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    ์ค‘๊ฐ„๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์ด ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ:๋‚จ๋…€ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ๋น„๊ต๋ฅผ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ํ–‰์ •๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ๊ณต๊ธฐ์—…์ •์ฑ…ํ•™๊ณผ, 2014. 8. ๊ตฌ๋ฏผ๊ต.์ตœ๊ทผ ์—ฌ์„ฑ์˜ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฐธ์—ฌ ๋น„์œจ์ด ์ง€์†์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋†’์•„์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ์—๋„ ์—ฌ์„ฑ ์ค‘๊ฐ„๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž์˜ ๋น„์œจ์ด ์ ์ฐจ ๋Š˜์–ด๋‚˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์‹œ์ ์—์„œ ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ด€์‹ฌ๊ณผ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ ๋˜ํ•œ ์ฆ๋Œ€ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ „ํ†ต์ ์ธ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋‚จ์„ฑ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์กŒ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ๊ณผ์˜ ๋น„๊ต์—์„œ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์ถœ๋ฐœํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ด๋ก ๊ณผ ์„ ํ–‰์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ, ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€ ์ค‘๊ฐ„๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž์˜ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์ด ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๊ณ , ๋ฆฌ๋” ์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํŠน์„ฑ์„ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๊ณ , ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์ด ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ์žˆ์–ด ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ์˜ํ•œ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์š”์•ฝ์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ, ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์œ ํ˜•์ด ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณ€ํ˜์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์€ ๋ฆฌ๋”์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋งŒ์กฑ๊ฐ, ์กฐ์ง์‹œ๋ฏผํ–‰๋™, ์กฐ์ง๋ชฐ์ž…, ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ๋ชจ๋‘ ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์ •(+)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋‹ค. ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์€ ์กฐ์ง๋ชฐ์ž…๊ณผ ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ์— ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์ •(+)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํŠน์„ฑ์€ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๋‚จ๋…€ ๋ชจ๋‘ ์œ ์˜ํ•œ ๊ด€๊ณ„์˜ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์œ ํ˜•์„ ๋ณด์ด์ง€ ์•Š์•˜์œผ๋‚˜, ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํ•˜์œ„๋ณ€์ˆ˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๊ฐœ๋ณ„์  ๋ฐฐ๋ ค, ์˜ˆ์™ธ์  ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์™€์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์ •(+)์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๊ณ , ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ๋Š” ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. ์…‹์งธ, ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์ด ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ๋ฆฌ๋” ์„ฑ๋ณ„์˜ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„์ด๋‹ค. ๋จผ์ € ๋ณ€ํ˜์ ยท๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ๊ณผ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„์˜ ์กฐ์ ˆํšŒ๊ท€๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์—์„œ๋Š” ๋ชจ๋‘ ์œ ์˜ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. ๋ณ€ํ˜์ ยท๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ํ•˜์œ„๋ณ€์ˆ˜์™€ ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ๊ณผ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„๋กœ ์กฐ์ ˆํšŒ๊ท€ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๊ฐœ๋ณ„์  ๋ฐฐ๋ ค์™€ ๋ฆฌ๋”์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋งŒ์กฑ๊ฐ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์—์„œ๋Š” ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”๊ฐ€ ์ข€ ๋” ๋ถ€์ •์ ์œผ๋กœ, ์˜ˆ์™ธ์  ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์™€ ๋ฆฌ๋”์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋งŒ์กฑ๊ฐ, ๋™๊ธฐ๋ถ€์—ฌ์™€ ์กฐ์ง์‹œ๋ฏผํ–‰๋™, ์นด๋ฆฌ์Šค๋งˆ์™€ ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ๋Š” ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”๊ฐ€, ์ง€์ ์ž๊ทน๊ณผ ์กฐ์ง๋ชฐ์ž…, ์ง€์ ์ž๊ทน๊ณผ ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ๋Š” ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”๊ฐ€ ์ข€ ๋” ๊ธ์ •์ ์ธ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ ์„ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ, ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋‚จ์„ฑ์ค‘์‹ฌ์ด๊ฑฐ๋‚˜, ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์—ฌ์„ฑ์ค‘์‹ฌ์  ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๊ธฐ์—…์—์„œ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ ธ์™”๋‹ค๋ฉด, ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋‚จ์„ฑ์ค‘์‹ฌ ์กฐ์ง์ธ ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์—์„œ ๋‚จ๋…€๋ฆฌ๋” ์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์œ ํ˜• ๋ฐ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค๋Š”๋ฐ ๊ทธ ์˜์˜๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ๊ณผ ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์žˆ์–ด ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ๋Š”๋‹ค์–‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ํŠน์ • ์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์ด ๋ฐœํœ˜๋  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋Š” ์กฐ์งํ™˜๊ฒฝ์„ ๋ฐ˜์˜ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰, ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์€ ๋‚จ์„ฑ์ค‘์‹ฌ์˜ ์กฐ์ง๊ตฌ์กฐ์ด๋ฏ€๋กœ ์—ฌ์„ฑ์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํŠน์„ฑ์„ ๋ฐœํœ˜ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๊ณ , ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”๋“ค์€ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„ ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์„ ๋ณด๊ณ  ๋ฐฐ์šฐ๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์—์„œ ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์˜ ์ง€์ ์ž๊ทน์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์„ ๋ณด๋ฉด, ์˜ค๋žœ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ„ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž๋กœ์„œ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์ด๋‚˜ ๊ต์œก, ๋ฉ˜ํ† ๋ง์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์ผ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ์—ฌ์„ฑ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž์—๊ฒŒ๋„ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ ํ•ฉํ•œ ๊ต์œก๊ณผ ๋ฉ˜ํ† ๋ง์˜ ๊ธฐํšŒ ์ œ๊ณต์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค. ์…‹์งธ, ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์ค‘ ๋‚จ์„ฑ๋ถ€ํ•˜์˜ ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋ถ€์ •์ ์ž„์„ ๋ณผ ๋•Œ, ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€ ์กฐ์ง ๋‚ด์— ์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ณ ์ •๊ด€๋…์ด ๋‚จ์•„์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ธ์‹๋ณ€ํ™”์™€ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ์กฐ์ง๋ฌธํ™”๊ฐ€ ์กฐ์„ฑ๋˜์–ด์•ผํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ๊ธฐ๊ด€์žฅ ๋“ฑ ์ตœ๊ณ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž์˜ ์˜์ง€๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์–ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ์ง€์†์ ์ธ ์—ฌ๊ฑด์กฐ์„ฑ ๋“ฑ์ด ๋’ท๋ฐ›์นจ๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋„ท์งธ, ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต๊ณต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋“ค์€ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๋ถ€๋ฌธ์— ๋น„ํ•ด ํ‰๋“ฑํ•œ ๊ณ ์šฉ์กฐ๊ฑด์— ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ธ์‹๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋‚˜, ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์„ ํ–‰์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ๋„ ํ† ํฐ์  ์ง€์œ„(token status)'์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์•”๋ฌต์  ์ฐจ๋ณ„์ด ์กด์žฌํ•จ์„ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ํ‰๋“ฑํ•œ ์ฑ„์šฉ์ด ์ธ์‚ฌ๊ฒฝ๋ ฅยท์Šน์ง„ ๋“ฑ์œผ๋กœ ์ด์–ด์ ธ์•ผํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ์ค‘๊ฐ„๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž๋ผ๋Š” ์ธ์žฌ๋กœ์„œ ์ธ์‹ํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฐฐ์น˜ํ•˜๋Š” ์ธ์‚ฌ์ œ๋„๊ฐ€ ์‹œํ–‰๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.์ œ 1 ์žฅ ์„œ ๋ก  1 ์ œ 1 ์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ 1 ์ œ 2 ์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ๋ชฉ์  2 ์ œ 2 ์žฅ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜์™€ ์„ ํ–‰์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒ€ํ†  4 ์ œ 1 ์ ˆ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜ 4 1. ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ์ •์˜ 4 2. ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์ด๋ก  ๋ฐœ์ „๊ณผ์ • 4 3. ํ˜„๋Œ€์  ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์ด๋ก  6 ์ œ 2 ์ ˆ ๋‚จ๋…€๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜ 9 1. ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ๋“ฑ์žฅ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ 9 2. ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋… ๋ฐ ํŠน์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 10 3. ๋‚จ๋…€๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜ ๋น„๊ต์ด๋ก  12 4. ๋ถ€ํ•˜์„ฑ๋ณ„์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋‚จ๋…€๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ์œ ํšจ์„ฑ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 16 ์ œ 3 ์ ˆ ๋‚จ๋…€๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ ๊ด€๋ จ ์„ ํ–‰์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒ€ํ†  17 ์ œ 4 ์ ˆ ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ 21 1. ๋ฆฌ๋”์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋งŒ์กฑ๊ฐ 22 2. ์กฐ์ง์‹œ๋ฏผํ–‰๋™ 23 3. ์กฐ์ง๋ชฐ์ž… 24 4. ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ 25 ์ œ 3 ์žฅ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ชจํ˜• ์„ค๊ณ„ ๋ฐ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 26 ์ œ 1 ์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ชจํ˜•์˜ ์„ค์ • 26 ์ œ 2 ์ ˆ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์„ค์ • 27 ์ œ 3 ์ ˆ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ค์ • 27 ์ œ 4 ์ ˆ ์กฐ์ž‘์  ์ •์˜ 31 1. ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 31 2. ์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 32 3. ์กฐ์ ˆ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 33 4. ํ†ต์ œ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 34 ์ œ 5 ์ ˆ ์กฐ์‚ฌ์„ค๊ณ„ 34 1. ํ‘œ๋ณธ์˜ ์„ ์ • ๋ฐ ์กฐ์‚ฌ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 34 2. ์„ค๋ฌธ์ง€์˜ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ 35 3. ์ž๋ฃŒ ๋ถ„์„๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 37 ์ œ 4 ์žฅ ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„ ๋ฐ ๊ฐ€์„ค๊ฒ€์ฆ 38 ์ œ 1 ์ ˆ ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„ 38 1. ์‘๋‹ต์ž์˜ ์ธ๊ตฌํ†ต๊ณ„ํ•™์  ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 38 2. ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„ 39 3. ๋ฌธํ•ญ์˜ ์‹ ๋ขฐ๋„ ๋ถ„์„ 41 4. ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ƒ๊ด€๊ด€๊ณ„ ๋ถ„์„ 43 ์ œ 2 ์ ˆ ๊ฐ€์„ค ๊ฒ€์ฆ 46 1. ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ๊ณผ ์กฐ์งํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ ๊ฐ€์„ค ๊ฒ€์ฆ 46 2. ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„๊ณผ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์œ ํ˜• ๊ฐ€์„ค ๊ฒ€์ฆ 53 3. ๋ฆฌ๋”์„ฑ๋ณ„ ์กฐ์ ˆํšจ๊ณผ ๋ถ„์„ 59 4. ๊ฐ€์„ค๊ฒ€์ฆ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 66 ์ œ 5 ์žฅ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  68 ์ œ 1 ์ ˆ ์š”์•ฝ ๋ฐ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  68 ์ œ 2 ์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์  71 ์ œ 3 ์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•œ๊ณ„ ๋ฐ ํ–ฅํ›„ ๊ณผ์ œ 73 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 75Maste

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๊ตญ์ œ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ๊ตญ์ œํ•™๊ณผ ๊ตญ์ œํ†ต์ƒ ์ „๊ณต, 2013. 8. ์•ˆ๋•๊ทผ.WTO ๋ถ„์Ÿํ•ด๊ฒฐ์ œ๋„๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ตญ์ œ๋ฒ• ๋ถ„์•ผ์™€๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋…ํŠนํ•œ ์ดํ–‰์ฒด์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ–์ถ”๊ณ  ์žˆ์–ด ๊ตญ์ œํ†ต์ƒ๋ฒ• ํ•™์ž๋“ค์˜ ๋งŽ์€ ์ฃผ๋ชฉ์„ ๋ฐ›์•„์™”๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ, WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๊ทœ์ •์€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ WTO ํ˜‘์ •๋ถ„์•ผ์— ๋น„ํ•ด ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์—„๊ฒฉํ•œ ๋ฐ˜๋ฉด, ์‹ค์ œ ๊ธˆ์ง€ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์˜ ๋ถ„์Ÿ์ดํ–‰ ์‹ค์ ์€ ์ƒ๋Œ€์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ €์กฐํ•œ ํŽธ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ํ˜„ WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๋ถ„์ŸํŒ๊ฒฐ์˜ ์ดํ–‰์„ ์ด‰์ง„์‹œํ‚ค๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ตฌ์ œ์ œ๋„์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์˜๋ฌธ์ด ์ƒ๊ธฐ์ง€ ์•Š์„ ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋‹ค. ๋”์šฑ ํŠน์ดํ•œ ์ ์€ ๋ฒ•ํ•™์ž๋“ค๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ ๊ตญ์ œ๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™์ž๋“ค์€ ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์œผ๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋Š” ์ˆ˜์ถœ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ˜„ WTO ๊ทœ์ •์„ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์œ ์—ฐํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐ ๊ตญ์ด ์ „๋žต์  ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ •์ฑ… ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ž…์žฅ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ๋Š” WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๊ตฌ์ œ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฒ•โ€ข๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™์  ๋ถ„์„์„ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๊ตฌ์ œ์ œ๋„์˜ ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐˆ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์„ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ์— ์ž…๊ฐํ•˜์—ฌ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ, ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ชจํ˜•์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์™€๋Š” ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ, ์ตœ๊ทผ์— ์ œ์‹œ๋œ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ชจํ˜•์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๊ตฌ์ œ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ดํ•ด๋ฅผ ๋„์ถœํ•ด๋‚ด๊ณ ์ž ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, WTO ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ˜„ ๊ทœ์ •์˜ ์ˆ˜์ค€์€ WTO ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ํ˜‘์ •์ด ์ถ”๊ตฌํ•˜๋Š” ๋ชฉ์ ๊ณผ ์ทจ์ง€์— ๋งž๊ฒŒ ๋ณด๋‹ค ๊ฐ•ํ™”๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ๋ณด๋‹ค ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ธ ๊ตฌ์ œ์ œ๋„์˜ ๋งˆ๋ จ์„ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์ง€ํ–ฅ์ (prospective) ํ”ผํ•ด ๊ตฌ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹Œ ์†Œ๊ธ‰์ ์ธ(retrospective) ๊ตฌ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•ด์•ผ ํ•จ์„ ์ฃผ์žฅํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ ๊ธˆ์ง€๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ๊ทœ์ •์ƒ ์ ์šฉ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜์‹ ์†์ ˆ์ฐจ(fast track)๊ทœ์ •์ด ์ œ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ฐœํœ˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก WTO ์ดํ–‰ํŒจ๋„์˜ ๊ด€ํ• ๊ถŒ ๋ฐ DSU ์ œ21.5์กฐ์™€ ์ œ22.6๊ฐ„์˜ ์ ์šฉ์ˆœ์„œ(sequencing) ๊ด€๋ จ ๊ทœ์ •์˜ ์˜ฌ๋ฐ”๋ฅธ ํ•ด์„๊ณผ ์ ์šฉ์ด ์š”๊ตฌ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ WTO ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ ํ˜‘์ •์˜ ๋ณดํ˜ธ๋Œ€์ƒ ๋ฐ ๋ชฉ์ ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๊ธˆ์ „์  ๋ณด์ƒ์€ ์ ํ•ฉํ•œ ๊ตฌ์ œ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์ด ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์—†์œผ๋ฉฐ, ํŠนํžˆ ์ดํ–‰ ์ด‰์ง„์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ณด๋ณต์กฐ์น˜์˜ ์ˆ˜์ค€์€ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์˜ ๋‹ค์ž์ (multilateral) ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ณด์กฐ๊ธˆ์˜ ๋ฌด์—ญํšจ๊ณผ์— ๊ทผ๊ฑฐํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฒฐ์ •๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ฃผ์žฅํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฒฐ๊ตญ WTO ๊ทœ์ •์˜ ์˜ฌ๋ฐ”๋ฅธ ์˜๋ฏธ์™€ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ œ๊ณ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” WTO ์žฌํŒ๊ด€๊ณผ ํšŒ์›๊ตญ๋“ค์˜ ํ•ฉ๋ฆฌ์ ์ด๊ณ  ํ˜„์‹ค์ ์ธ ํŒ๋‹จ์„ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ํ•ด๋‹น ๊ทœ์ •์˜ ๋ชฉ์ ๊ณผ ์ทจ์ง€๊ฐ€ ์ถฉ๋ถ„ํžˆ ์กด์ค‘๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.The remedy system in the WTO for prompt dispute settlement has attracted a lot of attention by international trade scholars due to its unique enforcement mechanism which is not available in other areas of international law. In particular, the remedy system for prohibited subsidies deserves more focused attention due to a contradiction: Despite the tight regulations and rules to ensure compliance with WTO subsidy rules, the actual implementation rate of the WTO DSB rulings to remove violating prohibited subsidy measures fares the poorest. This leads to the question of whether the current remedy system for prohibited subsidies is indeed effective, or at least desirable from the perspective of WTO Members. During the process of this study, several proposals have been made to remedy the current inefficiency in the remedy system for prohibited subsidies by examining the following issues: (1) Whether retrospective remedies should be allowed for the effective withdrawal of subsidies(2) What the appropriate level of retaliation for prohibited subsidies should be(3) Whether monetary compensation could be allowed as an alternative remedy for inducing compliance in prohibited subsidy disputesand (4) How the current mechanism for inducing compliance through the fast track procedure for prohibited subsidies could be strengthened. In order to address these questions, this research has relied on both legal and economic analyses to provide an economic justification for the legal arguments that are made in this study. In particular, existing research using economic models have been applied to this work in order to provide interesting perspectives that help to suggest a renewed approach for the remedy system, at least for the case of prohibited subsidies. In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that when it comes to the remedy rules on prohibited subsidies, a stronger incentive for prompt compliance is needed through the retrospective application of the retaliation remedy, especially for dealing with non-recurring prohibited subsidies. This study