Adverse Selection in Credit Markets: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

We test if riskier borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates than safer borrowers are as predicted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The data are from an Indian financial institution where interest rates are determined by competitive bidding. The government imposed an interest rate ceiling in 1993 and then relaxed the ceiling in 2002. Changes in default patters are analyzed before and after each of these policy changes. We find no evidence of adverse selection despite the use of collateral as a screening device. This study isolates adverse selection from moral hazard and controls for information on riskiness observed by the lender but not by the researcher.Defaults, Risk, Auctions, Asymmetric Information

Adverse Selection in Credit Markets: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

We test if riskier borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates than safer borrowers are as predicted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The data are from an Indian financial institution where interest rates are determined by competitive bidding. The government imposed an interest rate ceiling in 1993 and then relaxed the ceiling in 2002. Changes in default patters are analyzed before and after each of these policy changes. We find no evidence of adverse selection despite the use of collateral as a screening device. This study isolates adverse selection from moral hazard and controls for information on riskiness observed by the lender but not by the researcher.Defaults, Risk, Auctions, Asymmetric Information

Darwinian Adverse Selection

We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology. The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices. The agents' objective is to ensure their individual survival over time or, equivalently, to maximize profits. In equilibrium, however, rational agents who maximize their objective survival probability are, individually and collectively, eliminated by the forces of competition. Instead of rationality, there emerges a unique distribution of irrational players who are individually not fit for the struggle of survival. The selection of irrational players over rational ones relies on the fact that all rational players coordinate on the same optimal action, which leaves them collectively undiversified and thus vulnerable to aggregate risks.Comment: Maximization, Rationality, Economics, Biology, Group Selectio

Adverse reactions of amiodarone

Adverse drug reaction is defined by the World Health Organization as any response to a drug that is noxious and unintended and occurs at a dose normally used in man. Older people are at elevated risk of adverse drug reactions-because of changes in pharmacodynamics, concurrent use of multiple medications and the related drug interactions. However, adverse drug reactions are significantly underestimated in the elderly population that is also exposed to inappropriate drugs. Amiodarone is an antiarrhythmic drug used commonly for the treatment of atrial fibrillation and is increasingly prescribed in older people. While amiodarone is an efficient drug for rhythm control, it's a carrier of different adverse reactions, and pro and cons must be carefully evaluated before its use especially in older people

Prospective review of 30-day morbidity and mortality in a paediatric neurosurgical unit

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to record the 30-day and inpatient morbidity and mortality in paediatric patients in a tertiary neuroscience centre over a 2-year period. The intentions were to establish the frequency of significant adverse events, review the current published rates of morbidity in paediatric neurosurgical patients and propose three clinical indicators for future comparison. Methods: All deaths and adverse events were prospectively recorded from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015. Each adverse event was categorised, allocated a clinical impact severity score and linked to a neurosurgical procedure wherever possible. Where a patient suffered several adverse events in the same admission, each event was recorded separately. If a patient had been discharged home, an adverse event was recorded if it occurred within 30 days of admission. Results: Five hundred forty-nine procedures were performed in 287 patients (aged <16 years). One hundred thirty significant adverse events were identified. The following are the three clinical indicators: significant adverse event rate: 111 (20.2%) operations were linked to at least one significant adverse event; unscheduled return to theatre rate: 81 (14.8%) operations were associated with an adverse event that resulted in an unscheduled return to theatre; and surgical site infection rate: 29 (5.3%) operations were associated with an infection. Conclusion: Complications and adverse events are common in paediatric neurosurgery. Prospective, continuous surveillance will promote both quality assurance and quality improvement in the neurosurgical care delivered to patients

Testing for Adverse Selection into Private Medical Insurance

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine privatehealth insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider apurely private system or a system in which private insurance supplementsa public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately fundedhealth care is substitutive of the publicly funded one. Using a model ofcompetition among insurers, we generate predictions about the correlationbetween risk and the probability of taking private insurance under bothsymmetric information and adverse selection. These predictions constitutethe basis for our adverse selection test. The theoretical model is also usefulto conclude that the setting that we focus on is especially attractive to testfor adverse selection. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we findevidence that adverse selection is present in this market. We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine privatehealth insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider apurely private system or a system in which private insurance supplementsa public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately fundedhealth care is substitutive of the publicly funded one. Using a model ofcompetition among insurers, we generate predictions about the correlationbetween risk and the probability of taking private insurance under bothsymmetric information and adverse selection. These predictions constitutethe basis for our adverse selection test. The theoretical model is also usefulto conclude that the setting that we focus on is especially attractive to testfor adverse selection. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in this market