A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance

I present an account of deterministic chance which builds upon the physico-mathematical approach to theorizing about deterministic chance known as 'the method of arbitrary functions'. This approach promisingly yields deterministic probabilities which align with what we take the chances to be---it tells us that there is approximately a 1/2 probability of a spun roulette wheel stopping on black, and approximately a 1/2 probability of a flipped coin landing heads up---but it requires some probabilistic materials to work with. I contend that the right probabilistic materials are found in reasonable initial credence distributions. I note that, with some normative assumptions, the resulting account entails that deterministic chances obey a variant of Lewis's 'principal principle'. I additionally argue that deterministic chances, so understood, are capable of explaining long-run frequencies

The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection

A core insight of the legal realists was that many disputes are indeterminate. For example, in many appellate adjudications, respectable legal arguments can be made for both sides of the dispute. A contemporary reaction to the realist insight by critical legal scholars is expressed in the slogan Law is politics. This critical slogan might be elaborated as follows: in openly political activities, such as the legislative process or partisan elections, debate centers on issues of value and social vision that are outside the scope of legal reasoning. Judicial opinions merely dress up political decisions in the garb of legal reasoning. The realist insight and critical reaction challenge conventional notions about the selection of appellate judges on the basis of merit-a combination of legal expertise and judicial temperament. If appellate judges really render decisions on the basis of politics, then why should judges be selected (or elected) on the basis of merit? In his essay, Judging in a Corner of the Law, Professor Schauer has gone so far as to suggest that appellate judges need not be lawyers and certainly need not be experienced or excellent lawyers. Moreover, Schauer maintains, the skills and knowledge desirable in appellate judges are not even taught in law schools

Dilating and contracting arbitrarily

Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily

Indeterminacy in a Forward Looking Regime Switching Model

This paper is about the properties of Markov switching rational expectations (MSRE) models. We present a simple monetary policy model that switches between two regimes with known transition probabilities. The first regime, treated in isolation, has a unique determinate rational expectations equilibrium and the second contains a set of indeterminate sunspot equilibria. We show that the Markov switching model, which randomizes between these two regimes, may contain a continuum of indeterminate equilibria. We provide examples of stationary sunspot equilibria and bounded sunspot equilibria which exist even when the MSRE model satisfies a 'generalized Taylor principle'. Our result suggests that it may be more difficult to rule out non-fundamental equilibria in MRSE models than in the single regime case where the Taylor principle is known to guarantee local uniqueness.

Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView

Understanding the New Keynesian model when monetary policy switches regimes

This paper studies a New Keynesian model in which monetary policy may switch between regimes. We derive sufficient conditions for indeterminacy that are easy to implement and we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy, provided by Davig and Leeper, is necessary but not sufficient. More importantly, we use a two-regime model to show that indeterminacy in a passive regime may spill over to an active regime no matter how active the latter regime is. As a result, a passive monetary policy is more damaging than has been previously thought. Our results imply that the propagation of shocks in an active regime, such as that of the Federal Reserve in the post-1982 period, may be substantially affected by the possibility of a return to a passive regime of the kind that was followed in the 1960s and 1970s.

Understanding the New-Keynesian Model when Monetary Policy Switches Regimes

This paper studies a New-Keynesian model in which monetary policy may switch between regimes. We derive sufficient conditions for indeterminacy that are easy to implement and we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy, provided by Davig and Leeper, is necessary but not sufficient. More importantly, we use a two-regime model to show that indeterminacy in a passive regime may spill over to an active regime, no matter how active the latter regime is. As a result, a passive monetary policy is more damaging than has been previously thought. Our results imply that the propagation of shocks in an active regime, such as that of the Federal Reserve in the post-1982 period, may be substantially affected by the possibility of a return to a passive regime of the kind that was followed in the 1960s and 1970s.

Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience

At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true that, looking backwards, it was the case that there would be a sea battle? This tension forms, in large part, what might be called the problem of future contingents. A dominant trend in temporal logic and semantic theorizing about future contingents seeks to validate both intuitions. Theorists in this tradition--including some interpretations of Aristotle, but paradigmatically, Thomason (1970), as well as more recent developments in Belnap, et. al (2001) and MacFarlane (2003, 2014)--have argued that the apparent tension between the intuitions is in fact merely apparent. In short, such theorists seek to maintain both of the following two theses: (i) the open future: Future contingents are not true, and (ii) retro-closure: From the fact that something is true, it follows that it was the case that it would be true. It is well-known that reflection on the problem of future contingents has in many ways been inspired by importantly parallel issues regarding divine foreknowledge and indeterminism. In this paper, we take up this perspective, and ask what accepting both the open future and retro-closure predicts about omniscience. When we theorize about a perfect knower, we are theorizing about what an ideal agent ought to believe. Our contention is that there isn’t an acceptable view of ideally rational belief given the assumptions of the open future and retro-closure, and thus this casts doubt on the conjunction of those assumptions