further suggests that the possibility of using monetary compensation as an alternative remedy for prohibited subsidies is not viable, mainly due to the purpose of remedies in prohibited subsidy rules that is served by the property rule. For determining the level of retrospective retaliation, proportionality and the multilateral nature of remedies should be considered, under which the trade effects of the subsidy measure on individual WTO Members should be the basis for calculation. The problem of delayed implementation involving recurring prohibited subsidies may be a more intricate matter that mainly derives from the fundamental nature of subsidies as a strategic national policy. However, the loophole that is created, which undermines the stability and predictability of the WTO remedy system should not go unaddressed. In this regard, the existing fast track procedures that are in place as the remedy system for prohibited subsidies may be made more effective by addressing the problems that incur from the narrow jurisdiction of WTO compliance panels and the arbitrary sequencing arrangements in compliance and authorization proceedings. Ultimately, it will be the role of the WTO adjudicating bodies and the Members to apply the rules in a sensible and practical manner that gives meaning and effectiveness to the WTO rules in accordance with the purpose and objectives of the respective WTO Agreements.CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The Implementation Problem in Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 1 1.2 Purpose and Scope of Study 3 1.3 Research Methods and Sources 6 CHAPTER II LEGAL REMEDIES IN GENERAL 10 2.1 Rules on Remedies 10 2.1.1 Remedies in Domestic Contract Law 11 2.1.1.1 Damages 12 2.1.1.2 Restitution 13 2.1.1.3 Specific Performance 14 2.1.2 Remedies in Public International Law 15 2.1.2.1 Cessation 18 2.1.2.2 Reparation 19 2.1.3 Remedies in International Investment Treaties 22 2.1.3.1 Dispute Settlement Methods in Investment Arbitrations 23 2.1.3.2 Primary Remedy of Compensation 25 2.1.4 Remedies in Intellectual Property Law 28 2.1.4.1 Interim and Final Injunctions 31 2.1.4.2 Delivery-up 32 2.1.4.3 Damages 32 2.1.4.4 Account for Profits 33 2.1.4.5 Criminal Remedies 33 2.2 Purpose of Remedies 36 2.3 The Principle of Proportionality 42 2.4 Summary 45 CHAPTER III THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 46 3.1 Overview of the Remedy System in the WTO 46 3.1.1 Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 47 3.1.2 Purpose of Remedies in the WTO 51 3.1.3 Limitations of the WTO Remedy System 56 3.2 Current Status of Remedies for Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 61 3.2.1 The Compliance Problem in WTO Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 61 3.2.2 The Remedy System in Action for Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 67 3.2.2.1 Type of Remedies for Prohibited Subsidies 68 3.2.2.2 Application of Remedies in Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 71 A. Application of the primary remedy of withdrawal 72 B. Application of the retaliation remedy 74 C. The compensation remedy 80 3.3 The Distinctive Treatment of Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 80 3.3.1 Evolution of Rules on Prohibited Subsidies 81 3.3.1.1 Rules on Subsidies in the Draft ITO Charter 81 3.3.1.2 Subsidy Rules in GATT 1947 and 1955 Amendments 84 3.3.1.3 Subsidy Rules in the 1979 Subsidy Code 86 3.3.1.4 Subsidy Rules in the SCM Agreement 89 3.3.2 Interpretation and Application of the Remedy Rules on Prohibited Subsidies 92 3.3.2.1 Interpretation and Application of appropriate countermeasures 94 3.3.2.2 Interpretation and Application of withdraw the subsidy 100 3.3.2.3 Interpretation and Application of withdraw without delay 104 3.3.3 Issues in WTO Jurisprudence regarding Prohibited Subsidies 106 3.3.3.1 Level of Retaliation: appropriate countermeasures 106 3.3.3.2 Remedies for Past Injury: withdraw the subsidy 114 3.3.3.3 Prolonged Dispute Proceedings: withdraw without delay 120 3.4 Summary 123 CHAPTER IV ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE WTO REMEDY SYSTEM 124 4.1 Economic Perspectives on the Retaliation Remedy in General 124 4.2 Economic Perspectives on the Remedy System for Prohibited Subsidies 128 4.3 Summary 139 CHAPTER V REMEDYING THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 142 5.1 Introduction of the Retrospective Retaliation Remedy for Non-Recurring Prohibited Subsidies 143 5.2 Monetary Compensation as a Retrospective Remedy for Prohibited Subsidies 154 5.3 Improving the Fast Track Procedure for Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 163 5.4 Summary 173 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION 176 BIBLIOGRAPHY 181Docto

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