The Temporal Dimension of Wage Contracts in Oligopoly with Spillovers

This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and employment. We find that wages are non-monotone in the duration of wage contracts. Furthermore, a positive and one-to-one relation between innovation and union utility exists and both attain their highest value under a long-term contract. Profits may vary depending on the extent of R&D spillovers and the associated raising rivals' cost incentive, although they are highest when union/firms engage in a long-term contractual relation. Testable predictions to discriminate between short-term and long-term contracts are also discussed.Wage contracts; R&D; Spillovers; Raising rivals' cost.

Environmentally induced phenotypic variation in wild yellow-bellied marmots

We thank all the marmoteers who helped in data collection and 2 anonymous reviewers who helped us to clarify our message. AM-C was supported by a Fulbright Fellowship, and JGAM was supported by Fond Québécois de Recherche sur la Nature et les Technologies. KBA was supported by the National Science Foundation between 1962 and 2000. DTB was supported by the National Geographic Society, UCLA (Faculty Senate and the Division of Life Sciences), a Rocky Mountain Biological Laboratory research fellowship, and by the National Science Foundation (IDBR-0754247 and DEB-1119660 to DTB as well as DBI 0242960 and 0731346 to the Rocky Mountain Biological Laboratory).Peer reviewedPostprin

Multi-Region Hemispheric Specialization Differentiates Human from Nonhuman Primate Brain Function

The human behavioral repertoire greatly exceeds that of nonhuman primates. Anatomical specializations of the human brain include an enlarged neocortex and prefrontal cortex (Semendeferi et al. in Am J Phys Anthropol 114:224–241, 2001), but regional enlargements alone cannot account for these vast functional differences. Hemispheric specialization has long believed to be a major contributing factor to such distinctive human characteristics as motor dominance, attentional control and language. Yet structural cerebral asymmetries, documented in both humans and some nonhuman primate species, are relatively minor compared to behavioral lateralization. Identifying the mechanisms that underlie these functional differences remains a goal of considerable interest. Here, we investigate the intrinsic connectivity networks in four primate species (humans, chimpanzees, baboons, and capuchin monkeys) using resting-state fMRI to evaluate the intra- and inter- hemispheric coherences of spontaneous BOLD fluctuation. All three nonhuman primate species displayed lateralized functional networks that were strikingly similar to those observed in humans. However, only humans had multi-region lateralized networks, which provide fronto-parietal connectivity. Our results indicate that this pattern of within-hemisphere connectivity distinguishes humans from nonhuman primates

Dynamic gesture recognition using PCA with multi-scale theory and HMM

In this paper, a dynamic gesture recognition system is presented which requires no special hardware other than a Webcam. The system is based on a novel method combining Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with hierarchical multi-scale theory and Discrete Hidden Markov Models (DHMM). We use a hierarchical decision tree based on multiscale theory. Firstly we convolve all members of the training data with a Gaussian kernel, which blurs differences between images and reduces their separation in feature space. This reduces the number of eigenvectors needed to describe the data. A principal component space is computed from the convolved data. We divide the data in this space into two clusters using the k-means algorithm. Then the level of blurring is reduced and PCA is applied to each of the clusters separately. A new principal component space is formed from each cluster. Each of these spaces is then divided into two and the process is repeated. We thus produce a binary tree of principal component spaces where each level of the tree represents a different degree of blurring. The search time is then proportional to the depth of the tree, which makes it possible to search hundreds of gestures in real time. The output of the decision tree is then input into DHMM to recognize temporal information

The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data

The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual decisions and what the stock market would have dictated in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission’s decisions cannot be solely accounted for by the motive of protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as firms’ influence is concerned, however, our data suggests that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive to firms’ interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors - such as country and industry effects, as well as market definition and procedural aspects - do play significant roles. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Fusionskontrolle: Evidenz anhand von Aktienmarkt-Daten) In diesem Beitrag werden die Bestimmungsfaktoren für Entscheidungen der EUFusionskontrolle untersucht. Für eine Auswahl von 164 Entscheidungen der EUFusionskontrolle werden die wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Folgen dieser Fusionen berechnet. Dies geschieht anhand der Reaktion des Börsenkurses der Konkurrenten auf die Fusion. Erklärt werden anschließend die Abweichungen zwischen den gegenwärtigen Entscheidungen und dem, was die Aktienmärkte im Hinblick auf die politische Ökonomie, in welche die Fälle eingebettet sind, vorgeschrieben hätten. In Bezug auf Fehler vom Typ I (dem Anschein nach Wettbewerb bejahende Fusionen, die verboten wurden) decken die Ergebnisse einige systematische Fehler auf, untermauern jedoch nicht die häufige Behauptung, dass die Kommission auf Kosten der Konsumenteninteressen von den Interessen der Wettbewerber beeinflusst wird. Es werden auch systematische Fehler in Richtung von Fehlern des Typ II (scheinbar wettbewerbseinschränkende Fusionen, die genehmigt wurden) festgestellt, welche von einer Anzahl institutioneller und politischer Eigenschaften der EUEntscheidungsfindung beeinflusst zu sein scheinen. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen die Auffassung, dass wettbewerbseinschränkende Fusionen mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit in Phase I genehmigt werden, wenn sie Unternehmen aus großen Mitgliedstaaten betreffen, jedoch mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit, wenn der relevante Markt national ist. Zudem wird festgestellt, dass die Häufigkeit der genannten Fehler während der Amtszeit von Kommissar Monti gestiegen ist.Merger Control, European Commission, Political Economy, Lobbying, Stock Market Data

The temporal dimension of wage contracts in oligopoly with spillovers

This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and employment. We find that wages are non-monotone in the duration of wage contracts. Furthermore, a positive and one-to-one relation between innovation and union utility exists and both attain their highest value under a long-term contract. Profits may vary depending on the extent of R&D spillovers and the associated raising rivals' cost incentive, although they are highest when union/firms engage in a long-term contractual relation. Testable predictions to discriminate between short-term and long-term contracts are also discussed

On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries

This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the degree of regulatory intervention and entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications industry of OECD countries during the 1990's. We analyze the role of political institutions, government's types and ideological position, industry and consumers’ private interests, as well as the regulatory environment in shaping regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that all these sets of variables help to explain some degree of variability in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, political and regulatory institutions and the pressure of strong incumbent firms are found to be the most important factors. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Zur Politik der Regulierungsreform: Ökonometrische Evidenz für OECD-Länder) In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene Theorieansätze zur Wettbewerbspolitik am Beispiel der Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-Ländern empirisch getestet. Die Rolle der politischen Institutionen, der Regierungstypologie und ihrer ideologischen Positionierung im politischen Spektrum, der privaten Interessen der Industrie und Konsumenten, sowie der Struktur von Regulierungsbehörden wird anhand einer neu entwickelten Datenbank untersucht, um die beobachte Variabilität in der Deregulierungspolitik zwischen OECD-Ländern zu erklären. Es wird gezeigt, dass alle diese verschiedene Faktoren die Deregulierung der Mobilfunksindustrie in OECD-Länder während der 90er Jahren signifikant beeinflusst haben. Die Struktur der politische Institutionen und Regulierungsbehörden sowie der Druck starker Unternehmen im Markt sind jedoch die entscheidenden Faktoren des Deregulierungsprozesses.Political Economy, Regulation, Entry Liberalization, Institutions, Ideology, Private Interests, Mobile Telecommunications, OECD