18 research outputs found

    The Deployment of South Korean Troops to Vietnam and the Role of the National Assembly

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    ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 1960๋…„๋Œ€ ํ•œ๊ตญ๊ตฐ์˜ ๋ฒ ํŠธ๋‚จ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•œ ๊ตญ๋‚ด์  ๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ์ „ํˆฌ๋ถ€๋Œ€ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘๋™์˜์•ˆ์„ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ผ ๊ตญํšŒ์—์„œ์˜ ์‹ฌ์˜ ๋ฐ ๊ฒฐ์ • ๊ณผ์ •์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฒ ํŠธ๋‚จ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์  ํ•ฉ์˜์™€๋Š” ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๊ด€๊ณ„์—†์ด ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์กŒ๋‹ค. ์•ผ๋‹น์€ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•˜์—ฌ ์ข…์ข… ์ •๋žต์  ์ž…์žฅ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฐ์ƒ‰๋œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ด์ต์„ ์ถ”๊ตฌํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ผ๋ถ€ ๊ฐ•๊ฒฝํŒŒ๋Š” ์„ ๋ช…์•ผ๋‹น์˜ ๊ธฐ์น˜ ์•„๋ž˜ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์„ ๊ฐ•๋ ฅํžˆ ๋ฐ˜๋Œ€ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์—๋Š” ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ ์ •๊ถŒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ทน์‹ฌํ•œ ๋ถˆ์‹ ์ด ๋ฐ˜์˜๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์—ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ๋ถ„์—ด๋œ ์•ผ๊ถŒ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์˜ ์ฃผ๋„๊ถŒ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ๋„ ์›์ธ์œผ๋กœ ์ž‘์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ ์ •๋ถ€์™€ ์—ฌ๋‹น์€ ์ฒ˜์Œ์—๋Š” ์ฃผํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ตฐ์˜ ์ฒ ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ๋ง‰๊ฒ ๋‹ค๋Š” ๋™๊ธฐ์—์„œ, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์š”์ฒญ์ด ๋ฐ˜๋ณต๋จ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ์ดํ›„ ์ ์ฐจ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์  ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ์‹ค๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ํ™•๋ณดํ•˜๊ฒ ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ณ„์‚ฐ ํ•˜์— ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์„ ๋ฐ€์–ด๋ถ™์ด๋“ฏ ์ถ”์ง„ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ์•ผ๋‹น๊ณผ์˜ ๋Œ€ํ™”๋‚˜ ์‚ฌํšŒ ๊ฐ๊ณ„ ์˜๊ฒฌ์ˆ˜๋ ด์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ๋Œ€๊ทœ๋ชจ ํ•ด์™ธํŒŒ๋ณ‘์ด๋ผ๋Š” ์ค‘๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •์ฑ…์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‚ฌํšŒ์  ํ•ฉ์˜๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์„ ํ˜•์„ฑํ•ด๊ฐ€๋ ค๋Š” ๋…ธ๋ ฅ์€ ๊ธฐ์šธ์—ฌ์ง€์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. This article examines domestic political discussions about the deployment of South Korean armed forces to Vietnam during the 1960s, focusing especially on the role of the National Assembly. A series of deployment were decided and carried out, without significant efforts to build social consensus. The oppositions pursued national interest which was often defined according to their own political interests. Some hardliners, in particular, strongly opposed the deployment under the banner of clear-cut opposition. This attitude reflected deep-seated suspicions about the Park Chung Hee government. The rivalry among the opposition groups vying for a superior position also constituted another reason. The government and the ruling party, on the other hand, pushed ahead with the plan to send troops to Vietnam. Their original motive was to prevent withdrawal of US forces from Korea. As the Johnson administration repeated the request for more Korean troops, however, the Korean government began to try to reap more practical benefits of deployment including both military and economic benefits. In this process, however, the government made little effort to build social consensus through dialogues with the opposition and various social groups

