2 research outputs found
Universal Forgery and Multiple Forgeries of MergeMAC and Generalized Constructions
This article presents universal forgery and multiple forgeries against MergeMAC that has been recently proposed to fit scenarios where bandwidth is limited and where strict time constraints apply. MergeMAC divides an input message into two parts, , and its tag is computed by , where and are PRFs and is a public function. The tag size is 64 bits. The designers claim -bit security and imply a risk of accepting beyond-birthday-bound queries.
This paper first shows that it is inevitable to limit the number of queries up to the birthday bound, because a generic universal forgery against CBC-like MAC can be adopted to MergeMAC.
Afterwards another attack is presented that works with a very few number of queries, 3 queries and computations of , by applying a preimage attack against weak , which breaks the claimed security.
The analysis is then generalized to a MergeMAC variant where is replaced with a one-way function .
Finally, multiple forgeries are discussed in which the attacker\u27s goal is to improve the ratio of the number of queries to the number of forged tags. It is shown that the attacker obtains tags of messages only by making queries in the sense of existential forgery, and this is tight when messages have a particular structure. For universal forgery, tags for arbitrary chosen messages can be obtained by making queries
Small MACs from Small Permutations
The concept of lightweight cryptography has gained in popularity recently, also due to various competitions and standardization efforts specifically targeting more efficient algorithms, which are also easier to implement.
One of the important properties of lightweight constructions is the area of a hardware implementation, or in other words, the size of the implementation in a particular environment. Reducing the area usually has multiple advantages like decreased production cost or lower power consumption.
In this paper, we focus on MAC functions and on ASIC implementations in hardware, and our goal is to minimize the area requirements in this setting. For this purpose, we design a new MAC scheme based on the well-known Pelican MAC function. However, in an effort to reduce the size of the implementation, we make use of smaller internal permutations. While this certainly leads to a higher internal collision probability, effectively reducing the allowed data, we show that the full security is still maintained with respect to other attacks, in particular forgery and key recovery attacks. This is useful in scenarios which do not require large amounts of data.
Our detailed estimates, comparisons, and concrete benchmark results show that our new MAC scheme has the lowest area requirements and offers competitive performance. Indeed, we observe an area advantage of up to 30% in our estimated comparisons, and an advantage of around 13% compared to the closest competitor in a concrete implementation