Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability Insurance Generosity on Labour Market Participation

We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increasein the generosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result oftheir lack of skills and of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely tofind a job. The selection process for treatment is therefore conditional on having alow probability of employment, making evaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult.We exploit the fact that the benefit increase is only available to individuals aged 55or older, estimating its impact using a regression discontinuity approach. Our firstresults indicate a large drop in employment for disabled individuals who receive theincrease in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariates around the eligibility agethreshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DI is not continuous:the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged 55 or over.We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policydecreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observedDI generosity elasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to incomeeffects since benefit receipt is not work contingent in the system studied.labour economics ;

Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability Insurance Generosity on Labour Market Participation

We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in the generosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skills and of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. The selection process for treatment is therefore conditional on having a low probability of employment, making evaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult. We exploit the fact that the benefit increase is only available to individuals aged 55 or older, estimating its impact using a regression discontinuity approach. Our first results indicate a large drop in employment for disabled individuals who receive the increase in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariates around the eligibility age threshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DI is not continuous: the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged 55 or over. We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policy decreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observed DI generosity elasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to income effects since benefit receipt is not work contingent in the system studied.Disability insurance, labour market participation, income effect, regression discontinuity

The monodromy of T-folds and T-fects

We construct a class of codimension-2 solutions in supergravity that realize T-folds with arbitrary $O(2,2,\mathbb{Z})$ monodromy and we develop a geometric point of view in which the monodromy is identified with a product of Dehn twists of an auxiliary surface $\Sigma$ fibered on a base $\mathcal{B}$. These defects, that we call T-fects, are identified by the monodromy of the mapping torus obtained by fibering $\Sigma$ over the boundary of a small disk encircling a degeneration. We determine all possible local geometries by solving the corresponding Cauchy-Riemann equations, that imply the equations of motion for a semi-flat metric ansatz. We discuss the relation with the F-theoretic approach and we consider a generalization to the T-duality group of the heterotic theory with a Wilson line.Comment: 60 pages, 12 figure

Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability Insurance Generosity on Labour Market Participation

We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in thegenerosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skillsand of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. The selectionprocess for treatment is therefore conditional on having a low probability of employment, makingevaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult. We exploit the fact that the benefit increase isonly available to individuals aged 55 or older, estimating its impact using a regressiondiscontinuity approach. Our first results indicate a large drop in employment for disabledindividuals who receive the increase in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariatesaround the eligibility age threshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DIis not continuous: the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged55 or over. We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policydecreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observed DI generosityelasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to income effects since benefitreceipt is not work contingent in the system studied.labour organization;