Cross-selling lending and underwriting : scope economies and incentives

We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters’ incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank’s clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business

The Impact of Bank Entry in the Japanese Corporate Bond Underwriting Market

The 1993 Japanese financial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empirically whether underwriting commissions and spreads for corporate bonds fell as a result of this bank entry. The empirical results show that bank entry significantly lowers underwriting commissions. Commissions charged by banks are significantly lower than those charged by investment houses. In contrast, there is no strong evidence that bond spreads are significantly lowered by bank entry. A main bank relationship between the issuing firm and the parent of a bank-owned underwriting subsidiary does not have any significant influence in commission setting or the determination of spreadsfinancial system reform, bank entry, bank share, commission, main bank, spread, underwriting

Relationship Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services

We investigate how banking relationships that combine lending and underwriting services affect the terms of lending, through both loan supply- and loan demand-side effects, and the underwriting costs of debt and equity issues. We capture and control for firm characteristics, including differences in the sequences of firm financing decisions (which we argue are likely to capture important cross-sectional heterogeneity, and which previously have been ignored in the literature). We construct a structural model of lending, which separately identifies loan supply and loan demand. Our approach results in significant improvement in the explanatory power of our regressions when compared to prior studies. We find no evidence that universal banks under-price loans to win underwriting business. Instead, we find that universal banks charge premiums for loans and underwriting services to extract value from combined lending and underwriting relationships. We also find that universal banks (as opposed to stand alone investment banks) enjoy cost advantages in both lending and underwriting, irrespective of relationship benefits. Part of the advantage borrowers may enjoy from bundling products may be a form of liquidity risk insurance, which is manifested in a reduced demand for lines of credit. We also find evidence of a “road show� effect; firms that engage in debt underwritings enjoy loan pricing discounts on the loans that are negotiated at times close to the debt underwritings.

Policy Debates on Public Finance between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan from 1930 to 1936

To appropriate additional sources of fiscal revenue, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) started direct underwriting of new deficit-financing government bond, (GBs) (BOJ underwriting) on November 25, 1932. This paper examines the BOJ's underwriting policymaking process through the use of newly available archived documents from the BOJ and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Evidence from these documents contradicts conventional arguments that the BOJ was forced to underwrite GBs due to Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi's firm request and that it regarded the policy measure as temporary. Instead, the BOJ was confident it could exert monetary control through the market operation of selling underwritten GBs (selling operations). In addition, the BOJ willingly accepted the underwriting, expecting it to reinforce its influence over financial institutions. BOJ policymakers partly forecasted the course of events. First, the BOJ started underwriting during the Takahashi economic policy period (1931-36). Once it started, it was difficult for the BOJ to stop underwriting bonds. The BOJ was forced to continue underwriting deficit-financing bonds because of expanding financial demand. Second the MOF used very complex and irregular budgeting methods beginning with the budget process of fiscal 1936. This created a large deferred fiscal burden that concealed the realities of fiscal deficits.

Foreign entry into underwriting services: evidence from Japan's "Big Bang" deregulation

We examine the impact of foreign underwriting activity on bond markets using issue level data in the Japanese "Samurai" and euro-yen bond markets. Firms choosing Japanese underwriters tend to be Japanese, riskier, and smaller. We find that Japanese underwriting fees, while higher overall on average, are actually lower after conditioning for issuer characteristics. Moreover, firms tend to sort properly in their choice of underwriter, in the sense that a switch in underwriter nationality would be predicted to result in an increase in underwriting fees. Finally, we conduct a matching exercise to examine the 1995 liberalization of foreign access to the "Samurai" bond market, using yen-denominated issues in the euro-yen market as a control. Foreign entry led to a statistically and economically significant decrease in underwriting fees in the Samurai bond market, as spreads fell by an average of 23 basis points. Overall, our results suggest that the market for underwriting services is partially segmented by nationality, as issuers appear to have preferred habitats, but entry increases market competition.Japan

Tying lending and underwriting : scope economies, incentives, and reputation

Informational economies of scope between lending and underwriting are a mixed blessing for universal banks. While they can reduce the cost of raising capital for a firm, they also reduce incentives in the underwriting business. We show that tying lending and underwriting helps to overcome this dilemma. First, risky debt in tied deals works as a bond to increase underwriting incentives. Second, with limitations on contracting, tying reduces the underwriting rents as the additional incentives from debt can substitute for monetary incentives. In addition, reducing the yield on the tied debt is a means to pay for the rent in the underwriting business and to transfer informational benefits to the client. Thus, tying is a double edged sword for universal banks. It helps to compete against specialized investment banks, but it can reduce the rent to be earned in investment banking when universal banks compete against each other. We derive several empirical predictions regarding the characteristics of tied deals. JEL Classification: G21, G24, D4

Investment opportunity set, product mix, and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking

The product mix changes that have occurred in banking organizations during the 1990s provide a natural experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contracts as their mix of businesses changes. Deregulation and new technology have eroded banking organizations’ comparative advantages and have made it easier for nonbank competitors to enter banking organizations’ lending and deposit-taking businesses. In response, banking organizations have shifted their sale mix toward noninterest income by engaging in municipal revenue bond underwriting, commercial paper underwriting, discount brokering, managing and advising open- and close-ended mutual funds, underwriting mortgage-backed securities, selling and underwriting various forms of insurance products, selling annuities, and other investment banking activities via Section 20 subsidiaries. These mix changes could affect firms’ risk and the structure of CEO compensation. The authors find that as the average banking organization tilts its product mix toward fee-based activities and away from traditional activities, equity-based compensation increases. They also find that more risky banks have significantly higher levels of equity-based compensation, as do banks with more investment opportunities. But, more levered banks do not have higher levels of equity-based CEO compensation. Finally, the authors observe that equity-based compensation is more important after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994.

The Tying of Lending and Equity Underwriting

This article examines the practice of tying,' which occurs when an underwriter lends to an issuer around the time of a public securities offering. We examine whether there are efficiencies from tying lending and underwriting which lead to benefits for issuers and underwriters. We find evidence consistent with tying occurring for issues when there are informational economies of scope from combining lending and underwriting. Firms benefit from tying through lower financing costs, as tied issuers receive lower underwriter fees on seasoned equity offerings and discounted loan yield spreads. These financing costs are significantly reduced for non-investment grade issuers, where informational economies of scope from combining lending with underwriting are likely to be large. These results are robust to matching methodology developed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998). For underwriters, tying helps build relationships that augment an underwriter's expected revenues by increasing the probability of receiving both current and future business. Both commercial banks and investment banks tie lending and underwriting and offer price discounts, albeit in different ways, with commercial banks discounting loan yield spreads and investment banks offering reduced underwriter spreads.

Primer on Post-Claims Underwriting

Provides an overview of the practice of insurers investigating policy holders' medical histories after claims are submitted and canceling, rescinding, or limiting coverage. Examines weaknesses in federal and state regulations and their enforcement