Harmonization and tax competition: Efficiency versus fairness

Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht unter anderem die Effekte zweier klassischer Prinzipien der internationalen Kapitalbesteuerung auf die Gerechtigkeit und die Effizienz: das Bestimmungslandund das Ursprungslandprinzip. Weiterhin werden die Harmonisierungs- und die Steuerwettbewerbspolitik in der Unternehmensbesteuerung diskutiert, um die wünschenswerte Zukunft in der Besteuerung von Kapitals in Europa darzustellen. Abschließend werden in dem Beitrag die neuen Ansätze in der Kapitalbesteuerung, die gegenwärtig durch die Europäische Kommission unterstützt werden, analysiert und begründet. -- The present paper studies among other issues the effects on equity and efficiency of two classic principles of international capital taxation: the principle of residence and the principle of source. In addition, it discusses harmonization and tax competition policies in corporate taxation, aiming at establishing which should be the future of taxation of capital in Europe. Finally, the paper analyses und justifies the new approaches of levelling the playing field in capital taxation that are currently supported by the European Commission.Europäische Integration,Internationale Finanzwissenschaft,Harmonisierungs- und Steuerwettbewerb,Besteuerung und internationale Kapitalbewegungen,European Integration,International Public Finance,Harmonization and Tax Competition,Taxation and International Capital Flows

Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation

We present a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses several research inputs to invent a new good. These inputs, in turn, must be invented before they can be used by the final innovator. As a consequence, the degree of patent protection affects the revenues and cost of the innovator, but also determines the incentives to invent the research inputs in the first place. We study the effects of increases in the number of required inputs on innovation activity and optimal patent policy. We find that the probability of introducing the final innovation decreases (increases) as the number of inputs increases when inputs are complements (substitutes). We also find that the optimal strength of patents on research inputs is increasing in the degree of substitution between the inputs, but decreasing in the number of inputs for any degree of substitution.

Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.Sequential Innovation, Patent Pools, Anticommons

Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.Sequential Innovation, Patent Policy, Patent Pools, Anticommons, Double Marginalization, Complementary Monopoly