Automated Verification of Practical Garbage Collectors

Garbage collectors are notoriously hard to verify, due to their low-level interaction with the underlying system and the general difficulty in reasoning about reachability in graphs. Several papers have presented verified collectors, but either the proofs were hand-written or the collectors were too simplistic to use on practical applications. In this work, we present two mechanically verified garbage collectors, both practical enough to use for real-world C# benchmarks. The collectors and their associated allocators consist of x86 assembly language instructions and macro instructions, annotated with preconditions, postconditions, invariants, and assertions. We used the Boogie verification generator and the Z3 automated theorem prover to verify this assembly language code mechanically. We provide measurements comparing the performance of the verified collector with that of the standard Bartok collectors on off-the-shelf C# benchmarks, demonstrating their competitiveness

A formally verified compiler back-end

This article describes the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler back-end from Cminor (a simple imperative intermediate language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of formal methods applied to the certification of critical software: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well

Survey of Approaches and Techniques for Security Verification of Computer Systems

This paper surveys the landscape of security verification approaches and techniques for computer systems at various levels: from a software-application level all the way to the physical hardware level. Different existing projects are compared, based on the tools used and security aspects being examined. Since many systems require both hardware and software components to work together to provide the system\u27s promised security protections, it is not sufficient to verify just the software levels or just the hardware levels in a mutually exclusive fashion. This survey especially highlights system levels that are verified by the different existing projects and presents to the readers the state of the art in hardware and software system security verification. Few approaches come close to providing full-system verification, and there is still much room for improvement