    Danger and Opportunity of Detente: Park Chung Hee, Kim Dae Jung and their Views of South Korean National Security in the Early 1970s

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    1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ ๊ตญ์ œ์  ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ์˜ ๋ฌผ๊ฒฐ ์†์—์„œ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ•๋Œ€๊ตญ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ธด์žฅ์™„ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์˜คํžˆ๋ ค ํ•œ๊ตญ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ฃผ๋ณ€๊ตญ์—๋Š” ์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ ธ์™”๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ณด์•˜๋‹ค. ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ์œ„ํ˜‘์€ ๋ณ€ํ•จ์ด ์—†๋Š”๋ฐ, ๋™๋งน๊ตญ์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ์˜ ์™ธ๋ถ€์ง€์›์„ ๋” ์ด์ƒ ๊ธฐ๋Œ€ํ•˜๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ์–ด๋ ค์›Œ์กŒ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๋Š” ์ž๋ฆฝ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜๊ณผ ์ž์ฃผ๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๋ ฅ ํ™•๋ณด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋…ธ๋ ฅํ•˜๋Š” ํ•œํŽธ, ์œ„๊ธฐ ์ƒํ™ฉ์—์„œ ์‹œ๊ฐ„์„ ๋ฒŒ๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ถํ•œ๊ณผ์˜ ๋Œ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ์‹œ๋„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๋Š” ์œ„๊ธฐ ์ƒํ™ฉ์— ๋Œ€์‘ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ์  ์ดํ™”๋‹จ๊ฒฐ์„ ์ฃผ์žฅํ•˜๋ฉฐ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋น„์ƒ์‚ฌํƒœ๋ฅผ ์„ ํฌํ•˜๊ณ  ๋‚˜์•„๊ฐ€ ๋Œ€๋‚ด์  ํ†ต์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•ํ™”ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊น€๋Œ€์ค‘์€ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๊ฐ€ ์ •๊ถŒ์•ˆ๋ณด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ์•ˆ๋ณด์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๋ถ€ํ’€๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋น„ํŒํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊น€๋Œ€์ค‘์€ ๊ตญ์ œ์  ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ•๋Œ€๊ตญ ๊ฐ„ ๊ฐ์ถ•์„ ๋ฐฉ์ง€ํ•˜์—ฌ ํ•œ๋ฐ˜๋„ ํ‰ํ™”์˜ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์„ ๋†’์—ฌ์ฃผ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ธ์‹ํ–ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ์นจ๊ณต๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ๋„ ๋‚ฎ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ณด์•˜๋‹ค. ๊น€๋Œ€์ค‘์€ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๋‚จ๋ถ๋Œ€ํ™”์— ๋‚˜์„  ๋™๊ธฐ๋„ ์˜๊ตฌ์ง‘๊ถŒ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ์˜์‹ฌํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹น์‹œ ๋ถํ•œ์€ ๋Œ€๋‚จ๋ฌด๋ ฅ์นจ๊ณต๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ œ๊ฑฐ์™€ ์ฃผํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ตฐ์˜ ์ฒ ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ํ‰ํ™”๊ณต์„ธ์— ์ง‘์ค‘ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๊ฐ€ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์  ์œ„ํ˜‘์„ ๊ณผ์žฅํ•œ ํ˜์˜๋Š” ์ธ์ •๋œ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๊ฐ€ ๋ณด๋‹ค ๋‘๋ ค์›Œํ•œ ์œ„ํ—˜์€ ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ํ‰ํ™”๊ณต์„ธ์™€ ๋Œ€๋‚ด์  ๊ธด์žฅ์ด์™„์ด์—ˆ์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ์˜ ์œ„๊ธฐ๋ก ์ด ์ •๊ถŒ์•ˆ๋ณด์šฉ์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ณ ๋งŒ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜๋Š” ์—†๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ํ†ต์ผ์ „๋žต์ด ํ•œ๊ตญ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๋“ค์˜ ํ†ต์ผํฌ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ๋ถํ•œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋™์กฐ๋กœ ๋“ฑ์น˜์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ์ž˜๋ชป๋œ ์ „์ œ์— ๊ทผ๊ฑฐํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ์Œ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•  ๋•Œ, ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๊ฐ€ ๋ถํ•œ์˜ ์„ ์ „์„ ๋™์„ ํ•„์š” ์ด์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‘๋ ค์›Œํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ํ‰๊ฐ€๋„ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๋‹ค. Facing the wave of international detente in the early 1970s. President Park Chung Hee believed ironically that the relaxation of tension in great power relations brought crises for small countries like South Korea. Under pressure from the perceived weakening of US security commitment and the constant threat from Communist North Korea, Park strove for self-reliant economy and defense. He also started talks with the North as a way to buy time. In addition, he strengthened domestic control, stressing the need of national unity to cope with the crisis. His political opponent Kim Dae Jung criticized Parks apparent inflation of the national security crisis for the sake of regime security. Kim believed that detente reduced the chance of conflicts among great powers and, thereby, heightened the prospect for peace in the Korean peninsula. To him, North Korean attack seemed only a remote possibility. He also suspected Park started North-South talks to ensure his life-long seizure of power. At the time, in order to promote the withdrawal of US forces from Korea and the removal of Park Chung Hee regime, North Korea concentrated on peace offensive rather than military offensive. In view of this unification strategy of North Korea, it is admitted that Park exaggerated the North Korean military threat. Given Parks great fear of North Korean peace offensive and the relaxation of domestic vigilance against it, however, it is hard to conclude that his warning of crisis was only for regime security. Yet, North Koreas unification strategy was based on an illusionary premise of equating South Koreans aspiration for unification with preference for the North. This leaves a question if Park was excessively fearful of North Korean agitation

