4 research outputs found
New Weaknesses in the Keystream Generation Algorithms of the Stream Ciphers TPy and Py
The stream ciphers Py, Py6 designed by Biham and Seberry were promising candidates in the
ECRYPT-eSTREAM project because of their impressive speed. Since their publication in April
2005, a number of cryptanalytic weaknesses of the ciphers have been discovered. As a
result, a strengthened version Pypy was developed to repair these weaknesses; it was
included in the category of `Focus ciphers\u27 of the Phase II of the eSTREAM competition.
However, even the new cipher Pypy was not free from flaws, resulting in a second redesign.
This led to the generation of three new ciphers TPypy, TPy and TPy6. The designers claimed
that TPy would be secure with a key size up to 256 bytes, i.e., 2048 bits. In February
2007, Sekar \emph{et al.\ }published an attack on TPy with data and comparable
time. This paper shows how to build a distinguisher with key/IVs and one
outputword for each key (i.e., the distinguisher can be constructed within the design
specifications); it uses a different set of weak states of the TPy. Our results show that distinguishing attacks with complexity lower than the brute force
exist if the key size of TPy is longer than 268 bits. Therefore, for
longer keys, our attack constitutes an academic break of the cipher.
Furthermore, we discover a large number of similar bias-producing
states of TPy and provide a general framework to compute them. The
attacks on TPy are also shown to be effective on Py
ElsieFour: A Low-Tech Authenticated Encryption Algorithm For Human-to-Human Communication
ElsieFour (LC4) is a low-tech cipher that can be computed by hand; but unlike many historical ciphers, LC4 is designed to be hard to break. LC4 is intended for encrypted communication between humans only, and therefore it encrypts and decrypts plaintexts and ciphertexts consisting only of the English letters A through Z plus a few other characters. LC4 uses a nonce in addition to the secret key, and requires that different messages use unique nonces. LC4 performs authenticated encryption, and optional header data can be included in the authentication. This paper defines the LC4 encryption and decryption algorithms, analyzes LC4\u27s security, and describes a simple appliance for computing LC4 by hand
Weaknesses in the Pseudorandom Bit Generation Algorithms of the Stream Ciphers TPypy and TPy
The stream ciphers Py, Py6 were designed by Biham and Seberry for the ECRYPT-eSTREAM project in 2005. However, due to several recent cryptanalytic attacks on them, a strengthened version Pypy was proposed to rule out those attacks. The ciphers have been promoted to the ‘Focus ’ ciphers of the Phase II of the eSTREAM project. The impressive speed of the ciphers make them the forerunners in the competition. Unfortunately, even the new cipher Pypy was found to retain weaknesses, forcing the designers to again go for modifications. As a result, three new ciphers TPypy, TPy and TPy6 were built. Among all the members of the Py-family of ciphers, the TPypy is conjectured to be the strongest. So far, there is no known attack on the TPypy. This paper shows that the security of TPypy does not grow exponentially with the key-size. The main achievement of the paper is the detection of input-output correlations of TPypy that allow us to build a distinguisher with 2 281 randomly chosen key/IVs and as many outputwords (each key generating one outputword). The cipher TPypy was claimed by the designers to be secure with keysize up to 256 bytes, i.e., 2048 bits. Our results establish that the TPypy fails to provide adequate security if the keysize is longer than 35 bytes, i.e., 280 bits. Note that the distinguisher is built within the design specifications of the cipher. Because of remarkable similarities between the TPypy and the TPy, our attacks are shown to be effective for TPy also. The paper also points out how the other members of the Py-family (i.e., TPy6, Py6, Pypy and Py6) are also weak against the current and some existing attacks