Taking God Seriously, but Not Too Seriously: The Divine Command Theory and William James' 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’

While some scholars neglect the theological component to William James’s ethical views in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” Michael Cantrell reads it as promoting a divine command theory (DCT) of the foundations of moral obligation. While Cantrell’s interpretation is to be commended for taking God seriously, he goes a little too far in the right direction. Although James’s view amounts to what could be called (and what Cantrell does call) a DCT because on it God’s demands are necessary and sufficient for the highest obligations, this is a view with characteristics unusual for a DCT. It only holds for some obligations; on it moral obligation does not derive from God’s authority; it is not obvious that James believes the God required by it even exists; we do not know what God’s demands are; and, finally, since we do not know them, we cannot act on them. (Lest there be any confusion, the titular phrase "taking God seriously, but not too seriously" describes William James' view of God and morality, not my own view.

Church and Ministry From Hippolytus tothe Conciliarists: The Ordained Christian Ministry from the Patristic Era to the Late Middle Ages

(Excerpt) From the age of the church fathers through the late middle ages represents nearly three quarters of Christian history. with all that this involves. Nonetheless. I have been asked to survey what I know about the ordained leadership of the Christian church during this long period. Obviously. much must be omitted. I will endeavor at least to touch on matters which interest me and which I hope will interest you

Firms Merge in Response to Constraints

Theoretical IO models of horizontal mergers and acquisitions make the critical assumption of efficiency gains.Without efficiency gains, these models predict either that mergers are not profitable or that mergers are welfare reducing.A problem here is the empirical observation that on average mergers do not create efficiency gains.We analyze mergers in a model where firms cannot equalize marginal costs and marginal revenues over all dimensions in their action space due to constraints.In this type of model mergers can still be profitable and welfare enhancing while they create a loss in efficiency.The merger allows a firm to relax constraints.Further, this set up is consistent with the following stylized facts on mergers and acquisitions: M&A's happen when new opportunities have opened up or industries have become more competitive (due to liberalization), they happen in waves, shareholders of the acquired firms gain while shareholders of the acquiring firms lose from the acquisition. Standard IO merger models do not explain these empirical observations.Pro/anti-competitive mergers;efficiency defence;constraints;merger waves;deregulation

Technological progress and unemployment

welfare;technoligical change;unemployment

Competitive Pressure, Selection and Investments in Development and Fundamental Research

This paper analyses the effects of competitive pressure on a firm's incentives to undertake both fundamental research and development. It presents a new framework incorporating the selection effect of product market competition, the Schumpeterian argument for monopoly power, the Nickell/Porter argument for competitive pressure and the infant industry argument for protection. The key insight is that the effects of competitive pressure on a firm's incentives to innovate depend on the firm's efficiency level relative to that of its opponents. Finally the effects of competitive pressure on industry wide fundamental research and development are analyzed. It turns out that there is a trade off between development and fundamental research: a rise in competitive pressure cannot raise both types of innovative activity at the industry level.Competition;R&D;Selection

Balance of Power

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players.This theory of conduct predicts that entry by new firms leads to a less aggressive outcome if it creates a balance of power. A balance of power is created if more players get technologies that are close to the most efficient technology.Using a related argument, we show that an increase in entry costs can lead to more aggressive outcomes.pricing games;Folk theorem;refinement of predicted outcomes;supergames;contestable market