฐ›์•„๋“ค์ธ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•ด์„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ, ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์†Œ๋น„์— ๋ฏธ์นœ ์˜ํ–ฅ์€ ์•ž์„œ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”์—์„œ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์™€ ์œ ์‚ฌํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ฐจ์ž… ์ œ์•ฝ๊ณผ ๊ฐ€๊ตฌ๋ณ„ ํŠน์„ฑ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ๋ณด์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ๊ฐ€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์ธ์  ์ž์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ธˆ์œต/์‹ค๋ฌผ ์ˆœ์ž์‚ฐ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋ฅผ ์ข…ํ•ฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ด€๋ฆฌํ•จ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ์ธ์  ์ž์‚ฐ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ ํ™•๋Œ€์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ ์ถ•์†Œ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•œ ๊ธˆ์œต/์‹ค๋ฌผ ์ˆœ์ž์‚ฐ ๊ด€๋ จ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ ์ถ•์†Œ๋กœ ๋Œ€์‘ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์„ ์‹œ์‚ฌํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด ๊ณ ๊ฐ์˜ ์ž์‚ฐ ํฌํŠธํด๋ฆฌ์˜ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์กฐ์–ธ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์ตœ์  ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์กฐ์–ธ๋„ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์‹œ์‚ฌํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„์˜ ์†Œ๋“ ๋ณ€๋™์„ฑ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์†Œ๋“ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์†Œ๋น„์— ์ง์ ‘์  ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ๋กœ ์™ธ์—๋„ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋น„์œจ ์ถ•์†Œ ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ์ƒํ™˜ ๋ถ€๋‹ด์ด ๋Š˜์–ด๋‚จ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์ˆœ์ฒ˜๋ถ„๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์†Œ๋“ ๊ฐ์†Œ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ๋„ ๊ฐ€๊ณ„ ์†Œ๋น„์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์‹œ์‚ฌํ•œ๋‹ค.In this paper, we examine the effects of income volatility changes on households leverage and consumption. We use the Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions (SFLC) from year 2012 to year 2017 data. The main findings are as follow: First, households who faced increased income volatility lowered their leverage ratio. For example, a one standard deviation increase in income volatility was associated with 1.3 ~ 1.5 percentage point decrease in the leverage ratio. The effects of income volatility changes on households leverage choices varied among different household groups. Potentially borrowing-constrained households and households with net-short position in their real estate assets lowered leverage ratio more quickly. This indicates households leverage ratio responses to income volatility changes were affected by supply-side factors like borrowing-constraints; as well as demand-side factors like households precautionary-saving motives. The demand-side factors in leverage ratio responses may reflect households risk management incentives where they adjusted their financial net wealth risk exposure when faced with increased human wealth uncertainty. Second, when faced with enlarged income uncertainty, households income coefficients on consumption were lowered. The income coefficient of average households was estimated to be around 0.16, while households with increased income volatility were around 0.12. In particular, similar to the relations in leverage ratio changes, consumptions among potentially borrowing-constrained households and those with net-short position in real estate assets were more affected by increases in income volatility. This can be understood that households smoothed their consumption during the periods of increased income volatility, and this was shown in the smaller consumption elasticity on income. Combining household leverage and consumption choices in response to income volatility changes, there may exist two transmission channels for income uncertainty changes in consumption. The first one is, by precautionary saving motives and consumption smoothing motives, households adjust their consumption less to the changes of income, when they face increased income volatility. The second channel is through households deleveraging. Faced with increased income volatility, households lower the risk exposure of their financial net wealth by lowering their leverage ratio. Thus, households net disposable income may decrease as they deleverage and increased debt-servicing burdens hinder consumptions. In light of this relationship, financial institutions may advise on households optimal leverage choices before they face abrupt deleveraging needs which may be accompanied by considerable disutility. From a macroeconomic perspective, this indicates the possibility that considering households risk management incentives between human wealth and financial net wealth, precautionary saving motives from increased income uncertainty may be reinforced. Accordingly, an economy with huge household debts, such as Korea, would be more vulnerable to the income uncertainty change shocks, since households may face more deleveraging needs that undermine net-disposable income.1. Introduction ๏ผ‘ 1.1. Study background ๏ผ‘ 1.2. Previous studies and purpose of research ๏ผ’ 2. Household Income Volatility and Leverage ๏ผ— 2.1. Data ๏ผ— 2.2. Household income volatility change ๏ผ˜ 2.3. Leverage ratio ๏ผ‘๏ผ’ 2.4. Response of leverage ratio ๏ผ‘๏ผ– 2.5. Borrowing constraints and leverage response ๏ผ’๏ผ“ 2.6. Heterogeneity across groups ๏ผ”๏ผ’ 2.7. Robustness check ๏ผ•๏ผ‘ 2.8. Section summary ๏ผ•๏ผ— 3. Household Leverage and Consumption ๏ผ•๏ผ˜ 3.1. Data and stylized consumption patterns ๏ผ•๏ผ˜ 3.2. Baseline regression ๏ผ–๏ผ• 3.3. Income volatility changes and consumption ๏ผ—๏ผ’ 3.4. Borrowing constraints and consumption ๏ผ—๏ผ” 3.5. Heterogeneity across groups and consumptions ๏ผ˜๏ผ 3.6. Section summary ๏ผ˜๏ผ” 4. Concluding Remarks ๏ผ˜๏ผ• Bibliography ๏ผ˜๏ผ™ Appendices ๏ผ™๏ผ“ A1. Various income measures and descriptive statistics ๏ผ™๏ผ“ A2. Sample selection bias and coefficient of โˆ†SDi ๏ผ™๏ผ• A3. Asymmetric effects of income volatility changes ๏ผ™๏ผ– A4. Income volatility of various job industry ๏ผ™๏ผ˜ A5. An example of SFLC datasets structural break ๏ผ™๏ผ™ A6. Consumption equation estimation ๏ผ‘๏ผ๏ผ Abstract in Korean (๊ตญ๋ฌธ ์ดˆ๋ก) ๏ผ‘๏ผ๏ผ–Docto

    Supplementary budget rule and budget deficit

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(์„์‚ฌ) --์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™๋ถ€ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™์ „๊ณต,2006.Maste
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