    From Enemy to Tacit Ally : U.S. Approach to China during the Early Dรฉtente Period

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    ๋ฏธ๊ตญ๊ณผ ์ค‘๊ตญ์€ ์˜ค๋žœ ๋ƒ‰์ „์  ์ƒํ˜ธ๋ถˆ์‹ ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐœ์„ ์„ ๋ชจ์ƒ‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. 1972๋…„ 2์›” ๋‹‰์Šจ ๋Œ€ํ†ต๋ น์˜ ์ค‘๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๋ฌธ๊ณผ ์ƒํ•˜์ด์ฝ”๋ฎˆ๋‹ˆ์ผ€ ๋ฐœํ‘œ๋Š” ๊ทธ ํ•˜์ด๋ผ์ดํŠธ์˜€๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ด๋กœ์จ ๋ฏธ์ค‘๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐœ์„ ์€ ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ๊ธฐ ๊ตญ์ œ์ •์น˜์˜ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์ฃผ๋ชฉ๋ฐ›๋Š” ์‚ฌ๊ฑด์ด ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ธ€์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์™ธ๊ต์— ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋งž์ถ”๋ฉด์„œ 1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ์˜ ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ ๊ตญ๋ฉด์—์„œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ์ค‘๊ตญ๊ณผ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐœ์„ ์„ ์‹œ๋„ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ ์›์ธ๊ณผ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ , ๊ต์„ญ์˜ ๊ณผ์ •์„ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ๋ฏธ์ค‘์ ‘๊ทผ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์•„์šธ๋Ÿฌ ๋‹‰์Šจ ํ–‰์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์™ธ๊ต์ •์ฑ…์ด ์˜ค๋Š˜๋‚ ์˜ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์™ธ๊ต ๋ฐ ๋ฏธ์ค‘๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๋˜์ง€๋Š” ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ํ† ๋ก ํ•œ๋‹ค.Despite their mutual mistrust as Cold War enemies, the United States and China sought rapprochement during the early 1970s. Nixons visit to China in February 1972 was the highlight of such endeavor and one of the most eye-catching events in the dรฉtente period of international politics. Focusing on U.S. foreign policy, this article examines backgrounds against which rapprochement was sought, analyzes the U.S.-China negotiations leading to the Shanghai Communiquรฉ, and assesses the consequences of the negotiations. Some implications for current U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-China relations are also discussed.๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” 2013๋…„ ๋งฅ์•„๋”์žฌ๋‹จ(John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation)์ด ํ›„์›ํ•œ ์žฌ๋‹จ๋ฒ• ์ธ ๋™์•„์‹œ์•„์—ฐ๊ตฌ์›(EAI) ๋™์•„์‹œ์•„ ์•ˆ๋ณด์งˆ์„œ ๋ณ€ํ™˜๊ณผ ํ•œ๊ตญ์™ธ๊ต(East Asias Changing Regional Security Architecture and South Koreas Foreign Policy) ํ”„๋กœ์ ํŠธ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•˜์Œ

