281,357 research outputs found

    Informational Warfare

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    Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that reputation was an important mediator of access to resources in ancestral human environments. Reputations were built and maintained by the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the actions and capabilities of group members-that is, by gossiping. Strategic gossiping would have been an excellent strategy for manipulating reputations and thereby competing effectively for resources and for cooperative relationships with group members who could best provide such resources. Coalitions (cliques) may have increased members' abilities to manipulate reputations by gossiping. Because, over evolutionary time, women may have experienced more within-group competition than men, and because female reputations may have been more vulnerable than male reputations to gossip, gossiping may have been a more important strategy for women than men. Consequently, women may have evolved specializations for gossiping alone and in coalitions. We develop and partially test this theory

    A discourse in conflict : resolving the definitional uncertainty of cyber war : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

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    Since emerging in academic literature in the 1990s, definitions of ‘cyber war’ and cyber warfare’ have been notably inconsistent. There has been no research that examines these inconsistencies and whether they can be resolved. Using the methodology of discourse analysis, this thesis addresses this research need. Analysis has identified that the study of cyber war and cyber warfare is inherently inter-disciplinary. The most prominent academic disciplines contributing definitions are Strategic Studies, Security Studies, Information and Communications Technology, Law, and Military Studies. Despite the apparent definitional uncertainty, most researchers do not offer formal definitions of cyber war or cyber warfare. Moreover, there is little evidentiary basis in literature to distinguish between cyber war and cyber warfare. Proximate analysis of definitions of cyber war and cyber warfare suggests a high level of inconsistency between dozens of definitions. However, through deeper analysis of both the relationships between definitions and their underlying structure, this thesis demonstrates that (a) the relationships between definitions can be represented hierarchically, through a discourse hierarchy of definitions; and (b) all definitions share a common underlying structure, accessible through the application of a structural definition model. Crucially, analysis of definitions via these constructs allows a foundational definition of cyber war and cyber warfare to be identified. Concomitantly, use of the model identifies the areas of greatest inter-definitional inconsistency and the implications thereof and contributes to the construction of a taxonomy of definitions of cyber war and cyber warfare. Considered holistically, these research outputs allow for significant resolution of the inconsistency between definitions. Moreover, these outputs provide a basis for the emergence of dominant functional definitions that may aid in the development of policy, strategy, and doctrine

    Not Just Cyberwarfare

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    © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015Bringsjord and Licato provide a general meta-argument that cyberwarfare is so different from traditional kinetic warfare that no argument from analogy can allow the just war theory of Augustine and Aquinas (hereinafter called JWT) to be pulled over from traditional (modern) warfare to cyberwarfare. I believe that this meta- argument is sound and that it applies not just to cyberwarfare: in particular, on my reading of the meta-argument, argument from analogy has never been adequate to allow JWT to be applied to the kind of warfare that we are familiar with now.Peer reviewedSubmitted Versio

    The Technology of Terror: Accounting for the Strategic Use of Terrorism

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    To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other groups do not. In this chapter, we argue that disgruntled groups face three main choices when addressing their dissatisfaction: suffering a disadvantageous peace, engaging in unconventional warfare, or engaging in conventional warfare. We further disaggregate the choice of unconventional warfare into terrorism and guerrilla warfare. By focusing on asymmetrical aspects of the problem and the strategic interactions between the insurgent group, its complicit public, and the superior force of the state, we disentangle the technology of terror.

    Violence and warfare in prehistoric Japan

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    The origins and consequences of warfare or largescale intergroup violence have been subject of long debate. Based on exhaustive surveys of skeletal remains for prehistoric hunter-gatherers and agriculturists in Japan, the present study examines levels of inferred violence and their implications for two different evolutionary models, i.e., parochial altruism model and subsistence model. The former assumes that frequent warfare played an important role in the evolution of altruism and the latter sees warfare as promoted by social changes induced by agriculture. Our results are inconsistent with the parochial altruism model but consistent with the subsistence model, although the mortality values attributable to violence between hunter-gatherers and agriculturists were comparable

    War’s Tragic Pawn

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    Students, faculty, and local art buffs packed Schmucker Art Gallery here at Gettysburg College on October 25th to hear CWI Director, Peter Carmichael talk about visual depictions of warfare. The talk was given as a part of the ongoing exhibition, “The Plains of Mars: European War Prints 1500-1815,” which features an array of war prints depicting a range of both heroic and tragic moments of warfare. This semester I have been closely studying and writing about 19th-century images of warfare to help curate a photography exhibit for this summer’s CWI Conference, so I was intrigued by what Dr. Carmichael had to say about the artwork of war. [excerpt

