Axiomatic Attribution for Multilinear Functions

We study the attribution problem, that is, the problem of attributing a change in the value of a characteristic function to its independent variables. We make three contributions. First, we propose a formalization of the problem based on a standard cost sharing model. Second, we show that there is a unique attribution method that satisfies Dummy, Additivity, Conditional Nonnegativity, Affine Scale Invariance, and Anonymity for all characteristic functions that are the sum of a multilinear function and an additive function. We term this the Aumann-Shapley-Shubik method. Conversely, we show that such a uniqueness result does not hold for characteristic functions outside this class. Third, we study multilinear characteristic functions in detail; we describe a computationally efficient implementation of the Aumann-Shapley-Shubik method and discuss practical applications to pay-per-click advertising and portfolio analysis.Comment: 21 pages, 2 figures, updated version for EC '1

Attribution analysis of property portfolios

This paper aims to clarify the potential confusion about the application of attribution analysis to real estate portfolios. Its three primary objectives are: · To review, and as far as possible reconcile, the varying approaches to attribution analysis evident in the literature. · To give a clear statement of the purposes of attribution analysis, and its meaning for real-world property managers. · To show, using real portfolio data from IPD's UK performance measurement service, the practical implications of applying different attribution methods

(Mis)Attribution Symposium: Government Speech

In this Essay, I evaluate three issues of attribution and misattribution that arise in the so-called area of government speech. \u27 First, I explore when an individual might have a constitutional claim for misattribution by the state. Second, I discuss the citizen\u27s interest in proper attribution by the government when it is speaking. Third, I consider the government\u27s interest in avoiding expression being improperly attributed to it. This concern arises less often than is commonly assumed; what many scholars (and governments) claim to be a state interest in avoiding attribution or endorsement is in fact a state interest in not providing a platform for certain types of private speech. As such, the matter cannot be resolved according to the categories of public forum or government speech, and instead we must decide how much content-based decision- making is appropriate for the state when creating speech opportunities that fall into neither of these more doctrinally understandable forms

Front Cover

Collage on Exploring the Legacies of War designed by Candido Salinas. Image Attributions Cover collage public domain images: commons.wikimedia.org Doves image: © Didier Devèze / photodeprovence.com This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License. Machine gun image: © Israel Defense Forces / idfblog.com This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License. Cassegrain antenna image: © L. Chang This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic License. Drone image: © Corporal Steve Fellows RAF/MOD Cell tower image: © M.O. Stevens This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License

A Theory of Attribution

Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann (2000)) values of the dual of the implied cooperative game. Random order consistency does not use a reduced game. Restricted potentials facilitate identification of proportional value derivatives and coalition formation results. Attributions of econometric model performance, using data from Fair (1978), show stability across models. Proportional marginal attribution (PMA) is found to correctly identify factor relative importance and to have a role in model construction. A portfolio attribution example illuminates basic issues regarding utility attribution and demonstrates investment applications. PMA is also shown to mitigate concerns (e.g., Thomas (1977)) regarding strategic behavior induced by linear cost attribution.Coalition formation; consistency; cost allocation; joint effects; proportional value; random order model; relative importance; restricted potential; Shapley value and variance decomposition

Graph attribution through sub-graphs

We offer an alternative to the standard formalisation of attributed graphs. We propose to represent an attributed graph as a graph with a marked sub-graph, in which the sub-graph represents the data domain, rather than as a tuple of graph and algebra. This is a general construction which can be shown to preserve adhesiveness of categories; it has the advantage of uniformity and gives more flexibility in defining data abstractions. We show equivalence of our formalisation with the standard one, under a suitable encoding of algebras as graphs

Team formation and biased self-attribution

We analyze the impact of individuals' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the workplace. We consider a two periods model in which workers jointly decide whether to form a team or work alone. We assume workers' abilities are unknown. Agents update their beliefs about abilities after receiving a signal at the end of the first period. We show that allowing workers to learn about their abilities undermines cooperation when a fixed allocation of the group outcome is assumed. Consistent with the latter finding, we establish that making learning about workers' abilities less accessible increases workers' cooperation and welfare. When workers suffer from selfserving attribution, cooperation among agents is undermined whatever the allocation rule considered for the group outcome. We analyze possible solutions to insufficient teamwork. We find that team contracts based on a revelation game can improve cooperation as well as the presence of a manager in the team. Full efficiency is however never achieved. Our paper establishes a basic framework to analyze necessary psychological conditions for individuals to form teams. We apply our model to coauthorship and to organizational issues