Life after crisis for capital and labor in the era of neoliberal globalization

The aim of this paper is to discuss the outcomes of neoliberal globalization from the perspective of labor in the developing countries, with a particular emphasis on the crises that followed the substantial liberalization in capital accounts in the 1990s. Although a lot has been said about the effects of capital account liberalization on the macroeconomic performance of the economies, less attention is paid to the different effects on labor vs. capital. This paper analyses the outcomes of neoliberal globalization for labor in nine developing countries, and focuses on the episodes of crisis as part of the general class struggle where the question on who will carry the burden of adjustment is a part of the struggle. The paper describes the corner stones of the regime of growth in the neoliberal era, by analyzing the trends in growth, investment, unemployment, and labor's share in income, and discusses the effects of the shocks generated by crises on these variables. We empirically test whether the lower wage share has had any effect on unemployment, as the neoclassical theory claims, or whether unemployment is primarily driven by the goods market conditions a la Keynes. An empirical analysis about the cyclical behaviour of labor's share is carried on to understand whether the crises episodes change the effect of demand on distribution. Since the source of growth can also be important on how the generated output is distributed, we also discuss the effects of investment performance on labor's share. Then we proceed with an analysis of the specific consequences of economic policy choices on distribution, in terms of exchange rate and fiscal policies. Finally we discuss the core stones of an alternative policy framework. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness

Fiscal Crisis in Europe or a Crisis of Distribution?

We are in a new episode of the global crisis: the struggle to distribute the costs of the crisis. The financial speculators and corporations are relabeling the crisis as a “sovereign debt crisis” and pressurizing the governments in diverse countries ranging from Greece to Britain to cut spending to avoid taxes on their profits and wealth. In Europe the crisis laid bare the historical divergences. At the root of the problem is the neoliberal model which turned the periphery of Europe into markets for the core. The restrained policy framework, which is based on strict inflation targeting, and which lacks fiscal transfers targeting productive investments in the periphery is the main cause of the divergences. The EU’s current policies are still assuming that the problem is a lack of fiscal discipline and do not question the structural reasons behind the deficits and the “beggar my neighbor” policies of Germany. The deflationary consequences of wage cuts may turn the problem of debt to insolvency for private as well as the public sector.The crisis calls for a major change in policy framework within Europe that places regional and social cohesion at the core of policy making. This is a crisis of distribution and a reversal of inequality at the expense of labor is the only real solution.

Financialisation and physical investment: a global race to the bottom in accumulation?

We estimate the effects of financialisation on physical investment in the developed and developing countries using panel data based on balance-sheets of publicly listed non-financial companies (NFCs) for the period 1995-2015. Among the developed economies, we focus on the cases of the USA, Japan, and a group of Western European countries. In the developing world, we present estimations based on the group of the NFCs in all developing countries as well as BRICS as a group- and country specific estimations for South Africa, South Korea, India, and China. We find robust evidence of an adverse effect of both financial payments (interests and dividends) and financial incomes on investment in fixed assets. The negative impacts of financial incomes are non-linear with respect to the companies’ size; financial income crowds out investment in large companies, and have a positive effect on the investment of only smaller, relatively more credit-constrained companies. Our findings support the ‘financialisation thesis’ that the increasing orientation of the non-financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long term concerns for productivity in both developed and developing countries

Accumulation, distribution and employment: a structural VAR approach to a post-Keynesian macro model

The paper investigates the relation between effective demand, income distribution and unemployment empirically. Its aim is to evaluate Keynesian, Kaldorian and neoclassical hypotheses about the determination of labor market variables. To do so, a vector autoregression model consisting of capital accumulation, capacity utilization, the profit share, unemployment and the growth of labor productivity is estimated. A general post-Keynesian model following the lines of Kalecki and Kaldor is presented and provides the specification for a structural VAR. The model is estimated for the USA, UK and France.Keynesian economics; macroeconomics; capital accumulation; distribution; unemployment; structural vectorautoregression

Wage- versus profit- led growth in the context of international interactions and the political aspects of wage-led recovery

This paper presents the empirical evidence about the impact of the simultaneous race to the bottom in labour’s share on growth after taking global interactions into account based on the Post-Kaleckian theoretical framework developed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). The world economy and large economic areas are likely to be wage-led; and parameter shifts in different periods are unlikely to make a difference in this finding. The effects that can come from a wage-led recovery on growth and hence employment are positive, however they are also modest in magnitude. We then present an alternative scenario based on a policy mix of wage increases and public investment. A coordinated mix of polices in the G20 targeted to increase the share of wages in GDP by 1%-5% in the next 5 years and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country can create up to 5.84% more growth in G20 countries. The final section addresses the political aspects and barriers to a wage-led recovery

The case for a coordinated policy mix of wage-led recovery and public investment in the G20

A coordinated mix of polices in the G20 targeted to increase the share of wages in GDP by 1%-5% in the next 5 years and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country can create up to 5.84% more growth in G20 countries – compared to business as usual

A Brexit deal that minimizes damage for working people?

In this brief we discuss the impact on the economy through five channels via the effects of Brexit on trade, migration, budget deficit, private investment, and the depreciation of the pound. Moving forward, a Brexit deal that minimizes damage for working people would require minimum distortion to the relationship with Europe. This requires negotiating membership to the customs union as well as access to the single market

The working people of the UK are stronger in Europe

The working people in the UK have good reasons to vote to stay in the European Union, but not for the same reasons as the government or the reports from the financial sector and neoliberal thinktanks suggest. The UK should stay in the EU and work to expand the high road policies to the rest of labour. The effects of the pro-labour policies would be a lot stronger if implemented at the European level. A 1%-point increase in the wage share in the EU as a whole increases the GDP in the UK by 0.2%; this is almost double the increase that could be achieved if the UK were to implement these policies alone (Onaran and Obst, 2015). In the context of high road labour market policies, private investment also increases along with wage increases thanks to positive demand effects. The negative impact on trade balance is also more negligible when our trade partners allow their wages and demand increase. Therefore the UK should see the EU membership as an opportunity to increase our area of manoeuvre, use every chance to improve cooperation among pro-labour forces, and lead high road labour market policies in the EU as opposed to its current position of promoting low road policies

The case for a coordinated policy mix of wage-led recovery and public investment in G20

This paper shows that a coordinated mix of polices in the G20 targeted to increase the share of wages in GDP by 1%-5% in the next 5 years and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country can create up to 5.84% more growth in G20 countries (compared to business as usual)

Wage- versus profit-led growth in the context of globalization and public spending: the political aspects of wage-led recovery

This paper presents the empirical evidence about the impact of the simultaneous race to the bottom in labour’s share on growth after taking global interactions into account based on the Post-Kaleckian theoretical framework developed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). The world economy and large economic areas are likely to be wage-led; and parameter shifts in different periods are unlikely to make a difference in this finding. The effects that can come from a wage-led recovery on growth and hence employment are positive, however they are also modest in magnitude. We then present an alternative scenario based on a policy mix of wage increases and public investment. A coordinated mix of polices in the G20 targeted to increase the share of wages in GDP by 1%-5% in the next 5 years and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country can create up to 5.84% more growth in G20 countries. The final section addresses the political aspects and barriers to a wage-led recovery