    Training and education for network centric warfare : issues for New Zealand's Defence Force : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University

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    The concept of Network centric warfare (NCW) is viewed as the next revolution in military affairs. Its introduction globally will necessarily affect the way the New Zealand Armed Forces operates in future conflicts. With the increasing use of digital technology in the military environment the need for and degree of increasing knowledge of Network Centric Warfare and its concepts must be explored.This country will have to combine its own definition and understanding of NCW into the framework of its Armed Force if it wants to continue to remain interoperable with technologically advanced coalition forces. This thesis looks into the issues and solutions which have been considered by other countries in their attempts to implement the NCW concept. It examines in detail how issues and solutions could be applied to New Zealand's attempt at NCW. Chapters One and Two define the academic processes which have been used in this study. They also give a brief introduction to the broad idea of Network Centric Warfare and its origins. Chapter Three examines in detail the complex evolution of the concept of Network Centric Warfare to its present state. In particular, it looks at how the events of September 11th 2001 have redefined warfare and the impact of that revolution on the traditional NCW concept. This chapter also focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of NCW which have now been proven through the experiences of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These two conflicts have been described as the first information technology wars of the 21st century. Chapter Four focuses on how the concept of Network Centric Warfare has and will affect the specifics of personnel and make-up of the New Zealand Defence Force, as it makes the transition from a Platform centric to a Network Centric approach in warfare. The special focus in this chapter is on the New Zealand Army. The concepts of the ethos and cultural identity of a force are introduced here, with a view to revealing the influences that the adaptation of NCW methods and techniques can have on the organisation of that force. The discussion concludes that the introduction of NCW can have profound and permanent effect on a force's ethos and identity. This chapter also considers the influence of technology can help in the recruitment and retention of highly skilled people in the Army. Chapter Five shows how the adoption of the concept of Network Centric warfare also has the potential to fundamentally change the way in which higher level policy and doctrine are introduced and modified in the Armed Forces. This chapter looks at how future infrastructure and policies will need to have increased flexibility built into them from the start in order to embrace the demands of NCW for rapid developments in information technology and force-wide diffusion of such developments. Chapter Six discusses a third important consequence of adopting the concept of Network Centric Warfare. Namely, how the introduction of NCW will affect both training and education of service personnel. In particular, it examines how the change from Platform Centric to Network Centric forms of warfare puts changing demands on the skill sets and needs required of service personnel. Examples are given of the new skill sets needed in order for them to work effectively in a NCW environment. Chapter Seven discusses the formation of a new training branch of service which will need to be set up to accommodate the new methods and skills that NCW brings to the battlefield. Included in this chapter are the imperatives of Information Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations for such a branch. Alongside Air, Land, Sea and Space NCW brings with it the creation of a fifth battle space. This battle-space is cyberspace which encompasses the electromagnetic sphere, the Internet and all manner of Wide and Local Area Networks (WANs and LANs). Chapter Eight returns to the issue of training and education introduced in Chapter Six, but focuses specifically on the use of simulation techniques and technologies. Such techniques will be required in order to help train soldiers to work effectively and efficiently under NCW. Why other training methods won't work well given an NCW environment, and why simulation technologies will work, is explained with examples of each. This chapter argues in particular that simulation provides the most effective training in the unified data architecture that will be needed to provide cross platform capability and inter and intra service solutions in Network Centric Warfare. Examples of data solutions are provided to help explain the underlying simulation concepts and methods. Chapter Nine is the conclusion of this study. It reviews the results of this thesis and provides recommendations on the implementation of the Network Centric Warfare environment required in the New Zealand Armed Forces

    All-pay war

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    We study a model of war in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield (as in standard models), but because the involved countries lack information about their opponent. In our model their production and military technologies are common knowledge, but their resources are private information. Each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium the country with a comparative advantage in warfare allocates all resources to warfare for low resource levels and follows a non-decreasing concave strategy thereafter. The opponent allocates a constant fraction of its resources to warfare for low resource levels and follows an increasing non-linear strategy thereafter. From an ex ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is likely to win the war unless its military technology is much weaker than the opponent’s.Conflict; war; all-pay auction; private information
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