    Global Cold War and Northeast Asia

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    ๊ตญ์ œ์  ๋ƒ‰์ „์ด ์ข…์‹๋œ ์ง€ 25๋…„ ๊ฐ€๋Ÿ‰์ด ์ง€๋‚ฌ์ง€๋งŒ ๋™๋ถ์•„์‹œ์•„์—์„œ๋Š” ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ๋ƒ‰์ „์ด ์ž”์กดํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ ์—ญ๋‚ด์˜ ํ‰ํ™”๋กœ์šด ์งˆ์„œ ๊ตฌ์ถ•์„ ์–ด๋ ต๊ฒŒ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ ์—์„œ ์ด ์ง€์—ญ ๋ƒ‰์ „์‚ฌ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ด€์‹ฌ๊ณผ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์˜ค๋Š˜๋‚ ์—๋„ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์˜๋ฏธ๋ฅผ ์ง€๋‹Œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ทจ์ง€์—์„œ ์ด ๊ธ€์€ ๊ตญ์ œ์  ๋ƒ‰์ „์˜ ๋™๋ถ์•„์‹œ์•„ ์ง€์—ญ์œผ๋กœ์˜ ํˆฌ์˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋งž์ถ”๋ฉด์„œ ์ด ์ง€์—ญ์˜ ๋ƒ‰์ „๊ฒฝํ—˜์ด ๊ฐ–๋Š” ํŠน์ง•์„ ์„ธ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ, ๋™๋ถ์•„์‹œ์•„์˜ ๋ƒ‰์ „ ์ด์ „์˜ ์—ญ์‚ฌ์  ๊ฒฝํ—˜์ด ์ด ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ์˜ ๋ƒ‰์ „์— ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ๊ตญ์ œ์  ๋ƒ‰์ „๊ณผ ๋™๋ถ์•„์‹œ์•„ ์ง€์—ญ๋ƒ‰์ „์˜ ์ƒํ˜ธ์ž‘์šฉ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์…‹์งธ, ๋™๋ถ์•„์‹œ์•„ ๋ƒ‰์ „์˜ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์  ํŠน์ง•๊ณผ ๊ทธ ํ˜•์„ฑ๊ณผ์ •์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ๋‹ค.Although the international Cold War ended almost 25 years ago, the Cold War does not completely end in Northeast Asia, making a peaceful regional order difficult to emerge. For this reason, attention to and research on the Cold War in this region holds current importance even today. In this regard, this article examines main features of the Cold War experience in Northeast Asia from three aspects. First, it analyzed how historical experiences before the Cold War affected the actual course of the Cold War in the region. Second, it explains the interplay between the international Cold War and the Northeast Asian Cold War. Third, it examines the distinctive Cold War structure in the region and the process of its construction

    The Space for Liberal Democracy in South Korea: Political Discussions in Sasang-gye during the Early 1960s

