78 research outputs found
μ΄μ§μ κ²½μ 주체 κΈ°λ°μ κ±°μκ²½μ νμ κ΄ν μμΈμ΄
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Όλ¬Έ (λ°μ¬)-- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ μ¬νκ³Όνλν κ²½μ νλΆ, 2017. 8. μ΄μ² μΈ.This doctoral dissertation consists of the intersection of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modeling, including heterogeneous agents, and the subjects of public finance and labor economics.
The first chapter explains a puzzling empirical phenomenon regarding fertility rate in the United States. Over the last few decades, high-income females have demonstrated a tendency to have more children in the U.S. At the same time, household income structure has changed, becoming more unequal and more favorable to females. However, these changes appear contradictory to the predictions found in classical fertility literature, which suggest that high-income women exhibit low fertility due to the high opportunity cost of raising children. To account for this puzzling empirical phenomenon, we offer a fertility choice model with preference heterogeneity on having children, which allows for a comparative advantage between employment outside the home and child-rearing. We highlight the composition effect of females who desire children newly entering the high-income group, while females less desirous of children exit as the income structure changes. Our model accounts for 55% of the observed variation in the complete fertility rate, while the comparable model without composition effect fails to explain the observation. We also decompose various income shocks and find that changes in skill premium represent the major factor behind the phenomenon.
The second chapter examines the quantitative effects of population aging driven by declining mortality and fertility rates. We also study the macroeconomic effects of raising the mandatory retirement age in such an aging economy. When the mortality rate decreases, aggregate capital increases since individuals save more for a longer retirement. In contrast, an increase in aggregate labor input is negligible since lower mortality rates primarily affect those who are out of the labor force. When the fertility rate decreases, both aggregate labor and capital inputs shrink radically because the aggregate population diminishes along with the working age population and aggregate savings plunges due to a downsized population. We analyze the effects of population aging when the mortality rate of all ages decreases by 1% each year and the population growth rate declines from 0.7% to 0.3%. A huge drop in aggregate labor input drags down aggregate output by about 15%. The pension system will run a big budget deficit with more retirees and a smaller number of workers. The government can alleviate the negative effects of population aging by raising the mandatory retirement age. When workers retirements are postponed by either three or five years, both aggregate labor input and capital increase, and pension deficits are significantly reduced.I. Do High-Income Females Have More Children?: Relaxing Homogeneous Preference and Composition Change . 1
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Complete Fertility: Target Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The Change in Income Structure: Input . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Household Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.1 Period One: Young Adult . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.2 Period Two: Middle Adult . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.3 Period Three: Old . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.4 Period Zero: Education Choice and Marriage . . . 20
3.2.5 Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.6 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.7 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . 24
4 Matching the Model to U.S. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 The Result of Benchmark Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6 The Change of Wage Structure and Fertility Choice . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1 Total Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.1 The Measure of Explanatory Power . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.2 Total Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.1 Skill Premium (SKP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.2 Gender Wage Gap (GWG) . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.3 Income Volatility (VOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.4 Relative Importance of Each Factor . . . . . . . . 42
