Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians’ preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries’ actually experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita growth, de facto JI positively influences it.economic growth, rule of law, judicial independence

Joint implementation: sacrifices or opportunities for China?

The extent to which non-Annex I countries would work together with Annex I countries in combating global warming would be contingent on Annex I countries really taking the lead in reducing their GHG emissions and providing adequate technology transfer and financing. This is the best means of encouraging developing country participation and convincing hitherto sceptical countries of joint implementation (JI) as a cost-effective climate measure. Moreover, given the breadth of the subject of JI and its close linkage with national sovereignty, global political agenda, and national development priorities, a wide and successful implementa¬tion of JI will be conditional upon the consensus on a variety of operational issues such as the form of JI, criteria for JI, the establish¬ment of baselines against which the effects of JI projects can be measured, and the verification of emission reductions of JI projects. Even if such a consensus would be reached, given the fact that AIJ/JI remains virtually unknown to the majority of social and economic sectors in China as in most developing countries, it is still unrealistic to expect that AIJ/JI projects with China work as smoothly and fast as the developed countries wish. This underlines the need to promote JI through pilot projects in China's interest and capacity building in China in order to make JI gain ground and provide mutual benefits to all the parties involved. Furthermore, the extent of China's cooperation on JI will to some extent depend on the certainties about climate change. This in turn underlines the need for the scientific community to continue its efforts to clarify the scientific basis for climate change problem in order to lower the uncertainties about its magnitude, timing and regional patterns.Joint implementation; cost-effective climate policy; carbon taxes; China

Chang, Ji-Mei

University of Southern California, Department of Curriculum, Teaching, & Special Education, 1989, Ph.D. University of Southern California, School of Education, 1978, M.S. National Chengchi University, Department of Education, 1970, B.A.https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/erfa_bios/1002/thumbnail.jp

Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

De jure judicial independence (JI) is the single most important predictor of de facto JI. In this paper, we describe under what conditions countries are likely to include JI in their constitutions. We describe and analyze both their original choice in this regard as well as change over time using a newly constructed dataset comprised of 100 countries and covering the years between 1950 and 2005. Three results stand out. First, legal origins do have an impact on the likelihood of explicitly anchoring JI in the constitution: countries belonging to the common law tradition are less likely to implement JI in their constitutions (and those with a socialist tradition are more likely to do so). Correspondingly, former British colonies are less likely to address JI explicitly as are states in the Caribbean. Second, religion has a significant impact on whether JI is included in the constitution: societies experiencing a high level of religious fractionalization are not only less likely to anchor JI in their constitutions, but are also less likely to change their constitutions in that direction later on. Finally, Muslim countries are more likely to include mention of JI, whereas Protestant countries are less likely to do so. Third, the distribution of resources within societies has important—and largely unexpected—effects: a higher percentage of family farms, a wider distribution of education, and a higher percentage of urban dwellers are all connected with a lower likelihood of JI being mentioned in the constitution.Judicial Independence, Constitutional Choice, Constitutional ChangeJudicial Independence, Constitutional Choice, Constitutional Change

Explaining de facto Judicial Independence

A high degree of de facto judicial Independence (JI) functions as a crucial precondition of governments to credibly commit to legislative decisions, such as respecting private property rights. Thus, de facto JI should improve the allocative efficiency and may therefore contribute positively to economic growth. But JI as formally written down in legal texts is an imperfect predictor for de facto JI. This paper tries to identify the forces which determine de facto JI. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant. A rigorous empirical model reduction process is used in order to cope with the potential excess of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables for de facto JI that survive the reduction process are de jure JI, legal confidence of the public, extent of democratization, degree of press freedom, and the religious beliefs of the population.Judicial independence, informal institutions, formal institutions

Explaining de facto judicial independence.

De facto judicial Independence (JI) seems to be highly and robustly significant for economic growth. But JI as formally written down in legal texts is a imperfect predictor for de facto JI. This paper thus tries to identify the variables, which determine de facto JI.. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions