Research exercise: Analyzing the Actual Malice Standard in New York and Virginia Defamation Cases

Public figures suing the press for defamation must show that the journalist acted with knowledge that the material was false or recklessly disregarded evidence of the truth. This is what is known as actual malice. These papers analyze the actual malice standard as applied in defamation cases against the press in New York and Virginia state courts. Also considered are the circumstances under which actual malice would be required in a defamation case brought against a blogger.https://ecommons.udayton.edu/stander_posters/1399/thumbnail.jp

Toll v. Dist. Ct. (Gilman), 135 Nev., Advanced Opinion 58 (December 5, 2019)

A blogger claimed that his sources are protected under NRS 49.275. The court held that digital media is protected, but did not address whether a blogger is protected. The district court did not err in allowing discovery to determine whether the blogger acted with actual malice

Critical Error: Courts\u27 Refusal To Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts

Rules of civil procedure have been examined extensively for their intended and unintended effects on case outcomes. Little attention, however, has been given to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (Rule 52(a))-its clear error standard of review-and how appellate courts apply or avoid it when examining substantive legal doctrine. Specifically, when confronted with cases involving actual malice and intentional race discrimination determinations, courts take markedly different approaches. While demanding a full reevaluation of facts in the actual malice context, appellate courts invariably apply the far more deferential clear error standard to a trial court\u27s factual findings regarding intentional race discrimination. This inconsistent approach between intentional race discrimination and actual malice findings is neither doctrinally sound nor institutionally defensible

Fabricated Quotations--Facts Or Falsehoods - Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of certain defendants in a defamation and invasion of privacy action. In doing so, the court resolved the case on an actual malice basis and concluded that lies are constitutionally protected in some instances. This Note analyzes the court\u27s reasoning with respect to the proper standard to be applied in defamation actions. The analysis reveals that the court\u27s resolution was flawed in that it should have decided the defamation issue first. A finding that the quotations in question were not defamatory would have made it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue of actual malice. In conclusion, the court\u27s decision shields conscious lies which cause injury a result not intended by the Supreme Court when it fashioned the actual malice test

Gag with Malice

This Article brings agriculture privacy and other commercial gagging laws into the ongoing debate on the First Amendment actual malice rule announced in New York Times v. Sullivan. Despite a resurgence in contemporary jurisprudence, Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch have recently questioned the wisdom and viability of Sullivan, which originally applied actual malice to state law defamation claims brought by public officials. The Court later extended the actual malice rule to public figures, to claims for infliction of emotional distress, and—as discussed in this Article—to claims for invasion of privacy and to issues of public importance or concern. United States v. Alvarez recently identified the significance of Sullivan and the actual malice rule when announcing First Amendment protection for false speech. Alvarez notably excluded defamation from the categories of protected false speech. No federal district or circuit court that has applied Alvarez to agriculture privacy laws has considered Sullivan or the actual malice rule. Agriculture privacy laws are a type of gag law that seek to: (i) prevent the use of misrepresentations to gain access, employment, or unauthorized entry; (ii) prevent unauthorized or nonconsensual use of video, audio, and photographic cameras or recorders if there was an intent to cause harm to the enterprise; or (iii) impose a duty to submit recordings of animal or agriculture abuse. Some of the legislative histories of these laws demonstrate an intent to prevent undercover investigations into or exposés on the industry. Arkansas has applied a similar type of gag to all commercial businesses. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are currently split on the scope of Alvarez’s protection against agriculture privacy and commercial gagging laws. This Article demonstrates how Sullivan and the actual malice rule also balance the First Amendment right of privacy and press to gather and disseminate information about public matters. Part I introduces agriculture privacy and commercial gagging laws. Part II deliberates the civil rights roots and recent resurgence of Sullivan in contemporary jurisprudence. Part III contemplates how Sullivan alleviates First Amendment deficiencies that gagging courts left unaddressed, particularly with regard to the effect of gagging laws on undocumented workers and others in the marketplace of ideas about commercial food production

New York Times v. Sullivan at 50: Despite Criticism, the Actual Malice Standard Still Provides Breathing Space for Communications in the Public Interest

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the landmark Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan. With the benefit of a 50-year perspective, this article focuses on three related aspects of the Sullivan decision. First, it arose from and provided protection for the emerging civil rights movement in the south. Second, the defamation-based attack on the civil rights movement caused the Court to depart from the common law and adopt the “actual malice” standard for recovery in defamation actions brought by public officials. In this article, we also explore the legal origins of that standard. Finally, the article considers both the criticism and the overall benefit of the actual malice standard as it has been applied through the years. We explore the application of the standard in a variety of contexts, including to blog articles, to overcome state law conditional privileges, in labor disputes, and in federal legislation to protect reports of suspicious air-transportation activity. We conclude that the actual malice standard has succeeded in providing “breathing space” for communications made in the public interest

Prima Facie Tort: Is Actual Malice Necessary?

Marcus v. Textron, 177 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.Ct. 1958)

Actual Malice: Twenty-Five Years After \u3cem\u3eTimes v. Sullivan\u3c/em\u3e

A Review of Actual Malice: Twenty-Five Years After Times v. Sullivan. by W. Wat Hopkin

Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts

Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal To Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts raises a novel double standard: while fact-specific trial court findings of actual malice are reviewed under the “independent judgment” standard (a wholesale re-weighting of the trial court record and decision) on appeal, intentional race discrimination findings are reviewed under the far more deferential Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 clear error standard. Both legal concepts are arrived at through assessing state-of-mind determinations; both directly trigger constitutional proscriptions. Only actual malice, however, is classified as a constitutional fact, thus taking it out of the more deferential standard of review

Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts

Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal To Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts raises a novel double standard: while fact-specific trial court findings of actual malice are reviewed under the “independent judgment” standard (a wholesale re-weighting of the trial court record and decision) on appeal, intentional race discrimination findings are reviewed under the far more deferential Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 clear error standard. Both legal concepts are arrived at through assessing state-of-mind determinations; both directly trigger constitutional proscriptions. Only actual malice, however, is classified as a constitutional fact, thus taking it out of the more deferential standard of review