7 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.1 The Composition Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2 The Effect of Preference on the CFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.1 Implication from the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.2 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.1 Related Literature: Strong Income Effect and Weak Substitution Effect . . . . . . 50
9.2 Cohort Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.3 Proof of the Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.4 Toy Model: The Fertility Theory meats the Roy-Bojas Model 55
9.5 Supplement Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.6 Regularity Condition for Endogeneity Problem . . . . . . . 57
9.6.1 Endogeneity Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.6.2 Regularity Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
II. Population Aging and the Extension of Retirement Age
Quantitative Analysis using Overlapping Generation Model . 59
1 Purpose and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 Value Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1.1 The Retirees Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.1.2 The Employees Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.1.3 The Unemployeds Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Analysis of the Population Aging Phenomenon . . . . . . . 68
3.1.1 Increase in Average Life Expectancy . . . . . . . 69
3.1.2 Deepening low birth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Quantification of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.1 Effect of Reduction in Mortality Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.1.1 Changes in Macroeconomic Variables . . . . . . 74
4.1.2 Changes in Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Effects of Reduction in Fertility Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.1 Changes in Macroeconomic Variables . . . . . . 81
4.2.2 Changes in Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Effects of Both Declining Mortality and Fertility Rate . . . 87
4.3.1 Changes in Macroeconomic Variables . . . . . . 87
4.3.2 Changes in Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5 The Effect of the Retirement Age Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1 Extension of Retirement Age to 60 Years of Age . . . . . . 92
5.2 Extension of Retirement Age to 65 Years of Age . . . . . . 96
5.3 Changes in Income Inequality with Retirement Age Extension 97
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
κ΅λ¬Έμ΄λ‘ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Docto
A Study on the Expression of Locality in the Architectural Works of Wangshu
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Όλ¬Έ (μμ¬)-- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ : 건μΆνκ³Ό, 2013. 2. κΉκ΄ν.νλ 건μΆμ κ³ΌνκΈ°μ μ λ°λ¬κ³Ό μ¬λλ€μ μΈμλ³νλ‘ μΈν΄ μ μ λ€μν λ°©ν₯μΌλ‘ λμκ°κ³ μλ€. 건μΆμ€κ³λ₯Ό ν¨μ μμ΄μ μ§μλ¬Ένλ₯Ό ν λλ‘ ν κ²μΈκ°, μλλ©΄ μ§μλ¬Ένλ₯Ό 무μνκ³ μ€κ³ν κ²μΈκ°μ λ
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Έλ ₯ν 건μΆκ°λΌκ³ λ³Ό μ μλ€. κ±΄μΆ μ¬λ£μ κ΅¬μΆ μΈ‘λ©΄μμ μ ν΅κ³Ό νλμ λ€μν κ²°ν©μ λ³Ό μ μκ³ , λν ννμ 곡κ°, λ°°μΉ λ±μμ μ°¨μ©, μ΄λ―Έμ§ν, λν
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νμ§λ§ μ§μλ¬Ένμμλ₯Ό μ°¨μ©, μ΄λ―Έμ§ν, λν
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1.1. μ°κ΅¬μ λ°°κ²½κ³Ό λͺ©μ
1.2. μ°κ΅¬μ λμκ³Ό λ°©λ²
1.3. μ°κ΅¬μ μ§νκ³Ό νλ¦λ
2. μ§μμ± ννμ κ΄ν μλΉ κ³ μ°°
2.1. μΌλ€μ€ νλ¨ν΄μ λΉνμ μ§μμ£Όμ
2.1.1. λΉνμ μ§μμ£Όμμ λ°μ κ³Όμ
2.1.2. μΌλ€μ€ νλ¨ν΄μ λΉνμ μ§μμ£Όμμ νΉμ±
2.2. κ°νκ°λ°©μ΄ν μ€κ΅μ νλ건μΆμμ λνλ μ§μμ±
ννμ κ΄ν κ³ μ°°
2.2.1 μ€κ΅μ μ§μμ± ννμ κ΄ν μ¬λ¬ λ΄λ‘
2.2.2. μ€κ΅μ νλ건μΆμμ μ§μμ± ννμ μ€μ²
2.3. μ§μλ¬Ένμ κ΄ν μ΄λ‘ μ κ³ μ°°
2.4. μ§μμ± ννμ μν μμ
3. μμ€μ μ§μμ± ννμλ²μ κ΄ν μλΉ κ³ μ°°
3.1. μμ€μ μ°λμ νλμμ λ°λΌλ³Έ μ§μμ±
ννμλ²μ λ³ν
3.2. μμ€μμ μΈν°λ·°μμ λ°λΌλ³Έ μ§μμ± ννμλ²
3.3. μμ€μ μ§μμ± ννμλ²μ κ΄ν νκ°
3.3.1 κΈμ μ νκ°
3.3.2 λΉνκ³Ό λ¬Έμ μ κΈ°
3.4. μμ€ μνμμ λνλ μ§μμ± ννμλ²
4. μμ€ κ±΄μΆμ μ§μμ± νν μμ
4.1. μμ°νκ²½μμ
4.1.1. μμ°μμ 건μΆ
4.1.2. 건μΆμμ μμ°
4.1.3. λ°λΌλ³΄λ μμ°
4.2. μ ν΅κ±΄μΆκ³΅κ°κ³Ό λ°°μΉ
4.2.1. 'μ 체μ 곡κ°'
4.2.2. 'λμ 곡κ°'
4.2.3. 건μΆλ¬Όλ°°μΉμ μ°μν
4.3. μ ν΅κ±΄μΆνν
4.3.1. μ§κ°μ ννμ μ°¨μ©
4.3.2. κ°λ
μ ννμ μ°¨μ©
4.4. κ±΄μΆ μ¬λ£
4.4.1. ꡬ쑰μ¬λ‘μ μ¬μ©
4.4.2. ννΌλ‘μ μ¬μ©
4.5. μκ²°
5. κ²° λ‘
μ°Έκ³ λ¬Έν
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