Auction-Based Distributed Resource Allocation for Cooperation Transmission in Wireless Networks

Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized control. In this paper, we propose two share auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the resource allocation among users. We prove the existence, uniqueness and effectiveness of the auction results. In particular, the SNR auction leads to a fair resource allocation among users, and the power auction achieves a solution that is close to the efficient allocation.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Washington, DC, November 26 - 30, 200

VCG-based time-slot auctioning in IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA wireless mesh networks

In this paper, we study the problem of bandwidth resource allocation in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA based wireless mesh network, and propose an auction based framework in which the gateway, equipped with the precious high speed Internet connection, serves as the auctioneer while the first-level mesh routers (MRs) (i.e., those with direct wireless connections to the gateway) act as bidders competing resources among each other. We then present Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) based auction approaches to allocate time-slots among MRs. Through simulations, we find that the proposed VCG algorithms can achieve much better throughput and connection blocking probability performance than traditional resource allocation approaches in a non-cooperative environment. ©2009 IEEE.published_or_final_versionThe 5th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM 2009), Beijing, China, 24-26 September 2009. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2009, p. 1-

Relay auction algorithms for downlink bandwidth allocation in IEEE 802.16-based OFDM/TDMA wireless mesh networks

In this paper, we study the problem of downlink bandwidth allocation in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA based wireless mesh network, and propose an auction based framework in which the gateway, equipped with the precious high speed Internet connection, serves as the auctioneer while the first-level mesh routers (MRs) (i.e., those with direct wireless connections to the gateway) act as bidders competing resources among each other. We then present two novel relay auction (RA) approaches to allocate time-slots among MRs and analyze the bidding strategy using the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. Through simulations, we find that the proposed RA algorithms can achieve competitive performance in terms of resource allocation efficiency compared with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) approaches, while having the capability to strike a proper balance between efficiency and fairness by adjusting the payment function. Specifically, with a smaller payment parameter value, the RA algorithms can also achieve much better connection blocking probability performance than VCG algorithms.published_or_final_versionThe 4th International Conference on Communications and Networking in China (ChinaCOM 2009), Xian, China, 26-28 August 2009. In Proceedings of ChinaCOM, 2009, p. 1-

Joint Channel Selection and Power Control in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks: A Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit Framework

This paper deals with the problem of efficient resource allocation in dynamic infrastructureless wireless networks. Assuming a reactive interference-limited scenario, each transmitter is allowed to select one frequency channel (from a common pool) together with a power level at each transmission trial; hence, for all transmitters, not only the fading gain, but also the number of interfering transmissions and their transmit powers are varying over time. Due to the absence of a central controller and time-varying network characteristics, it is highly inefficient for transmitters to acquire global channel and network knowledge. Therefore a reasonable assumption is that transmitters have no knowledge of fading gains, interference, and network topology. Each transmitting node selfishly aims at maximizing its average reward (or minimizing its average cost), which is a function of the action of that specific transmitter as well as those of all other transmitters. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed adversarial bandit game, in which multiple players receive an a priori unknown reward with an arbitrarily time-varying distribution by sequentially pulling an arm, selected from a known and finite set of arms. Since players do not know the arm with the highest average reward in advance, they attempt to minimize their so-called regret, determined by the set of players' actions, while attempting to achieve equilibrium in some sense. To this end, we design in this paper two joint power level and channel selection strategies. We prove that the gap between the average reward achieved by our approaches and that based on the best fixed strategy converges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated equilibria. We further characterize this set for two special cases of our designed game