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    ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 1960๋…„๋Œ€์˜ ๋ฅผ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๋‹น์‹œ ํ˜„์‹ค์ •์น˜์˜ ๋งฅ๋ฝํ•˜์—์„œ ์ง€์‹์ธ๋“ค์ด ์ž์œ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๊ด€๋…ํ•˜์˜€๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ์‚ดํ•€๋‹ค. ๋ƒ‰์ „๊ณผ ๋‚จ๋ถ๋Œ€๊ฒฐ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ตฌ์กฐ์•„๋ž˜์—์„œ๋„ ๋ฅผ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ์ผ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์‹์ธ๋“ค์ด ์ž์œ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ์‹คํ˜„์„ ๊ฟˆ๊พธ๊ณ  ์„ค๊ณ„ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ง€์‹์ธ๋“ค์€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ๋ณดํŽธ์„ฑ์„ ์ธ์‹ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ, ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ์šฐ๋ฆฌ ๋ฏผ์กฑ์˜ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ์ง„๋กœ์ด์ž ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ •์ฒด์„ฑ์˜ ์š”์†Œ๊ฐ€ ๋˜์–ด์•ผ ํ–ˆ๊ณ , ๋˜ํ•œ ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ๋งŒ ๋ฏผ์กฑ์˜ ์ƒ์กด์„ ๋„๋ชจํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์—ฌ๊ฒผ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์ž์œ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ ์ด๋ฃจ๋Š” ๋‘ ๊ฐœ๋…์ธ ์ž์œ ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์˜ ์ธ์‹์€ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ ์˜ˆ๋ฆฌํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•ด์„œ ์ข…์ข… ๋‘˜์„ ํ˜ผ์šฉํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ, ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ž๋“ค์€ ๋ฏผ์กฑ ๊ฐœ๋…์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ์™€ ์นœํ™”ํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋‚˜ ํ•œ์ผํšŒ๋‹ด์„ ๊ธฐํ™”๋กœ ๋๋‚ด ๊ทธ์™€ ๋ถˆํ™”ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ดํ›„ ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋Š” ๋ฌผ๋ก  ๋ฏผ์กฑ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ๋„ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ ์ •๊ถŒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹ ๋ขฐ๋ฅผ ์ ‘๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋ฉด์„œ ์ •๊ถŒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋น„ํŒ์€ ๋„๋•์ฃผ์˜์  ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์„ ๊ฐ•ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ ๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค.This article examines South Korean intellectuals discussions about liberal democracy during the first half of the 1960s, focusing on an influential magazine, Sasang-gye. Despite the Cold War and the confrontation with North Korea, the Sasang-gye intellectuals dreamed and strived to achieve liberal democracy. Recognizing its universality, they hope liberal democracy to be the new course for the nation and an essential part of the national identity. They also believed democracy was the only way for the nations survival. The Korean intellectuals, however, often failed to distinguish the concepts of liberty and democracy which constitute liberal democracy, and used them interchangeably. The Sasang-gye democrats initially sympathized with Park Chung Hees call for nationalism but began to turn against him when the Park government pushed for the normalization of relationship with Japan. Since then, Sasang-gyes criticism of the government began to bear a moralistic tone

    South Koreas Diplomacy and National Interest in the Early 1970s: An Appraisal Based on Morgenthaus Discussions of National Interest

