12 research outputs found

    Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

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    We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required

    Asymptotic nash equilibria in discounted stochastic games of resource extraction

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    A class of two person nonzero-sum nonsymmetric stochastic games of capital accumulation/resource extraction is considered. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium in the discounted games has a limit when the discount factor tends to 1. Moreover, this limit is an epsilon-equilibrium in the discounted game with sufficiently large discount factor

    Wydarzenia grudniowe 1970 roku poza Wybrzeżem

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    NASH EQUILIBRIA IN UNCONSTRAINED STOCHASTIC GAMES OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION

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    A class of nonzero-sum symmetric stochastic games of capital accumulation/resource extraction is considered. It is shown that Nash equilibria in the games with some natural constraints are also equilibrium solutions in unconstrained games and dominate in the Pareto sense an equilibrium leading to exhausting the entire resource stock in the first period of the game.Nonzero-sum stochastic games, capital accumulation problems, resource extraction games, Nash equilibrium
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