Understanding Trust

Several papers study the effect of trust by using the answer to the World Values Survey (WVS) question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" to measure the level of trust. Glaeser et al. (2000) question the validity of this measure by showing that it is not correlated with senders' behavior in the standard trust game, but only with his trustworthiness. By using a large sample of German households, Fehr et al. (2003) find the opposite result: WVS-like measures of trust are correlated with the sender's behavior, but not with its trustworthiness. In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

Pre- and post-selection, weak values, and contextuality

By analyzing the concept of contextuality (Bell-Kochen-Specker) in terms of pre-and-post-selection (PPS), it is possible to assign definite values to observables in a new and surprising way. Physical reasons are presented for restrictions on these assignments. When measurements are performed which do not disturb the pre- and post-selection (i.e. weak measurements), then novel experimental aspects of contextuality can be demonstrated including a proof that every PPS-paradox with definite predictions implies contextuality. Certain results of these measurements (eccentric weak values with e.g. negative values outside the spectrum), however, cannot be explained by a "classical-like" hidden variable theory.Comment: Identical content; stream-lined verbal presentatio

Inequality of Happiness: Evidence of the Compression of the Subjective-Well-Being Distribution with Economic Growth

The use of Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) measures in economics research has grown markedly (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). This has come about for at least two reasons. First, the measures have been systematically validated as reliable for examining a range of questions. Second, economists have long relied on income as a proxy for wellbeing. However, research shows that there are potentially large slippages between economic indicators and wellbeing (Diener and Seligman 2004). Thus, SWB measures have become an important alternative proxy for wellbeing. Indeed, SWB measures have also caught the attention of policy makers. The OECD launched the Better Life Index in 2011 as an alternative wellbeing measure; and the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy formed the Stiglitz Commission in 2008 to identify the limits of gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of wellbeing and to identify alternative measures (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010). When studying the distribution of income, economists have long recognized the importance of examining measures of central tendency and dispersion, as the latter are necessary to understand income inequality and poverty (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010). Thus, there is a vast literature analyzing both the first and second moments of the distribution of income. For example, the Lorenz and Kuznets curves try to model the distribution of income, and the Gini coefficient summarizes the entire distribution in a scalar (see Atkinson 1970; Gastwirth 1972; Gini 1921; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1887; Kuznets 1955; and Lorenz 1905). In contrast, the vast majority of SWB research focuses on mean SWB. Given the current interest in SWB measures, and recognizing that the entire distribution of SWB merits study, we believe it is important to study SWB inequality (dispersion) as well as mean SWB. In this paper, we contribute to the emerging SWB literature by investigating the relationship between economic growth and SWB inequality using data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The results suggest that economic growth is inversely related to SWB inequality in cross-sectional analysis. There is also some evidence from time-series analysis that countries that experience greater economic growth rates also experience the greater decreases in SWB inequality, although this pattern does not hold for two of the fastest growing countries in the dataset. This is important because it indicates that economic growth may reduce SWB inequality over time, even if it does not increase mean SWB. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the results. Section V concludes

Social norms and corruption

We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels

Education, Equity and Social Cohesion : A Distributional Model [Wider Benefits of Learning Research Report No. 7]

This report - the first from the Centre’s comparative strand of research - focuses on the effects of education on social cohesion at the societal level. The research involved two elements. The first was a theoretical analysis and critique of models in the existing international and comparative literature on education, social capital and social cohesion. This led to the development of a new hypothetical model relating skills distribution to social cohesion. The second part of the research used cross-national, quantitative techniques to test the model on aggregated data for 15 countries. The analysis suggests that educational distribution may be a very significant influence on societal cohesion in certain contexts. Improving levels of education alone may not foster social solidarity if inequalities of skill and income persist. The findings here have important policy implications. Existing policies focus on developing the individual resources and competences which will help to build social capital and community cohesion. However, these will not necessarily impact on cohesion at the societal level. Creating a more cohesive society is likely to require policies that are also designed to increase equality through narrowing educational outcomes

On the Interpretation of World Values Survey Trust Question: Global Expectations vs. Local Beliefs

How should we interpret the World Values Survey (WVS) trust question? We conduct an experiment in India, a low trust country, to correlate the WVS trust question with trust decisions in an incentivized Trust Game. Evidence supports findings from one strand of the fractured literature – the WVS trust question captures expectations about others' trustworthiness, though not always. We show that WVS trust question correlates with globally determined stable expectations but does not correlate with short term locally determined fluctuations in beliefs about trustworthiness. One implication of our study is that survey based methods may not be used to measure contextualized beliefs

Social capital across Europe - findings, trends and methodological shortcomings of cross-national surveys

Two sets of issues are elaborated and reflected on. The first one concerns the distribution of stocks of social capital across European (EU) nations. Using the conventional proxies like trust and associational involvement on the basis of data of cross-national surveys (EVS/WVS and ESS) the main tentative trends and patterns are outlined. The second issue refers to the quality of data. Are the findings and indicators reliable and credible? Are the EVS and other available European surveys a methodologically correct and sufficient source of empirical evidence? Concerning the first issue, it is possible to speak of four groups with regard to the distribution of social capital at the European level. In contrast to authors who argue that there are no large differences in mean scores across the national patterns, this analysis arrives at more differentiated conclusions. Between the first and fourth group a very clear borderline can be drawn while differences between the second and third groups are not so pronounced. In the context of the thematising and critical reflection of the validity and comparability of the empirical evidence some errors and inconsistencies were found. It seems that they appeared partly due to the inappropriate technical design of cross-national surveys and also because of the semantic-cultural as well as institutional factors which have not been paid much attention, partly in the stage of preparing and conducting the survey as well as in the phase of interpreting and generalizing of the data. --

Religious Conversion in 40 Countries

Questions about current and prior religion adherence from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey allow us to calculate country-level religious-conversion rates for 40 countries. These conversion rates apply to religion adherence classified into eight major types. In a theoretical model based on rational individual choice, the frequency of religious conversion depends on factors that influence the cost of switching and the cost of having the "wrong" religion. Empirical findings for a panel of countries accord with several hypotheses: religious-conversion rates are positively related to religious pluralism, gauged by adherence shares; negatively related to government restrictions on religious conversion; positively related to levels of education; and negatively related to a history of Communism. Conversion rates are not much related to per capita GDP, the presence of state religion, and the extent of religiosity. Effects from the type of religion adherence are minor, except for a negative effect from Muslim adherence. The empirical results are robust to alternative specifications of the religion groupings used to construct the conversion rates.