Systematic review of studies of mental health nurses' experience of anger and of its relationships with their attitudes and practice

IntroductionEmotional regulation is important in mental health nursing practice but individual emotions may require different regulation strategies. There is ample evidence that nurses experience anger specifically during their work, for example when experiencing patient aggression. It is, therefore, important to consolidate what is known about how anger manifests in mental health nursing practice.AimWe aimed to systematically identify, evaluate, and synthesise results from studies about mental health nurses and anger, where anger was measured objectively.MethodsSystematic literature review based on PRISMA guidelines.Results.We identified 12 studies. A range of validated and non-validated instruments were used. Mental health nurses may have lower levels of anger than normative samples but anger is commonly reported as an issue for them. Anger was studied in relation to its links with i) clinical management of patients, notably violence containment; and ii) employment issues more generally, notably job motivation. Anger is related to nurses’ attitudes about the acceptability of coercion but there is no evidence that it results in more coercion.Implications for practiceNurses should be aware of the potential influence of anger on their practice. Anger, specifically, should be considered when supporting mental health nurses, for example in clinical supervision. Emotional regulation training should target anger

Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice

Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston Church shooting, Gandhi, and King, she claims that we should choose love instead of anger – not only in our intimate relationships but also in the political realm. Buddhist monk and scholar, Śāntideva, argued that anger is an obstacle to love. Anger leads to suffering. Love frees us from suffering. All this makes an initially compelling case against anger at racial injustice. In addition, although philosophers Jeffrie Murphy and Antti Kauppinen argue that anger communicates self-respect and valuing, respectively––they make no connection between agape love and anger. In this essay I’ll show that the love King and others have in mind––agape love––is not only compatible with anger at hateful racists and complicit others, but finds valuable expression in such anger

Anger and assaultiveness of male forensic patients with developmental disabilities : links to volatile parents

This study with 107 male forensic patients with developmental disabilities investigated whether exposure to parental anger and aggression was related to anger and assaultiveness in a hospital, controlling for background variables. Patient anger and aggression were assessed by self-report, staff-ratings, and archival records. Exposure to parental anger/aggression, assessed by a clinical interview, was significantly related to patient self-reported anger, staff-rated anger and aggression, and physical assaults in hospital, controlling for age, intelligence quotient, length of hospital stay, violent offense history, and childhood physical abuse. Results are consonant with previous findings concerning detrimental effects of witnessing parental violence and with the theory on acquisition of cognitive scripts for aggression. Implications for clinical assessment and cognitive restructuring in anger treatment are discussed

Valuing Anger

It is widely acknowledged that susceptibility to suitable emotional responses is part of what it is to value something. Indeed, the value of at least some things calls for such emotional responses – if we lack them, we don’t respond appropriately to their value. In this paper, I argue that susceptibility to anger is an essential component of valuing other people, ourselves, and our relationships. The main reason is that various modes of valuing, such as respect, self-respect, and love, ground normative expectations towards others and ourselves. And holding someone accountable for violating legitimate normative expectations involves emotions from the anger family, such as resentment and indignation. I hold that such forms of anger, which aim at getting the target to conform to expectations or lower their unduly elevated status, are neither inherently problematic or dispensable parts of the package of attitudes involved in valuing. Finally, thinking about anger’s role in valuing also helps see when it is out of place or immature – roughly, it is often excessive, because we easily exaggerate the magnitude of the value involved, the harm or threat to it, or the degree of the target’s moral responsibility

"On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice"

Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences that epistemic injustices repeatedly manufacture and explain the obvious: silencing practices produce angry experiences. I focus on tone policing and tone vigilance to illustrate the relationship between silencing and angry knowledge management. Next, I use María Lugones’s pluralist account of anger to bring out the epistemic dimensions of knowing resistant anger in a way that also calls attention to their histories and felt textures. The final section draws on feminist scholarship about the transformative power of angry knowledge to suggest how it might serve as a resource for resisting epistemic injustice

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the co-activation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, while disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation

The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation

Anger: the unrecognized emotion in emotional disorders

Anger plays a prominent definitional role in some psychological disorders currently widely scattered across DSM‐5 categories (e.g., intermittent explosive disorder, borderline personality disorder). But the presence and consequences of anger in the emotional disorders (e.g., anxiety disorders, depressive disorders) remain sparsely examined. In this review, we examine the presence of anger in the emotional disorders and find that anger is elevated across these disorders and, when it is present, is associated with negative consequences, including greater symptom severity and worse treatment response. Based on this evidence, anger appears to be an important and understudied emotion in the development, maintenance, and treatment of emotional disorders.First author draf

The Errors and Limitations of Our “Anger-Evaluating” Ways

In this chapter I give an account of how our judgments of anger often play out in certain political instances. While contemporary philosophers of emotion have provided us with check box guides like “fittingness” and “size” for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by themselves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, inconsistently, and erroneously. If anger—particularly anger in a political context—can provide information and spark positive change or political destruction, then we have moral reasons to evaluate it properly. But can we? And what are the limitations and errors we often face when evaluating anger? I will begin by laying out the ways in which we evaluate emotions and the moral and epistemic errors we attribute to the angry agent in judgments of disapproval. Then I attempt to answer the question: How do we judge political anger improperly? An improper evaluation, in my view, does not take into account relevant information that is needed to evaluate the anger. An overly generous, uninformed, biased, or selfish process of evaluation produces an improper evaluation. We see this occur when we immediately evaluate anger. I will also identify two social discursive practices of improper evaluation as well as the moral and epistemic errors committed when anger evaluators participate in these practices

Piloting a ward anger rating scale for older adults with mental health problems

Aggression, including physical assault, is a significant problem in providing services for older people with mental health problems. A range of bio-psycho-social correlates of aggressive behaviour have been explored in this client group, but little attention has been given to the role of anger as an activator of aggression, despite its demonstrated predictive association with aggression in other clinical populations. In this pilot study, a staff-rated anger measure was administered to 27 inpatients in a specialist service for older people with mental health problems. The Anger Index was found to have high internal consistency and inter-rater reliability, and it showed robust concurrent and discriminant validity with comparison measures completed by independent raters. Higher anger scores were associated with organic diagnoses, history of aggression, and hospital assault data. The potential role of anger in the activation of aggression, the utility of anger assessment in the evaluation of risk, and the value of therapeutic approaches for aggression problems in older adult patients are discussed