Conditional Cooperation: Disentangling Strategic from Non-Strategic Motivations

We use a novel experimental design to examine the role of reputational concerns in explaining conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. By using the strategy method in a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma in which the probabilistic end is known, we can distinguish between strategically and non-strategically motivated cooperation. Second movers who are strong reciprocators ought to conditionally cooperate with first movers irrespective of whether the game continues or not. In contrast, strategically motivated second movers conditionally cooperate only if the game continues and they otherwise defect. Experimental results, with two different subject pools, indicate reputation building is used around 30% of the time, which accounts for between 50% and 75% of all realized cooperative actions. The percentage of strong reciprocators varied between 6% to 23%.cooperation;reputation building;strong reciprocity;repeated prisoners’ dilemma

Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation

We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called endgame effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which endgame effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.reputation building;strong reciprocity;conditional cooperation;strategic cooperation

Boolean functions: noise stability, non-interactive correlation distillation, and mutual information

Let $T_{\epsilon}$ be the noise operator acting on Boolean functions $f:\{0, 1\}^n\to \{0, 1\}$, where $\epsilon\in[0, 1/2]$ is the noise parameter. Given $\alpha>1$ and fixed mean $\mathbb{E} f$, which Boolean function $f$ has the largest $\alpha$-th moment $\mathbb{E}(T_\epsilon f)^\alpha$? This question has close connections with noise stability of Boolean functions, the problem of non-interactive correlation distillation, and Courtade-Kumar's conjecture on the most informative Boolean function. In this paper, we characterize maximizers in some extremal settings, such as low noise ($\epsilon=\epsilon(n)$ is close to 0), high noise ($\epsilon=\epsilon(n)$ is close to 1/2), as well as when $\alpha=\alpha(n)$ is large. Analogous results are also established in more general contexts, such as Boolean functions defined on discrete torus $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n$ and the problem of noise stability in a tree model.Comment: Corrections of some inaccuracie

Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation

We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.reputation building, strong reciprocity, conditional cooperation, strategic cooperation

Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas

Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.cooperation, social dilemmas, community choice, punishment, voting with feet

Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non-sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous and the former shows a higher level of truth-telling but lower material payoffs. It is shown that our experimental findings are consistent with the equilibrium analysis of a logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who perceive non-monetary lying costs as senders and non-monetary costs when being lied to as receivers and one consisting of payoff maximizers.Experiment, Sender-receiver games, Strategic information transmission, Institutional selection