Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training

A worker's output depends not only on his/her own ability but also on that of colleagues, who can facilitate the performance of tasks that each individual cannot accomplish on his/her own. We show that this common-sense observation generates monopsony power and is sufficient to explain why employers might expend resources on training employees even when the training is of use to other firms. We show that training will take place in better-than-average or ‘good’ firms enjoying greater monopsony power, whereas ‘bad’ firms will have low-ability workers unlikely to receive much training

Does profit sharing increase training by reducing turnover?

We test the theoretical prediction that profit sharing reduces worker separations and by doing so increases the incidence of training. Using individual level UK data, we confirm that profit sharing is a robust determinant of lower separation rates and of greater training incidence. Critically, we cannot confirm the predicted link between separations and training. Instead, the evidence supports alternative theories suggesting a direct link between profit sharing and training. Our results suggest that profit sharing changes employer-worker relations in a way that leads to greater formal and informal investment in worker skills but that this is independent of its influence on reducing separations.

Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?

Nominally free, unrestricted training in portable computer skills is offered by the majority of U.S. temporary help supply (THS) establishments, a practice that is inconsistent with the competitive model of training. This paper asks why temporary help firms provide free general skills training. The answer proposed is that in addition to skills formation, training plays an informational role at THS firms by eliciting private information about worker ability. The model is built on the premise that training is more productive and therefore valuable to high ability workers. Firms offer a package of training and initially lower wages that induces self-selection. Workers of high perceived ability choose training in anticipation of a steeper wage profile while low ability workers are deterred by limited expected gains. Firms profit from their sunk training investment via their short-run informational advantage about ability and thereby limited monopsony power. Market competition among THS firms reduces employer rents, yielding higher wages and more training. Detailed tests of the model using representative establishment data on wages and training find strong support. The analysis demonstrates that beyond providing spot market labor, THS firms gather and sell information about worker quality to clients. The rapid growth of THS as a labor market information broker implies that the demand for worker screening is rising.

Do Some Employers Share the Costs and Benefits of General Training?

[Excerpt] One of the central propositions of the human capital theory of on-the-job training is that workers pay all the costs and receive all the benefits of general training (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1996, Filer, Hammermesh and Rees 1996, Borjas 1996, Kaufman 1986). Since general training raises a worker\u27s ability to be productive in other organizations as well as the one providing the training, the training firm must pay a wage commensurate with the trained worker\u27s new higher level of productivity if they are to prevent the loss of their trained workers. Since the workers, not the firm, get the benefits of the training, firms [will] provide general training only if they [do] not have to pay any of the costs (Becker 1962 p. 13). Since the training is of value to prospective trainees, equilibrium in the training market requires that employees pay for general on-the-job training by receiving wages below what could be received elsewhere (Becker 1962 p. 13) in a job offering no training. Is this correct? Do Workers pay all the costs of training in skills that are technically general (i.e. useful at other firms)--WPAC for short? Do workers receive all the benefits of general training ( WRAB for short)

Is There a Role for Public Support of Incumbent Worker On-the-Job Training?

States have begun to use training subsidies as a policy tool for employment retention and business competitiveness. This paper summarizes a survey of states concerning their investments in incumbent worker training. Altogether, states are investing about $550 to$800 million, which is perhaps one percent or less of total private sector training costs. The paper further discusses a study conducted for one state in which we found significant fiscal returns implying that underinvestment of public funds for incumbent worker training may be occurring. In this state, primary sector jobs were created or retained at a public cost of less than $9,000 per job; a cost that rivals or bests most economic development initiatives.incumbant, worker, on-the-job training, ojt, hollenbeck

Challenges to Fair Elections 5: Poll Worker Training

If elections are the foundation of our democracy, then poll workers are the gears and wheels that make the mechanics of democracy function on Election Day. Regrettably, this human factor is often overlooked and under-supported. States squeak by each year with a bare minimum of poll workers who receive inadequate training for an increasingly complex task. Recent surveys, press accounts, and troubled primary elections attest to the problem

Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training

Recent human capital theories predict that labor market frictions and product market competition influence firm-sponsored training. Using matched worker-firm data from Dutch manufacturing, our paper empirically assesses the validity of these predictions. We find that a decrease in labor market frictions significantly reduces firms’ training expenditures. Instead, product market competition does not have an effect on firm-sponsored training. We conclude that increasing competition through international integration and globalization does not pose a threat to investments in on-the-job training. An increase in labor market flexibility may reduce incentives of firms to invest in training, but the magnitude of this effect is small.firm-sponsored training, labor market frictions, product market competition, matched worker-firm data

Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers' mobility.

We analyze a model where a multinational fir can use a superior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after training a local worker. Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment arise when this worker is later hired by a local firm Pecuniary spillovers arise when the foreign affiliat pays the trained worker a higher wage to prevent her from moving to a local competitor. We study conditions under which these spillovers occur. We also show that the multinational fir might fin it optimal to export instead of investing abroad to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets or the payment of a higher wage to the trained worker.Multinational corporations; Externalities; Spillovers; Training; Labor movility;

Key worker services for disabled children: what characteristics of services lead to better outcomes for children and families?

Background: Research has shown that families of disabled children who have a key worker benefit from this service and recent policy initiatives emphasize the importance of such services. However, research is lacking on which characteristics of key worker schemes for disabled children are related to better outcomes for families. Methods: A postal questionnaire was completed by 189 parents with disabled children who were receiving a service in seven key worker schemes in England and Wales. Path analysis was used to investigate associations between characteristics of the services and outcomes for families (satisfaction with the service, impact of key worker on quality of life, parent unmet need, child unmet need). Results: The four path models showed that key workers carrying out more aspects of the key worker role, appropriate amounts of contact with key workers, regular training, supervision and peer support for key workers, and having a dedicated service manager and a clear job description for key workers were associated with better outcomes for families. Characteristics of services had only a small impact on child unmet need, suggesting that other aspects of services were affecting child unmet need. Conclusions: Implications for policy and practice are discussed, including the need for regular training, supervision and peer support for key workers and negotiated time and resources for them to carry out the role. These influence the extent to which key workers carry out all aspects of the key worker's role and their amount of contact with families, which in turn impact on outcomes