Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games

We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a strong Nash equilibrium is SigmaP2-complete. We then study practically relevant restrictions that lower the complexity. In particular, we are interested in quantitative and qualitative restrictions of the way each players payoff depends on moves of other players. We say that a game has small neighborhood if the utility function for each player depends only on (the actions of) a logarithmically small number of other players. The dependency structure of a game G can be expressed by a graph DG(G) or by a hypergraph H(G). By relating Nash equilibrium problems to constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs), we show that if G has small neighborhood and if H(G) has bounded hypertree width (or if DG(G) has bounded treewidth), then finding pure Nash and Pareto equilibria is feasible in polynomial time. If the game is graphical, then these problems are LOGCFL-complete and thus in the class NC2 of highly parallelizable problems

On Quasi-Interpretations, Blind Abstractions and Implicit Complexity

Quasi-interpretations are a technique to guarantee complexity bounds on first-order functional programs: with termination orderings they give in particular a sufficient condition for a program to be executable in polynomial time, called here the P-criterion. We study properties of the programs satisfying the P-criterion, in order to better understand its intensional expressive power. Given a program on binary lists, its blind abstraction is the nondeterministic program obtained by replacing lists by their lengths (natural numbers). A program is blindly polynomial if its blind abstraction terminates in polynomial time. We show that all programs satisfying a variant of the P-criterion are in fact blindly polynomial. Then we give two extensions of the P-criterion: one by relaxing the termination ordering condition, and the other one (the bounded value property) giving a necessary and sufficient condition for a program to be polynomial time executable, with memoisation.Comment: 18 page

A Bayesian information criterion for singular models

We consider approximate Bayesian model choice for model selection problems that involve models whose Fisher-information matrices may fail to be invertible along other competing submodels. Such singular models do not obey the regularity conditions underlying the derivation of Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the penalty structure in BIC generally does not reflect the frequentist large-sample behavior of their marginal likelihood. While large-sample theory for the marginal likelihood of singular models has been developed recently, the resulting approximations depend on the true parameter value and lead to a paradox of circular reasoning. Guided by examples such as determining the number of components of mixture models, the number of factors in latent factor models or the rank in reduced-rank regression, we propose a resolution to this paradox and give a practical extension of BIC for singular model selection problems

Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time

Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of factoring. We define a new notion of bounded rationality, where the payoffs of players are discounted by the computation time they take to produce their actions. We use this notion to give a direct correspondence between the existence of equilibria where Alice has a winning strategy and the hardness of factoring. Namely, under a natural assumption on the discount rates, there is an equilibriumwhere Alice has a winning strategy iff there is a linear-time samplable distribution with respect to which Factoring is hard on average. We also give general results for discounted games over countable action spaces, including showing that any game with bounded and computable payoffs has an equilibrium in our model, even if each player is allowed a countable number of actions. It follows, for example, that the Largest Integer game has an equilibrium in our model though it has no Nash equilibria or epsilon-Nash equilibria.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of The First Symposium on Innovations in Computer Scienc