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    1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ์˜ ๊ตญ์ œ์ •์„ธ๋ฅผ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ดํ•ดํ•˜๊ณ  ๋Œ€์‘ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ๋†“๊ณ  ๋ฒŒ์–ด์ง„ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ์ •๋ถ€์™€ ๊น€๋Œ€์ค‘์˜ ๋…ผ์Ÿ์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ด์ต์˜ ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ •์˜ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ธ๊ณ  ํŽผ์ณ์ง„ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์˜ ์ข‹์€ ์‚ฌ๋ก€์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๋ชจ๊ฒ์†Œ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œํ‚จ ๊ตญ์ต๊ฐœ๋…์„ ์žฌ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ ๊ฒฝ์Ÿํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตญ์ต์˜ ์ƒํ™ฉ์—์„œ ๊ตญ์ต์€ ๊ณผ์—ฐ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋ฌด์—‡์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ํŒ๋‹จํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š”์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ ์„ ์–ป๊ณ ์ž ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ชจ๊ฒ์†Œ์˜ ๊ตญ์ต๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ์ค€์œผ๋กœ ํ–ˆ์„ ๋•Œ, 1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ •์ฑ…์€ ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ธ์ •์  ํ‰๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๋ฐ›์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ฃผํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ตฐ์ฒ ์ˆ˜์™€ ๋ฏธ์ค‘์ ‘๊ทผ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๋Œ€์™ธ์ •์„ธ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๋Š” ์•ˆ๋ณด์œ„๊ธฐ์˜ ์ƒํ™ฉ์œผ๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •ํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ๊ฐ•๋Œ€๊ตญ๊ฐ„ ๊ธด์žฅ์™„ํ™”๋Š” ๋‹จ์ง€ ์ผ์‹œ์ ์ธ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ฏ€๋กœ ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์— ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ์•ˆ๋ณด๋ฅผ ์˜์ง€ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์•ˆ๋œ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ฏฟ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ๋ฐํƒ•ํŠธ๊ฐ€ ๋ƒ‰์ „๋Œ€๋ฆฝ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ์˜ ๊ทผ๋ณธ์  ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ผ๊ธฐ ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ๋Œ€์  ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์ด ์ž ๊น ์ˆจ๊ณ ๋ฅด๊ธฐ์— ๋“ค์–ด๊ฐ„ ์ „์ˆ ์  ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ตญ๋ฉด์— ๋ถˆ๊ณผํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ชจ๊ฒ์†Œ์˜ ์ธ์‹๊ณผ ์ผ์น˜ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์†Œ์ˆ˜์˜๊ฒฌ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ณดํ˜ธ, ๋…ผ์Ÿ์„ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ์‚ฌํšŒ์  ํ•ฉ์˜๊ฐ€ ํ˜•์„ฑ๋˜๋Š” ๊ณผ์ •์„ ์ค‘์‹œํ•œ ๋ชจ๊ฒ์†Œ์˜ ์‹œ๊ฐ์—์„œ ๋ณด๋ฉด, ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ๊ฐ€ ๊ตญ์ต์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์‚ฌํšŒ์  ํ•ฉ์˜๋ฅผ ์ฐฝ์ถœํ•ด๋‚ด๋Š” ๋ฐ ํ•„์š”ํ•œ ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์„ ์ œ๋Œ€๋กœ ํ–‰์‚ฌํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๊ณ  ์–ต์••์ฒด์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•ํ™”ํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์€ ๊ฒฐ์ฝ” ๊ธ์ •์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ‰๊ฐ€๋  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋Š” ๋ฌธ์ œ์ด๋‹ค. In the early 1970s, President Park Chung Hee and the most prominent opposition leader Kim Dae Jung engaged in a heated dispute over the questions of how to understand international deฬtente and how to respond to it. Each leader had different understandings of the international circumstances and policy prescription from the other and claimed that his policy served the national interest. This article reexamines Morgenthaus discussions of the concept of national interest and pays particular attention to the question of how to define national interest in the situation of competing claims of national interest. When judged against the yardstick of national interest as discussed by Morgenthau, some parts of the Park governments policy in the early 1970s can be positively appraised. President Park believed that the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea and the Sino-US rapprochement created a security crisis in Korea. He did not believe that South Koreas national security should rely on temporary and precarious deฬtente between great powers. This belief was in line with Morgenthaus own understanding that deฬtente was a phase of tactical - rather than fundamental - change with which great powers allowed themselves a breathing space in the continuing Cold War confrontation. On the other hand, given Morgenthaus emphasis on the protection of minority opinions and the process of consensus building with regard to national interest, Park Chung Hees record cannot be positively appraised, because rather than making a good effort to play a leadership role for consensus-building Park opted to reinforce repression
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